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ABSTRACT
This research provides an institutional explanation of the practices of external
intervention in the Arab state system from the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1922 to the
Arab Spring.
My explanation consists of two institutional variables: sovereignty and inter-state
borders. I examine the changes in regional and international norms of sovereignty and
their impact on the practices of external intervention in the Arab state system. I also
examine the impact of the level of institutionalization of inter-state borders in the Arab
World on the practices of external intervention. I argue that changes in regional and
international norms of sovereignty and changes in the level of institutionalization of interstate borders have constituted the significant variation over time in both the frequency
and type of external intervention in the Arab state system from 1922 to the present.
My institutional explanation and findings seriously challenge the traditional
accounts of sovereignty and intervention in the Arab World, including the cultural
perspectives that emphasize the conflict between sovereignty, Arabism, and Islam, the
constructivist accounts that emphasize the regional norm of pan-Arabism, the
comparative politics explanations that focus on the domestic material power of the Arab
state, the post-colonial perspectives that emphasize the artificiality of the Arab state, and
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the realist accounts that focus on great powers and the regional distribution of power in
the Middle East.
This research also contributes to International Relations Theory. I construct a new
analytical framework to study the relations between sovereignty, borders, and
intervention, combining theoretical elements from the fields of Role Theory, Social
Constructivism, and Institutionalization. Methodologically, this research includes both
quantitative and qualitative analysis. I conduct content analysis of official documents of
Arab states and the Arab League, Arabic press documents, and Arab political thought. I
also utilize quantitative data sets on international intervention.
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PART 1: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The Arab Spring and Sovereignty
The traditional rules of internal and external sovereignty in the Arab state system1
(absolute supreme authority, non-intervention, mutual recognition, and territorial
integrity), which were the hegemonic rules of the game for at least three decades, have
been seriously contested since the eruption of the Arab Spring in 2011. The recent
practices of popular uprising, civil war, transition to democracy, external intervention,
threats to state’s territorial integrity, non-recognition of ruling regimes and recognition of
opposition groups, embody this change in the rules of sovereignty in the Arab state
system.
It is too early to identify clearly the new rules of sovereignty because they have
yet to reach their high level of institutionalization.2 But the old rules of sovereignty are no
longer the hegemonic rules of the game in the Arab state system. This change is one of

1

Arab state system is the regional inter-state system in the Middle East and North Africa, whose
members are the Arab states. Arab states are the countries that are member of the Arab League.
Israel, Turkey and Iran are non-Arab states and thus they are not included in this research project.
I use international system and international society interchangeably. International society is “a
society composed solely of states and the international organizations formed by states; it excludes
not only individuals and private groups, but also political organizations who are not states or are
not composed of states” (Jackson and Rosberg 1982: 12-13; Bull 1977).
2

“Level of institutionalization” is a common concept in sociology but not in IR. Berger and
Luckmann (1967: 47-92), Huntington (1968), Powell and DiMaggio (1991), Tulbert and Zucker
(1996), and Zucker (1977).
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the major transformations in the structure of the Arab state system since its formation
following the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1922.3
The traditional rule of absolute non-intervention, in particular, is seriously
contested as evidenced in recent practices of intervention conducted by some Arab states
and the Arab League in Syria and Libya. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Jordan have been
intervening in the Syrian civil war, providing military and economic aid to the Syrian
opposition groups. The state of Lebanon is not intervening in the Syrian civil war but
Hezbollah, which is a non-state actor that resides within the sovereign state of Lebanon,
is intervening militarily inside the Syrian territories to help Bashar al-Assad regime to
stay in power.4 The Arab League authorized and called for an international military
intervention in Libya, which later conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) forces, with participation of some Arab states. The Arab League also called
upon the United Nations Security Council to send peacekeeping forces to Syria.5
The traditional rule of diplomatic recognition, regardless of domestic human
rights conditions, is also seriously contested. In reaction to the mass atrocities in Syria,
the Arab League ceased its diplomatic recognition of Assad regime as representative of
the state of Syria. The Arab League imposed political and economic sanctions against
Assad regime and even recognized the Syrian opposition as the formal representative of
the Syrian people. Some Arab states even allowed the Syrian opposition to open
3

On the structure of political systems see Donnelly (2011; 2012).

4

Hezbollah’s military intervention in Syria is an interesting case of military intervention by a
non- state actor.
5

I elaborate more on the Arab Spring and practices of intervention and recognition in Chapter
Eight.
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embassies in their capitals. The Arab League conducted similar policies of diplomatic
recognition against Gadhafi’s Libya.
The current recognition practices in reaction to the mass atrocities in Libya and
Syria are strikingly unprecedented in the Arab state system. This is the first time that the
Arab League suspends one of its members for mass violation of human rights. The Arab
states and the Arab League did not halt their diplomatic recognition or impose political
sanctions against the regime of Hafez Assad in response to its massacre in the Syrian city
of Hama in 1982. The Arab states were also relatively indifferent to Saddam Hussain’s
mass atrocities against the Kurds in Iraq and King Hussain’s mass killings against the
Palestinians during the “Black September” in 1970.
The rule of territorial integrity is also no longer perceived as natural,
unquestionable fact in the Arab state system particularly in Syria and Iraq. Since the fall
of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, the Kurdish minority has intensified its struggle for
self-determination and independence, seriously challenging the territorial integrity of the
state of Iraq. The territorial integrity of Syria is also under serious threat due to the Syrian
civil war.
The idea of redrawing the international borders in the Middle East, which would
have been unthinkable a few years ago, is perceived as a realistic possibility in political,
academic and journalistic circles. In September 28, 2013 the New York Times published
an article titled “Imagining a Remapped Middle East,” expecting the disintegration of
five Arab states (Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia) into fourteen smaller
states.

4

The Arab state system is also experiencing substantive changes in the rules of
internal sovereignty. The popular uprisings in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and
Yemen ended absolute domestic sovereignty in these state—“the right of a government
not to be resisted by its people” (Dobos 2012:1).6 The transition process from absolute
sovereignty to popular sovereignty, however, has yet to be successfully completed
despite the collapse of the old political regimes.7 The military coup against a
democratically elected president in Egypt in July 2013 vividly illustrates the difficulties
in transforming absolute sovereignty into popular sovereignty.
To explain the current changes in the rules and practices of sovereignty, we need
to understand the historical evolution of the rules and practices of sovereignty in the Arab
state system.8 Understanding the historical development of sovereignty helps us to
explain the present transformation of sovereignty. Furthermore, situating the Arab Spring
within the history of sovereignty in the Arab World raises interesting puzzles and
research questions, as we shall see below. The historical framework for the study of the

6

Absoluteness of sovereignty is also “a measure of the scope of the affairs over which a
sovereign body governs within a particular territory…A holder of sovereignty need not be a
sovereign over all matters” (Philpott 2001: 18-19).
7

In Bahrain and Syria, the popular uprisings have not succeeded in overthrowing the old ruling
regimes.
8

To explain the current transformations in the Arab World, scholars have compared the Arab
uprisings and their regional effects with parallel European revolutions in 1989, 1848, or even the
Peace of Westphalia in 1648 (Springborg 2011). Other scholars compare the current transition
processes in the Arab states to Chile and Argentina’s transition to democracy in 1980s and 1990s.
These are indeed valuable comparisons for understanding the current changes in the Arab state
system but this dissertation takes a different path that has yet to be explored. It looks at the
history of the Arab state system itself to understand the current changes in its rules of
sovereignty.

5

Arab Spring is also justified by the particular history of sovereignty in the Arab state
system.
Back to the Future: Sovereignty After Empire
This is not the first time in which the Arab state system experience changes in
internal and external sovereignty. The Arab state system did experience significant
variations in the norms and practices of sovereignty in the past. This is not the first time
the Arab state system suffer from the absence of hegemonic inter-subjective
understandings of sovereignty. Following independence from great powers, the Arab
state system also suffered from the absence of hegemonic inter-subjective understandings
of sovereignty. The current conflicts on the rules of sovereignty are also not
unprecedented. Arab states and societies did engage in previous conflicts over defining
the rules of sovereignty.
In fact, the rules of absolute internal sovereignty, non-intervention, mutual
recognition and territorial integrity became the hegemonic rules of the game in the Arab
state system only around 1970s, almost sixty years after its formation following the fall
of the Ottoman Empire in 1922.
Between 1922 and 1960s, the Arab state system suffered from the absence of
hegemonic inter-subjective rules of internal and external sovereignty. Competing
understandings of sovereignty, instead of shared inter-subjective understandings of
sovereignty, structured Arab politics. The Arab states and societies were engaged in
conflicts on defining the hegemonic rules of internal and external sovereignty. The rules
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of sovereignty, which are often assumed and taken for granted in International Relations
literature,9 were actually the focal point of struggles in the Arab state system.
The practices of intervention, non-recognition, threats to territorial integrity, and
internal resistance to supreme authority were in fact common practices in the Arab state
system until 1960s. “The sovereign norm of non-interference in the domestic affairs of
other states was flouted with stunning and unapologetic regularity” in the Arab states
system (Gause 1992: 448). Fred Halliday also asserts, “the predisposition of Middle
Eastern states, more than in any other part of the world, to interfere in each other’s
internal affairs…such a level of sustained intervention and interference… is on a scale
unseen elsewhere in the world” (2009: 15-16).10
The Middle East11 experienced the highest number of military interventions in the
world during the Cold War. It was the target of 173 military interventions, accounted for
25.1% of total interventions in the world. The majority of interventionist acts took place
before 1980 (Pickering and Kisangani 2009: 598). 70,000 Egyptian military troops
intervened in Yemen’s civil war between 1962-1967 to mention only one single military
intervention (Gause: 447-51; Sela 1998: 44-47).
The Arab state system also did not have shared hegemonic rules of diplomatic
recognition. Following independence from great powers, Iraq and Jordan, under the rule
9

For a review of IR theories and sovereignty see Biersteker and Weber (1996).
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Similarly, Roger Owen states, “there was a general disregard for borders and for national
sovereignty when it came to trying to influence an Arab neighbour, to put pressure on it or to try
to stop it from pressuring you. Over the years this has taken the form of direct military
intervention, assassinations, kidnappings, bombings, sabotage, newspaper and radio campaigns,
and support for the political opponents of rival regimes” (2004: 66).
11

Notice the term Middle East includes also the non-Arab states in the region.
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of the Hashemite dynasty, did not recognize the sovereignty of Syria, Lebanon and Saudi
Arabia. Iraq did not recognize the sovereignty of Kuwait, and Syria did not recognize the
sovereignty of Lebanon as evidenced in its rejection to open a Syrian embassy in Beirut.
Egypt, under the rule of Gamal Abed al-Nasser, also did not regard the Arab monarchies
as legitimate sovereigns.
The principle of territorial integrity was also non-hegemonic. The Hashemite
dynasty in Iraq and Jordan relentlessly tried to impose their dynastic sovereignty over
Saudi Arabia and Syria. By the late summer of 1957, Syria in particular was on the verge
of disintegration as an organized political community (Gause 1992: 448; Seale 1986:
307). The history of Syria after independence is a “story… of a country courted,
subverted, manipulated, intrigued against by almost everyone: Hashimites, Saudis,
Egyptians, not to mention the Great Powers” (Seale 1986: xvi). The territorial integrity of
Kuwait was also threatened by Iraq, which perceived Kuwait as part of its historical
geography. Only the presence of British troops in Kuwait, supported by international
norms, did deter Iraq from invading Kuwait in 1961. The territorial integrity of Lebanon
was also in serious danger due to its civil war and external military interventions by Syria
and Israel.
The Arab state system also suffered from unstable internal sovereignty until
1970s, as evidenced in high frequency of military coups. “In seven key Arab countries
between 1939 and 1969, 41 military coups were attempted—23 of which were successful.
Many of these were recurrent second or third coups” (Ben-Dor 1983: 146-147). “Syria
experienced fifteen successful coups between 1949 and 1970. In 1949 alone, the year of
Syrian independence, there were three successful coups” (Quinlivan 1999: 134).
8

“Between March 1949 (the first coup after World War II) and the end of 1980, fifty-five
coups were attempted in Arab states—half of them successful” (133).
Only around 1970s did the rules of absolute internal supreme authority, mutual
recognition, non-intervention, and territorial integrity become the hegemonic rules of the
sovereignty in the Arab state system.12 The hegemonic status of these rules of sovereignty
is embodied in practices. The number of intervention acts, military coups, nonrecognition acts and threats to territorial integrity declined significantly compared to the
previous decades.
But these traditional rules of sovereignty, which became hegemonic only around
1970s, are contested again as vividly evidenced in the Arab Spring. The new practices of
intervention, recognition, popular uprisings, and threats to territorial integrity embody the
new wave of contestation over the rules of sovereignty. The Arab states and societies are
engaging again in a new conflict on redefining the rules of internal and external
sovereignty. The current structure of the Arab state system again lacks inter-subjective
and hegemonic rules of internal and external sovereignty, resembling the structure of the
Arab state system after independence from great powers. The above brief history of
sovereignty brings us to the puzzle of this research project.
The Puzzle
The variation over time in the practices of sovereignty in the Arab state system
from the fall of the Ottoman Empire to the Arab Spring is the puzzle of this research
12

The relevant literature differs on the timing of the consolidation of state-territorial sovereignty
in the Arab states system. Some argue it is the post 1967 war; others claim it is the post 1970s oil
boom; while still other claims it is actually the post 1964. I address the alternative arguments in
the literature review chapter.

9

project. Of course I cannot examine all of the above practices of sovereignty in one
single research project for space limits. Instead I focus on one single external practice of
sovereignty (intervention and non-intervention).
The significant variation over time in the practices of external intervention from
the fall of Ottoman Empire to the Arab Spring is the puzzle of this research project. The
qualitative and quantitative changes in the practices of external intervention in the Arab
state system are the puzzle of this research. I aim to explain the variation in the number of
the acts of external intervention as well as the changes in the type and meanings of these
acts (Justification, purpose, and legitimacy of these acts).
Table 1
Practices of External Intervention in the Arab State System
Practices of
External
sovereignty
Intervention/nonintervention

1922-1960s

1970s-2011

2011-Present

High frequency of
external intervention
justified by national,
dynastic, and
geographical
purposes

Low frequency of
external
intervention;
Hegemonic rule of
non-intervention

Increasing acts of
external
intervention
justified by
humanitarian
purposes

Research Questions
1) Why was external intervention a common practice in the Arab state system
after independence from great powers (1922-1960s)?
2) Why did non-intervention become hegemonic rule and practice in the Arab
state system around 1970s?
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3) Why has the Arab states system been experiencing new practices of external
intervention since 2011?
Explanatory Variables: Two Constitutive-Institutional Variables
My explanation consists of two institutional variables: Inter-subjective
understandings of sovereignty and level of institutionalization of interstate borders. The
two institutional variables are underlying causes that determine the proneness of the Arab
state system to practices of external intervention. The underlying causes are persistent
over long period of time and they are different from proximate causes, which account for
timing of specific acts. The causal effects of proximate causes, however, are heavily
affected by the underlying causes (Miller 2007: 82-83).
This is a constitutive explanation. Constitutive accounts seek to establish the
conditions of possibility for objects or events (Fearon & Wendt 2002). Constitutive
causes fall into the category of reasons for actions, which is not the same as the
mechanistic causes of action as understood by rationalist theories (Finnemore 2003: 1415; Ruggie 1998: 869; Wendt 1998, 1999).13 For example, new understandings of
sovereignty as popular sovereignty make possible (and in that sense cause) new
intervention behavior (humanitarian intervention). Changes in territorial rules in the Arab
state system also constitute changes in the proneness of the Arab state system to practices
of external intervention. In the following I briefly introduce the two explanatory
variables:14
13

See also Kurki (2006, 2008) on the concept of cause in IR.

14

I provide a detailed discussion of the explanatory variables in the “Analytical Framework”
chapter.
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Institution of Sovereignty in the Arab State System and International System
The content of the institution of sovereignty is neither fixed nor timeless.
Sovereignty is a social institution of supreme authority whose content varies over time
and across space (Barnett 2010; Biersteker and Weber 1996; Hall 1999; Jackson 1987;
Philpott 2001; Reus-Smit 1999; Suganami 2007).15 Sovereignty is “a variable,
practically constituted institution, its precise content and political implications varying
with time and context” (Reus-Smit 2001: 538). 16 “The meanings attached to sovereignty
and the practices which follow from them [including intervention] are historically and
geographically variable” (Weber 1995: 16). The conception of sovereignty does not even
logically entails the principle of absolute non-intervention (Suganami 2007: 523-526).
Instead of imposing a fixed and timeless definition of sovereignty, I explore the
inter-subjective understandings of sovereignty in the Arab state system and international
system and examine their impact on the practices of intervention in the Arab state system.
I explore the inter-subjective understandings of sovereignty not only in the Arab
state system but also in the international system. For, the Arab state system does not exist
within an international vacuum. The international normative structure affects the
legitimacy of the practices of intervention and non-intervention in the regional Arab state
system. International norms also affect the international reactions to regional practices of

15

For a different perspective of sovereignty see Krasner (1999).

16

The literature on sovereignty in the Arab states system, however, adopts a constant, fixed, legal
definition of sovereignty. But, as R.B.J. Walker puts it, “the very attempt to treat sovereignty as a
matter of definition and legal principle encourages a certain amnesia about its historical and
culturally specific character” (Walker: 1993: 116; quoted in Biersteker and Weber 1996: 2).
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intervention. Exploring the norms of sovereignty in international system is also useful to
avoid “Arab Exceptionalism” accounts.
Changes in inter-subjective understandings of sovereignty, I argue, constitute
transformations in practices of external intervention. The behavioral patterns of external
intervention (or non-intervention) are understood here as practices of sovereignty. They
are patterns of behavior that embody inter-subjective understandings of sovereignty.17
I argue that the changes in the practices of intervention in the Arab state system
are constituted by changes in the inter-subjective understandings of sovereignty in the
Arab state system and international system.
Institution of Inter-State Borders
“Borders are a human institution” (Holsti 2004: 75-76). They are “institutions for
organizing understandings about jurisdiction over territory” (Simmons 2005: 824).
Borders are “sets of rules, compliance procedures, and moral and ethical behavioral
norms designed to constrain behavior” (827). “International borders and the explicit
demarcation of the exclusive territorial sovereignty that they imply are akin to a
fundamental article in the “international constitution” of the modern state system” (827).
I treat inter-state borders as institution. “An institutional perspective on borders suggests
that borders coordinate the expectations and behavior of both international and domestic
actors” (Carter and Goemans 2011: 282).
The level of institutionalization of international borders is a significant variable.
Institutionalization of borders is a process that takes place over time (Drysdale and Blake
17

“Understandings of sovereignty” and “practices of sovereignty” are not the same even though
they mutually constitute each other. See Chapter Four.
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1985: 77). There are multiple factors that determine the level of institutionalization of
borders, including the duration of the border’s existence, technology, the ambiguity of the
norms on borders, and whether the border is disputed or not (Carter and Goemans 2011;
Gavrilis 2008; Kahler and Walter 2006; Murphy 2002; Simmons 2005; Vasques 1995).
International borders constitute practices of intervention when they suffer from
low level of institutionalization. For, low level of institutionalization of the institution of
international borders blurs the distinction between the “international” and “domestic”
arenas (Nexon 2009: 22). Low level of institutionalization of international borders also
enables internationalization of domestic disputes and the domestication of international
conflicts, increasing mutual fear among neighboring states.
Conversely, high institutionalization of international borders reduces the acts of
intervention.18 For, high level of institutionalization of international borders stabilizes
expectations, sharpens the distinction between the domestic and the international and it
also precludes the internalization of domestic conflicts and domestication of international
conflicts. Mutually agreed upon borders also reduce jurisdictional uncertainty.19 “When
[borders] are mutually accepted, they drastically reduce external challenges to a
government’s legitimate authority to create domestic institutions and policies within a
clear physical domain” (Simmons 2005:827).

18

Vasques offers a similar explanation of territoriality and war: “Once borders are established
and accepted by all concerned, the probability of war becomes very unlikely” (1995: 283).
19

“Jurisdictional uncertainty flows from ambiguity over whose rules—and what legal
protections—apply to a particular transaction” (Simmons 2005: 828).
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Argument in Brief
Changes in the dominant inter-subjective understandings of sovereignty and level
of institutionalization of inter-state borders constitute the significant variation in the acts
of intervention in the Arab state system from the fall of the Ottoman Empire to the
present.
The Arab state system experienced high frequency of intervention from the fall of
Ottoman Empire to 1960s because the dominant understandings of sovereignty in the
Arab world were dynastic sovereignty and national sovereignty, not state-territorial
sovereignty. The most frequent interveners during this period were Iraq and Jordan under
the Hashemite dynasty (1922-1950s) and Egypt under Nasser (1950s-1960s). Their acts
of intervention were constituted by their subjective understandings of sovereignty as
dynastic sovereignty and national sovereignty respectively. Dynastic and national
sovereignty prescribed behavioral roles to the states of Iraq, Jordan and Egypt that
constituted and justified their acts of intervention in other Arab states.
At the international level, the norm of non-intervention was still in its emergence
and diffusion stages; it did not reach the highest stage of “norm consolidation” during this
period (Bull 1984). The international system in fact experienced high frequency of
intervention during the same period. The international society did not impose strong
structural constraints against acts of intervention. Thus, the Arab state system was not an
exception to the international norms and practices of intervention, contrary to what
commonly argued in Middle East area studies.
At the same time, the inter-state borders in the Arab state system suffered from
low level of institutionalization because they were new borders. Territoriality was a new
15

political practice in the Arab state system. Territoriality was absent in both Political
though and practice in Islam. The combination of the two variables constituted the high
frequency of intervention in the Arab state system between 1922 and 1960s.
The significant decline in the acts of intervention after 1960s was constituted by
changes in the dominant inter-subjective understandings of sovereignty in the Arab state
system. The Arab states distanced themselves from the national and dynastic
understandings of sovereignty. Instead, they adopted state-territorial sovereignty as
ordering principle of the Arab state system. The state-territorial sovereignty prescribed
behavioral roles that respect the borders of the states and delegitimize the acts of external
intervention. Internationally, the norms of non-intervention and absolute sovereignty
reached their highest level of consolidation as evidenced in the international treaties as
well as practices of great powers (Bull 1984; Zacher 2001). At the same time, the
institution of inter-state border in the Arab world reached higher level of
institutionalization comparing to the previous decades (Ajame 1978; Salame 1987). The
changes in the two institutional variables constituted the significant decline in the practice
of intervention in the Arab state system after 1960s.
The revival of the acts of intervention in the Arab state system during the Arab
Spring is constituted by new inter-subjective understandings of sovereignty, contingent
sovereignty, that challenge the legitimacy of the traditional principle of absolute stateterritorial sovereignty and non-intervention. The new understanding of sovereignty
constitutes new practices of intervention that are driven or strategically justified by
humanitarian causes, which were unthinkable in the Arab state system in the past.
Internationally, the international society adopted “sovereignty as responsibility” and
16

“Responsibility of Protect” as new international norms, providing international
legitimacy and justification for the regional practices of intervention. The Arab states and
Arab league have been strategically utilizing the new international norms of sovereignty
to justify their intervention in Syria and Libya. At the same time, global forces,
technology in particular, have reduced the robustness of interstate borders and their
effectiveness in the Arab world, which intensified the security interdependence and
vulnerability in the Arab state system. Consequently, the system is more prone to acts to
external intervention.
Methodology and Research Design
I examine patterns of behavior of external intervention. The goal is to examine
not specific acts of external intervention but general patterns of intervention.20 The term
external intervention is extremely elusive (Bull 1984; Little 1987; Finnemore 2003) and I
will address this notion in more details in the analytical framework chapter.
To examine the impact of inter-subjective understandings of sovereignty on
practices of intervention, I adopt the interpretive methodology. The interpretive approach
allows us to explore the justificatory framework that links between the state’s selfunderstanding of sovereignty and the social practices of intervention/non-intervention in
which the meanings of sovereignty are embedded (Reus Smit 1999: 10). “In offering
justification for their intervention practices, diplomats of intervening states
simultaneously assume the existence of norms regulating state practices and interpretive
community that will judge intervention practices according with these norms” (Weber
20

This approach is similar to Finnemore’s study on intervention (2003: 11). She studies patterns
of intervention rather than specific acts of intervention.
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1995: 5). 21 To examine the robustness of the rules of territoriality I rely on political
geography scholarship on the Middle East.
Case Study
The case study is the following Arab state sub-system: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon,
Jordan, Kuwait and Egypt and Saudi Arabia. These countries were the original members
of the Arab League22 and they were the most active in the debate on regional order in the
Arab World (Barnett 1998: 16). Geographically, they belong to the Fertile Crescent subsystem except Saudi Arabia and Egypt. But the latter two states have been very involved
in the politics of this sub-region. All of the above states are members of this strategicsub-system (Buzan and Waever 2003; Lake and Morgan 1997; Solingen 1998).
This sub-system is also a “critical case study” because it is the focus of the
alternative arguments on sovereignty and regional order in the Arab world: Realism
(Ajami 1978/9; Walt 1987), Constructivism (Barnett 1998), cultural, and comparative
politics accounts (Hudson 1979; Owen 2004; Sela 1998).23 The time frame of this study
is 1922-2014: The Arab states system from the fall of the Ottoman Empire to the present.
Theoretical and Policy Contributions
My institutional explanation and findings challenge the traditional accounts of
sovereignty in the Arab World, including the cultural perspectives that emphasize the
conflict between sovereignty, Arabism, and Islam, the constructivist approaches that
21

“Justification is literally an attempt to connect one’s action with standards of justice or, perhaps
more generally, with standards with appropriate or acceptable behavior” (Finnemore 2003: 15).
22

Except Kuwait, which became independent in 1961. Yemen was also the original member of
the Arab League but is not included in this research.
23

I critically discuss the alternative arguments in the Literature Review Chapter.
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emphasize non-state identities and the regional norm of pan-Arabism, the comparative
politics explanations that focus on the domestic material power of the Arab state, the
post-colonial perspectives that emphasize the artificiality of the Arab state, and the realist
accounts that highlight the role of great powers and the regional distribution of power in
the Middle East.24
This is the first research project that considers sovereignty in the Arab state
system as a variable and explores its variation and impact on the practices of intervention
in the Arab World. The alternative accounts, on the other hand, impose a fixed, constant
and ideal-type meaning of sovereignty. They also confuse sovereignty with autonomy
and material power of the Arab state. Sovereignty, autonomy, and material power are
three different things (Sorensen 1999, 2001; Thomson 1995).
This is also the first research that situates sovereignty and intervention in the Arab
state system within the historical context of sovereignty and intervention in the
international system. Knowing the changing practices of sovereignty in international
system is an inescapable necessity for understanding changes in the practices of
sovereignty and intervention in the regional Arab state system. Our understanding of
sovereignty in the Arab state system after World War II, for example, is incomplete or
even misleading if we ignore the actual norms and practices of sovereignty and
intervention in the international system at the very same time. Also, our account of the
Arab Spring is incomplete without serious attention to the new practices of sovereignty in
the international system. The alternative accounts, on the other hand, ignore the

24

I critically review the alternative arguments in the literature review chapter.
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international system utterly or discuss only the role of great powers and polarity,
neglecting the norms and practices of sovereignty and intervention in the international
system.
This is a very timely research project situates the Arab Spring within the history
of internal and external sovereignty in the Arab state system. Furthermore, I provide
systemic analysis of acts of intervention in the Arab states system from 1922 to the
present.
This study also contributes to International Relations literature on sovereignty,
borders and intervention. I construct a new analytical framework for the study
sovereignty, borders, and intervention, combining theoretical elements from the fields of
Role Theory, Social Constructivism, and Institutionalization. This framework is also
helpful for understanding institutional change and stability in general.
The study of sovereignty has important policy implications for current affairs in
the Middle East and North Africa. Understanding sovereignty is necessary for successful
processes of democratization that have followed the Arab Spring. Democratization
requires changes in domestic understandings and practices of sovereignty. The regulative
rules of democracy require the support of particular constitutive rules of sovereignty
otherwise democratization efforts are doomed to fail.
Understanding sovereignty and its variations throughout history also helps us to
design creative solutions to the contested issue of sovereignty in the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict. Historical examples of shared sovereignty, dual sovereignty, hybrid sovereignty,
contingent sovereignty, divided sovereignty, functional sovereignty and non-territorial
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sovereignty, to mention only a few, could help us to design creative solutions to the
problem of sovereignty in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Structure of the Dissertation
Chapter Two provides a critical review of the alternative accounts of state
sovereignty and intervention in the Arab state system including domestic politics
explanations, realism, constructivism, oil and economic interdependence, Islam, and
international level explanations.
Part II introduces the analytical framework. It embeds the study of sovereignty
within institutional analysis. Chapter Three provides a new analytical framework for the
study of institutions in general. Chapter 4 focuses on the institution of sovereignty. This
institutional analysis of sovereignty offers a new framework for the study of the relations
between sovereignty, borders and intervention.
Part III examines sovereignty and intervention from the fall of the Ottoman
Empire to 1960s. It is divided into two chapters. Chapter Five discusses sovereignty and
intervention in the Arab state system between 1922 and 1950s. Chapter Six focuses on
sovereignty and intervention in the Arab state system in 1950s and 1960s.
Part IV examines sovereignty and intervention since 1970s. Chapter Seven
discusses sovereignty and intervention in Arab state system between 1970s and 2011.
Chapter Eight examines sovereignty and intervention during the Arab Spring. In each
chapter, I examine the impact of regional and international norms of sovereignty as well
as level of institutionalization of inter-state borders on the practices of intervention in the
Arab state system. Let’s turn to the literature review chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
Sovereignty and Intervention in the Arab State System after Empire: 1922-1980s
The issue of sovereignty in the Arab state system suffers from scant attention in
International Relations and Middle East area studies. Only a few articles directly address
the practices of sovereignty in the Arab World. But they also suffer from inadequate
perspective of sovereignty. They impose a fixed and timeless definition of sovereignty
without exploring the actual meaning of sovereignty embedded in the political practices
in the Arab state system.
I will critically review the existing literature on sovereignty and intervention, after
independence from great powers. I will critically review the following alternative
accounts: domestic politics explanations, realism, constructivism, oil and economic
interdependence, Islam, and international level explanations. In the conclusion, I will
highlight the common shortcoming of these accounts.
Domestic Level Explanations
The explanatory accounts that fall under this category provide a bottom-up
explanation of sovereignty and intervention in the Arab states system. These domestic
explanations are also materialist; they explain state sovereignty by the material power of
the Arab state.
According to these explanations, military coups and external intervention
occurred in the Arab state system because of the weakness of the newly independent
22

Arab states. The new Arab states were too weak to defend their internal and external
sovereignty. Therefore, they experienced high frequency of military coups and external
intervention (Gause 1992: 456-462; Mufti 1996: 1-19; Sela 1998: 3-54).
The Arab states experienced external intervention and military coups also because
they suffered from the lack legitimacy. The Arab states were perceived as artificial
constructs and illegitimate entities created by the European great powers to divide the
Arab nation (Miller 2008: 142-150). The Arab states suffered from illegitimacy also
because of the incompatibility between the state and the nation in the Arab world as put
by Michael Hudson, “legitimate authority is hard to develop within state structures whose
boundaries are inherently incompatible with those of the nation” (1977: 6). The
legitimacy problem enforced the ruling regimes to adopt the popular ideology of PanArabism in order to legitimize themselves. But the ideology of Pan-Arabism, according
to these accounts, legitimized interference in domestic affairs of other Arab states.
The weakness of the ruling regimes also enforced them to pursue Pan-Arab
political unity programs, which were common following independence from great power.
The unity plans were “defensive unionism” pursued to defend the ruling elite to defeat
domestic foes.25 As soon the ruling regimes became stronger they gave up on their
political unity programs with other states.
Mufti Malik aptly capture this theme in the provocative title of his book
Sovereign Creations: Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq:
25

Mufti Malik identifies several reasons that make defensive unionism an attractive strategy for
ruling elites trying to consolidate their power: 1) legitimacy; 2) justification for administrative
reshuffles that neutralize opponents; 3) external support from the other members of the political
union; 4) countering domestic opponents to pursue their own unity projects (Mufti 1996: 7-8).
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There is an inverse relationship between the stability of a regime (the particular
individual or collection of individuals in power at a given time) and the likelihood
that it will consider ceding its country’s sovereignty to more powerful foreign
actors. It is the inability of ruling elites to consolidate their hold on power that has
pushed them in a pan-Arab direction in search for legitimacy and support” (Mufti
1996: 2).
As soon as the ruling regimes consolidated their power and reduce domestic
instability their interest in pursuing unity projects subsided. Thus, “the story of PanArabism is the story of the emergence and consolidation of sovereignty and efficacious
states in the Arab world (Mufti 1996: 2).
Only after 1970s, when the ruling regime became strong enough to protect their
internal and external sovereignty, did the practices of intervention, military coups and
unit plans decline in the Arab World. The Arab states became more powerful and “have
acquired more carrots, with which to vest social interest in the state rather than its
competitors, and more sticks, with which to confront enemies domestic and foreign”
(Gause 1992: 457). This change in regime power made foreign policy based on panArabism ideology more risky and costly. It also made the regimes less vulnerable to
pressures of pan-Arabism generated from abroad (Gause 1992: 461).
The increasing power of the Arab state is also reflected in the significant decline
in the number of military coups:
After the numerous coups of the 1950s and 1960s, no regime or ruling family was
overthrown by force in the 1970s and 1980s, with the exception of that of
President Numeiri of Sudan, who was ousted as a result of widespread popular
(and army) opposition in 1985. Other enforced changes, like President Sadat’s
assassination in 1981 or President Bourguiba’s deposition in 1987, did not lead to
any basic change in the way each country was run…the major reason for this
durability lies in the growth of state power. (Owen 2004: 63; italic added)
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To support the above arguments, scholars have provided data on changes in the material
power of the Arab states, including size of bureaucracy, armed forces and government
expenditure as a percentage of Gross National Product (GDP). In Egypt, for example, the
number of those who worked in the bureaucracy and public enterprises increased from
some 350,000 employees in 1952/52 to over one million in 1965/6. By 1960, the
Egyptian government employed about 33 percent of Egypt’s non-agricultural labor force.
The total number of armed forces (soldiers, sailors and airmen) increased from 80,000 in
1955/6 to about 180,000 in 1966 besides 90,000 paramilitary police. The government
expenditure as proportion of the GDP also grew from 18.3 percent in 1954/5 to 55.7
percent in 1970 (including defense). The expansion of state expenditure is also reflected
in the increasing size of the education system. The number of Egyptians who were
enrolled in all types of education increased from 1,900,000 in 1953/4 to 4,500,000 in
1965/6 and the number reached 5,900,000 in 1972/3 (Owen: 2004: 24-26).
In Syria, the number of state employees reached 170,000 in 1975 compared to
34,000 in 1960. Twenty five percent of the urban employments were on the state payroll
in 1975. The state expenditure as percentage of GDP increased from 26.2% in 1963 to
30.6% in 1968 to 49.4% in 1977 (Gause 1992: 460). In terms of education, the
percentage of school age children enrolled in secondary schools increased to 48 percent
in 1975 compared to 16 percent in 1960 (Owen 2004: 25-26).
Jordan also experienced expansion in the size of the state. The percentage of
government employees was about 15 percent (59,000 employees) of the total labor force
in 1982. The number of armed forces reached 70,000-100,000 in the same year. The
government expenditure as percentage of GDP increased from 31.4% in 1959 to 51.9% in
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1967 and 54.7% in 1973. The number of government employees in Kuwait increased
from 22,073 in 1966 to 113,274 in 1976. In Saudi Arabia the public service employees
increased from a few hundreds in 1950s to about 85,000 in 1970/1 (Owen 2004: 39).
Gause uses another indicator of state power: the number of armed forces per 1000
of total population. In Egypt, it increased from 3.5 in 1955 to 5.8 in 1967 and 8.9 in 1977.
In Syria it raised from 6.4 in 1955 to 10.8 1967 and 29.4 in 1977. In Jordan, it increased
from 16.4 in 1955 to 26.7 in 1967 and it reached 31.8 in 1977 (Gause 1992: 458).
Shortcomings
The above account is one of the most popular accounts of sovereignty, military
coups and intervention in the Arab world but it suffers from the following pitfalls.
First, the above account overestimates the power of the Arab state after 1970s.
The Arab state has been overstated in two ways, as explained by Ayubi (1995). First, the
real power of the Arab state is overstated. The Arab state is a ‘fierce’ state that frequently
relies on raw coercion to maintain itself. But it is not a ‘strong’ state for lacking Michael
Mann’s “infrastructural power” and Antonio Gramsci’s ideological hegemony. Second,
the power of the Arab state is overstated in the numbers of public officials, public
expenditure, size of the security forces, bureaucracy etc. In this sense, overstating means
“overstaffing” or “overdeveloped” (Ayubi 1995: 3):26
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On the weakness of the Arab state since 1970 see also the review in Benjamin Miller (2007:
194, 198-199). The above account also assumes that the Arab state is a coherent entity with a
single interest. Roger Owen challenged this assumption relying on evidence from Egypt, the most
powerful Arab state at that time. Owen founds that at least part of the state’s apparent coherence
is more a matter of presentation rather than of reality. We are enabled to observe the real power
of the state only “when the veil of omnipotence created around itself by an authoritarian regime
fell away to expose the bundle of competing, and often contradictory, interests that had always
lain just behind” (Owen 2004: 38).
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Although most Arab states are ‘hard’ states, and indeed many of them are ‘fierce’
states, few of them are really ‘strong’ state. Although they have large
bureaucracies, mighty armies and harsh prisons, they are lamentably feeble when
it comes to collecting taxes, winning wars or forging a really ‘hegemonic’ power
block or an ideology that can carry the state beyond the coercive and ‘corporative’
level and into the moral and intellectual sphere (Ayubi 1995: xi).
The size of bureaucracy and security forces is not a necessary a measure of power.
Jackson convincingly illustrate this point in his discussion of the African state
emphasizing that the size of bureaucracy is a sign of weakness rather than strength of the
new African states (1990).
Notice also that none of above accounts did include data on poverty,
unemployment and inequality in the Arab states after independence. These are important
sources of state legitimacy and power, as evidenced in the current popular uprisings in
the Arab World (Arab Spring). According to a World Bank report, the total labor force
participation in the Middle Eat and North Africa region was 57.1% in 1950; 56.2% in
1960; 54.4% in 1970; and 54.5% in 1980. In other words, the labor force participation
actually declined between 1950 and 1980 (World Bank 2004: 222).
These accounts also overlook the rise of political Islam after 1970s. The revival of
political Islam after 1970s in fact reflects the continuity of Arab state illegitimacy and
weakness. The end of Pan-Arabism was replaced by another transnational identity and
movement, which also reflect the weakness and illegitimacy of the Arab state.
Furthermore, the argument that Arab states suffered from illegitimacy because
they were artificially constructed by great powers should also be treated with caution. In
his contribution to the edited volume The Foundation of the Arab State (1987), Iliya
Harik convincingly argues that the Arab state system was not a pure creation of western
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great powers. “Colonialism affected the boundaries of the Arab states, but it did not, with
the exception of the Fertile Crescent, create them” (6). According to Harik,
The history of the eighteen Arab countries clearly shows not only that they are old
societies but also old states. Except for three of them—Iraq, Syria and Jordan—
they all go back to the nineteenth century or a much earlier. The traditional state
should not be overlooked or dismissed because of a modern outlook or other
biases. Those who ignore it do so because of a formalistic definition of the state,
and/or because of their limited historical curiosity (21).
These fifteen Arab states “have within themselves the sources of their legitimacy…they
have enjoyed legitimacy in terms of the values of their peoples and times” (22). The
majority of the Arab states “were locally rooted and enjoyed legitimacy in the eyes of
their people” and they “had recognizable boundaries, or at least a core territory whether
their authority endured through the vicissitudes of time” (35). Harik argues the Arab
nationalism activists and thinkers, who desired to create a single Pan-Arab state,
exaggerated the colonial association of the Arab states to discredit and delegitimize the
existing states (44).
Second, the link between state weakness and Arab political unity projects is also
problematic. Mufti Malik argues that regime weakness was the driving force behind the
Arab unity projects in Syria and Iraq. But there were many weak regimes in the rest of
the Arab states but they did not pursue unity projects to protect themselves.
Actually only a few Arab states pursued political unity plans, and they were not
weak states. The main supporter of Pan-Arabism ideology in 1950s and 1960s was Egypt
under Nasser. But Egypt was relatively the strongest and most coherent Arab state with a
long tradition of central administration and national identity (Miller 1997: 162). Also, the
Hashemite dynasty in Iraq and Jordan, which were among the strongest Arab regimes
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during the interwar period, were the main advocates of Pan-Arabism. The examples of
Egypt and the Hashemite dynasty actually refute the connection between state weakness
and pan-Arabism.
Notice also the European states, which are much more powerful and legitimate
than Arab states, formed the European Union. The European experience in fact
challenges the argument that the weakness of ruling regimes is the driving force behind
regional political integration (Barnett 1998: 14-15).27
Finally, the above accounts reduce the norms of sovereignty to the material power
of the Arab states. They also confuse sovereignty with empirical statehood. But
sovereignty and empirical statehood are two different things that cannot be reduced to
each other. Sovereignty and state power are also two different things (Jackson 1990;
Sorenson 1999, 2001; Thomson 1995).
Regional Level of Analysis
There are four different explanations that fall under this category: Realism, oil
and economic interdependence, Islam, and Pan-Arabism.
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Mufti does not address the experience of the European Union. He refers only once to Karl
Duetsch at the end the book’s conclusion (262). Mufti Malik also confuses state power and
national sovereignty with neorealism: he argues “the emergence of stronger state institutions in
[Iraq and Syria] during the 1970s has indeed given rise to newer style of foreign policy, one
aimed at securing and enhancing national sovereignty and thus one that conforms more and more
closely to the behavior predicted by neorealists…. The transition from foreign policies driven
primarily by internal consideration (a la Steven David) to foreign policies driven primarily by
external considerations (a la Stephen Walt) mirrors the formation of stronger states in Iraq and
Syria” (9). But “securing and enhancing state sovereignty” is not included in the neorealist view
of national interest. And the most powerful states USA, Japan and EU countries are the most
interdependent and integrated states—and their foreign policies do not follow the expectations of
neorealism. The history of the State taught us that “stateness” and “national interest” should not
be confused or conflated with practices of realism and realpolitik. National interest is socially
constructed and its content does not necessarily fit the assumption and expectation of political
realism (Barnett 1998: 14-15).
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Realism
Political Realism is the most popular explanation of Middle East politics:
There is a widespread consensus among many analysts, both realists and nonrealists, that the modern Middle East is the region that more than any other
manifests the predictions of realism in the international system, as evidenced by
the dominance of conflict and the recurrence of rivalries, arms races, competing
alliances, great power interventions, crises, and wars. (Miller 2007: 130-131)
Realists explain political transformations in the Middle East by regional distribution of
power. From the realist perspective, the decline of Egypt power after 1967 war led to
decline of pan-Arabism, a revisionist ideology mobilized by Egypt to achieve regional
hegemony, which in turn led to decline of acts of intervention. Shortly thereafter, the oil
boom in 1970s led to the emergence of new regional power, Saudi Arabia. The latter
formed a new regional order based on sovereignty-non-intervention instead of panArabism (Telhami 1990; Walt 1987; Miller 2008).
But the realist account suffers from serious shortcomings. First, changes in the
distribution of power in the Arab states system do not correlate with the decline of PanArabism. “Shifts in the distribution of power are a poor predictor of this fundamental
change in Arab politics” (Barnett 1998: 3-4). Realists also argue that the defeat of Arab
states in 1967 war,28 the defeat of Egypt in particular, caused the decline of Pan-Arabism
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The realist account of 1967 war has also been challenged. Michael Barnett, for example, claims
that strategic interest, which what realists emphasize, is NOT what drove Egypt and Jordan to the
1967 war. Nasser “knowingly risked unwanted war with Israel to preserve his image as the leader
of Arab nationalism… If ideologies such as Arab nationalism are simply instruments in state
power, as realist content, why would Arab leaders sacrifice state power on the altar of Arab
nationalism.” Nasser went to this war not for realist strategic interest but to save his image as
leader of Pan-Arabism (Barnett 1998:3; see also Miller 2007: 183). King Hussain of Jordan also
went to war with Israel not for strategic interests but for the sake of his image: “Political
Legitimacy superseded any strategic considerations” in the Jordan way to 1967 war (Gerges
1994: 216; quoted in Miller 2007: 166).
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but a similar defeat of the same Arab states in 1948 war actually increased the popularity
of Pan-Arabism.29
Realists also have difficulty to explain the prevalence of external intervention as a
strategic tool of the state. Why did Arab states intervene frequently in each other affairs
instead of adopting deterrence and balance of power politics? Realists have difficulty to
explain the relationship between national interest and intervention in domestic affairs of
other Arab states, including attempts of regime change (Gause 1992: 451-452; Miller
2008: 130-133). In addition, realists have difficulty to explain the lack of arms race
among Arab states. Despite the rivalry among them, Arab states did not engage in arm
race (Barnett 1998: 1-2).
Realists also fall short in explaining the political unity project among Arab states.
They cannot convincingly explain how rational states voluntarily cede their sovereignty
to another state as Syria and Iraq did in the in 1950s and 1960s (Mufti 1996).30 Stephen
Walt’s The Origins of Alliances (1987) is a classic realist account of Middle Eastern
politics. He provides a balance of threat theory, a modified version of Waltz’ balance of
power theory, which argues that states formed alliances in response to external threats,
operationalized in terms of aggregate power, offensive power, geographic proximity, and
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On the relationship between war and change, see Robert Gilpin (1981).

30

Another shortcoming in Walt’s account is his reading of the Iraqi-Jordanian federation of
February 14, 1958 as an instance of balancing against United Arab Republic. Barnett challenged
Walt’s reading of this event and he convincingly show that the Iraqi-Jordanian federation was an
act of “impression management” for the sake of their image rather than an act of balancing. Mufti
Malik also criticized Walt’s account, arguing that domestic threat rather than external threat is
what drove the Iraqi-Jordanian federation (Mufti 1996: 3-5; Barnett 1998: 2). Malik provide a
powerful critique of neorealism inability to explain sovereignty violation and unity projects in the
Arab states.
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aggressive intentions. Walt, however, does not provide a convincing realist explanation
of the unity projects that dominated inter-Arab politics. Walt does not even distinguish
between formal unity agreements and alliances, viewing the distinction as simply a
stylistic one. But political union is not even a bandwagon act (Mufti 1996).
Some Realists explain the instability in the Middle East by its multiple structure,
the existence of more than two regional powers: Egypt, Iran, Israel, Turkey, Israel, pre2003 Iraq, post 1970 Syria, and Saudi Arabia. But there are other regions with similar
structure but they are peaceful such as Western Europe (Miller 2008: 132-133). The
Middle East also illustrates the limits of material power, which is the focus of realism. In
the Middle East, there is no correlation between military power and status of hegemony.
Israel is the most powerful country in the region but it is not the regional hegemon. The
Arab states do not even perceive Israel as equal partner because of the distinctive nonArab identity of Israel (Ben-Dor 1983: 208-209; Miller 2007: 186).
The above limits of realism explanations led the prominent realist scholar
Benjamin Miller to state that, “even though patterns of behavior and outcomes in the
Middle East seem to conform to realist expectations about the dominance of international
conflict, the key explanation is not based on realist factors such as distribution of
capabilities in the region” (Miller 2008: 131).
Constructivism: The Myth of Sovereignty-Pan-Arabism Conflict
According to this account, the rules of sovereignty in the Arab state system
(supreme authority and non-intervention) were frequently violated because of dominance
of the norms of Pan-Arabism. The decline of pan-Arabism in 1970s, according to this
account, caused the institutionalization of sovereignty in the Arab state system.
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The norms of sovereignty were in conflict with the norms of pan-Arabism.
Raymond Hinnebusch, for example, emphasizes the “enduring rivalry between the norms
of sovereignty and pan-Arabism,” whose
bottom line is that the embedding of a states system in a supra-state community
build an enduring tension into the Arab system between the logic of sovereignty,31
in which each separate state, insecure amidst the anarchy of a states system,
pursues its own interests and security, often against its Arab neighbours, and the
counter norm which expects states sharing an Arab identity to act together for
common interests. (as cited in Lawson 2006: 143)
Similarly, Stephen Krazner claims that pan-Arabism and sovereignty constitute
“alternative structures” of international politics. Hendrik Spruyt also asserts that, “nonterritorial forms of organization such as the city-league then or pan-Arabism today are
logically at odds with sovereign statehood.”32 Michael Barnett also argues “an Arab
nationalism that demanded territorial unification represented a direct challenge to the
sovereign authority and territorial basis of Arab states” (as cited in Lawson 2006: 143).
This is one of the most popular explanations of Arab politics. Yet, it suffers from
serious shortcoming. The process tracing that link Pan-Arabism with violations of the
rules of sovereignty is not clearly stated. The relationship is either assumed or imposed
but not explored. The above accounts also impose a distinctive meaning of Arab
nationalism and a particular meaning of sovereignty without exploring their actual
meanings in Arab political thought and practice.
Unsurprisingly, the prominent historian Roger Owen concludes his review of the
literature on Arab nationalism by the following:
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According to Hinnebusch’s statement, there is only one single logic of sovereignty but this is
not accurate as evidenced in the history of sovereignty in international system.
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But sovereignty is not inherently territorial.
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Academic writing about the phenomenon of Arab nationalism and the movement
for Arab unity has been unusually unsatisfactory. Although almost all authors
acknowledge their power and importance, little effort is made to understand their
development and to explain their role in Arab politics. For some Arab nationalism
remains an ultimately “mysterious” force; for others it seems to be seen as so
much a self-evident part of Middle Eastern life that it requires no further
examination. The problem has been further compounded by the failure to
distinguish properly between nationalism as a set of ideas and nationalism as a
political movement, and by the interchangeable use of such terms as “unity”,
“solidarity”, and “Pan-Arabism”, as though they all had more or less the same
meaning. (Owen 1983: 16)
A very recent review of International Relations and Middle East area studies
literature on sovereignty and pan-Arabism, comes to a similar conclusion, “the power of
regional identity [Arabism] over state behavior, particularly its detraction from
sovereignty, is not demonstrated but is rather assumed, as it is in much of the area studies
literature on which [Michael] Barnett draws” (Ewan Stein 2012; 15).
In the following I will show that neither Arab nationalism theory nor Arab
political unity projects are incompatible with sovereignty. I will also challenge the
argument that Arab identity constituted violations of state sovereignty.
Arab nationalism theory and sovereignty. It is striking that the theory of Arab
nationalism does not address the issue of sovereignty. It even overlooks the issue of the
Arab state. Sati’ Al-Husri, the most prominent theoretician of Arab nationalism, does not
address the issues of sovereignty and the state. In his obsession to prove the existence of
the Arab nation, “Al-Husri certainly overlooked the state and its foundations” (Ayubi
1995: 139). The state is “a matter of indifference” in Al-Husri’s writings as put by
Bassam Tibi (Ibid).
Even in the political writings of President Nasser and the Ba’th party in Syria and
Iraq, who adopted Arab nationalism, the considerations of the state “has remained only
34

implicit and void of practical implications” (Ayubi: 140). Both the theory of Arab
nationalism and the Pan-Arabism movement “have tended to regard matters of borders,
populations, rights, market, and so on, as rather artificial or superficial details” (Ayubi:
21). Clement Moore (1971: 106) also asserts that “most Arab ideology is expressive
rather than practical” and a Moroccan scholar describes Arab nationalism as “a kind of
‘identity-mania’: the eternal question is forever: ‘who we are?’ and very rarely ‘what are
we going to do?’ and ‘how we can do?’” (Ayubi: 147).
“The neglect by Arab nationalist ideology to elaborate on the organization of the
desired Arab state is one of the most important loopholes in the nationalist doctrine”
(Korany 1987). Arab nationalism scholars did not even come to agreement whether Arab
political unity requires strengthening or weakening the Arab territorial states (Ayubi:
148).
The doctrine of Pan-Arabism has remained, from its inception to the present time,
basically language-centered and rather reluctant to take adequate account of other
factors. Although the slogan of ‘unity’ has been invoked by most Arab
nationalists, Arabism remains closer to a concept of a kulturnation, and has not
been pushed far enough in the direction of a staatsnation: Arabism forms a
cultural community and an emotional bond that can be invoked in the political
arena, although it has not been able to modify the practice of state sovereignty in
any significant way. (Ayubi: 146; emphasis added)
Political unity and sovereignty. Scholars often use political unity programs as an
indicator of institutionalization of sovereignty in the Arab world. But contra to the this
popular argument, Arab political unity projects were in fact compatible with the rules of
sovereignty as long as the political unification is achieved by consent of all sovereign
states involved in the unity project.
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The compatibility between political unification and sovereignty is even
acknowledged even by Michael Barnett himself:
Both sovereignty and pan-Arabism permit a range of behaviors that often overlap.
For instance, because sovereignty allows for political unification, it is
theoretically consistent with pan-Arabism’s goal of political unification; neither
the active nor abandoned search by Arab states for regional integration represent
conclusive evidence of the institutionalization of sovereignty. (1995: 505-6)33
The United Arab Republic, the political unity between Syria and Egypt, was NOT
a violation of state sovereignty because it was achieved through consent between two
sovereign states, Syria and Egypt. Studying the United Arab Republic [UAR], Fred
Lawson concludes that “even the most fully articulated institutional expression of the
broad doctrine of Pan-Arabism [UAR] turn out to have been compatible with, if not in
fact predicted on, the principles of Westphalian sovereignty” (Lawson 2006: 144).
The existing literature also exaggerates the role of pan-Arabism in unity plans.
Actually Pan-Arabism played a minor role in the political unity programs among Arab
states. As Roger Owen asserts,
the major schemes for unity put forward during the inter-war period were the
work not of any Pan-Arab political party or movement, but of a small handful of
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However, Barnett still uses the decline of political unity as indicator of institutionalization of
sovereignty: “The dramatic downturn in the number of unification efforts suggests the
institutionalization of sovereignty” (506). To justify his decision of including political unity as
indicator of institutionalization of sovereignty, Barnett claims that “what matters, then, is not the
attempt of integration per se but rather the meaning and motivation attributed to such actions.”
For him, the unification efforts were motivated by a belief in the Arab states’ artificiality and lack
of legitimacy. Therefore, “the decline in unification talks suggests a decreased belief in the
artificiality of the Arab state…[and] provides an indirect indicator of both an increase in the Arab
state’s legitimacy and empirical sovereignty and/or a decrease in the luster of pan-Arab claims”
(506). But the states that pursued political unity programs were The Hashemite dynasty in Iraq
and Jordan in interwar period and Egypt under Nasser in the 1950s, which were relatively the
most legitimate and strongest states in the system. Notice also different Arab states had different
level of artificiality and legitimacy, which is often overlooked in the literature on Pan-Arabism.
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rulers and their advisors anxious either to reunite the separate parts of Syria or to
create an Iraqi-Syrian federation. (Owen 1983: 18; emphasis added)
During the interwar period, only Iraq and Jordan, under the rule of the House of Hashim,
pursued unity plans but these plans were driven by dynastic principles rather than panArabism. Even after World War II, the
practical attempts to dissolve political boundaries and to create larger political
entities have generally been the work of rulers and regimes, many of whom were
guided more by dynastic ambition or sheer realpolitik than by any strongly held
belief in the basic tenets of Arab nationalism. (16; emphasis added)
All of the Arab political unity projects
envisaged an integrated political entity in which the member states retained sole
responsibility for managing their internal affairs. At most, amalgamation would
entail a unified foreign policy, particularly vis-à-vis the State of Israel and
western industrial powers, along with close cooperation on economic matters
(Ibid.).
The historian Philip Hitti succinctly summarized the different visions of Arab
unity plans: “By union here we mean somewhat loose political association of independent
states, a federation, or a confederation, of sovereign Arab units similar to the British
Commonwealth of Nations minus the crown.” None of the visions of the Arab unity
envision a hierarchical Arab state with one sovereign on the top (in Lawson 2006: 144).
This confusion over the relations between Pan-Arabism and sovereignty partly
originates from misunderstandings over the meaning of “unity.” The word Wehda (unity)
in Arabic refers to a large spectrum of relationships, including cooperation, coordination,
unity of purpose, and solidarity. By Wehda, President Nasser meant “solidarity,” and
wahdat al-hadaf “unity of purpose” (common goal), which is the common struggle
against imperialism and Zionism. Nasser also referred to “unity of ranks” and “unity of
action,” which means coordination and cooperation (Ben Dor 1983: 147-148).
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Pan-Arabism is a justification not a cause of intervention. A careful reading of
IR literature on sovereignty in the Arab world actually reveals that it reduces the effects
of pan-Arabism to a social fact that “justifies” but does not “cause” intervention. For
example, Michael Barnett argues that
Pan-Arabism encouraged instability of the Arab states system by providing Arab
leaders with a camouflage for their intervention in each other’s domestic affairs.
Such intrusions were not only inconsistent with the norm of sovereignty but
clearly complicated the region’s search for rules of stability (1993: 288; emphasis
added).
Elsewhere he also claims
Arabism frequently provided opportunities for Arab leaders to interfere in the
domestic affairs of others as long as these intrusions were viewed as serving panArabism ‘s goals. (1993: 287; emphasis added).
Gregory Gause also claims that “Transnational ideology [Arabism] justifies intervention”
(Gause: 451; emphasis added).
Thus, according to Barentt and Gause, Pan-Arabism provided camouflage and
justification for intervention. But providing justification and camouflage is different from
the real causes of intervention. “Causes of intervention” and “justification of
intervention” are two different things. To justify intervention does not mean “to cause
intervention.” Thus, Pan-Arabism was NOT the real cause of intervention; it just justifies
it. Furthermore, if Pan-Arabism only provided justification and camouflage to Arab
leaders to interfere in each other’s domestic affairs, then Pan-Arabism could not be a
“social role” as Barnett claims in the very same article. Social roles cannot be just tools
for justification. Social roles constitute interests and have more effects on behavior than
just providing justification for intervention.
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Arab identity and sovereignty. Some scholars explain the violation of state
sovereignty (intervention and military coups) through the rise and decline of Arab
identity (Barnett 1998). Accordingly, the dominance of Arab identity caused violation of
sovereignty whereas the decline of Arab identity caused the consolidation of state
identity, which in turn caused institutionalization of sovereignty. As put by Barnett’s
argument on the institutionalization of sovereignty in the Arab world:
a dramatic development in Arab politics is the greater agreement among Arab
states that regional order should be premised on the norms of sovereignty. And
the emergence of sovereignty in this instance is descriptively and analytically
connected to the rise of statist identities that are better able to compete with
Arabism that generate alternative expectations. (Barnett 1998: 15)
This argument is based on the assumption that Arab identity was stronger than state
identity until 1970s but “there is no reason to believe the Arabs constitute a more
‘natural’ nation than do Syrians, Iraqis or Egyptians” (Stein 2012: abstract). They provide
no evidence to illustrate the strength of Arab and state identity in the Middle East.
Furthermore,
although the norms of Arab politics are asserted to develop ultimately because of
Arab heritage, shared language or common history, these links are neither
theorized nor substantiated, which results in a view of regional politics as sharply
detached from the social milieus in which these norms supposedly arise (2).
Local nationalisms were actually strong already in 1930s. In the pre-1945 period, in spite
of the so-called 'artificiality' of most of the Arab states, local nationalism (wataniyya) had
become as strong as pan-Arabism (qawmiyya), and statehood had become a major
attribute of the Arab system. Thus, the concept of the state (raison d'etat) took root in
Middle Eastern politics long before the decline of pan-Arabism in the 1960s (Podeh
1998: 52).
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Owen also emphasizes the strength of local identities and local nationalism during
the interwar period. During the interwar period, “nationalist energies were now largely
diverted into fighting more specifically local battles against the colonial powers” (Owen
1983: 18).
Prominent scholars also challenge the argument that Arab identity declined after
1960s. Hudson asserts that in 1970s “pan-Arab perspectives have not lost their salience.
Arab nationalism remains a formidable legitimizing resource for kings and Presidents
alike” (Hudson 1977: 6). Public Polls also shows that Pan-Arabism was still predominant
identity among Arabs even in the 1980s (Korany: 53-55). According to public polls
conducted in 1981 (6000 persons in ten Arab states), 78 percent of the respondents
“contend that there exists a cultural unity defined as “the Arab Homeland,” whereas 22
percent doubt it” (Ben Dor 1983: 138).
To sum, neither the theory of Arab nationalism nor pan-Arabism (Arab political
unity project) nor Arab identity caused intervention and military coups in the Arab state
system. At the most, they provide justification but they were not the real causes of
intervention and military coups in the Arab world. Thus, the conflict between PanArabism and Sovereignty is a myth.
Oil and Economic Interdependence
According to this explanation, the oil boom in 1970s increased the economic
interdependence among Arab states, which in turn caused the decline of revisionist
policies, including external intervention. The oil revenues also helped the Arab states to
impose their internal sovereignty, which reflected in the significant decline of military
coups.
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The economic interdependence made radical Arab states such as Egypt more
dependent on the Arab oil states. They also become more vulnerable to the Arab oil
states. As a result, they had to restrain their hegemonic ambitions and revisionist polices.
Whereas Nasser could pursue regional hegemony and destabilize the regimes in the Arab
Gulf states during the 1950s and 1960s with little concern for economic consequences,
Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak could not do the same in 1980s and 1990s.
Following the oil boom in 1970s, the Arab states become more interdependent in
terms of labor migration and capital flow. The Non-oil Arab states such as Egypt, Syria,
Lebanon, and North Yemen supplied millions of workers to the oil countries. In early
1970s there were only about 648,000 Arabs working in other Arab states. The number of
Arab workers in other Arab states reached to about 4 million in early 1980s. Two thirds
of the labor force in Kuwait was Arabs from neighboring countries in 1980. The number
of foreign Arab workers in Iraq was about one million in the same year. In mid 1980s, 48
percent of Saudi Arabia teachers were Arabs from neighboring countries. Three millions
Egyptians were working in oil Arab countries in 1984. In addition to labor migration, the
oil revolution increased the formal foreign aid of oil countries to non-oil Arab countries
(Sela 1998: 23-27; Guese 1992: 462-464).
The increasing economic interdependence among Arab states also made the Arab
states more vulnerable to the costs of revisionist policies in the region. During the IraqKuwait war, for example, hundreds of thousands of Arab workers left Iraq alone. Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia expelled thousands of Palestinian and Jordanian workers in revenge to
Jordan and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) support to Saddam Hussein’s
invasion of Kuwait.
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This is an interesting explanation of consolidation of sovereignty and decline of
military coups and external intervention after 1970s. But economic interdependence
among Arab states actually declined in mid 1980s. In the first half of the 1980s, OPEC’s
total oil income fell by 50 percent, from $261.2 billion in 1981 to $131.5 billion in 1985.
The Gulf countries earning actually declined by 66 percent during this period. As a result
they reduced their aid programs by more than 50 percent from $9.7 billion to $3.9 billion
during the first half of the 1980s. Qatar even stopped its foreign aid to Syria, Jordan and
other Arab states. The Arab oil states investment in other Arab states was less than 5
percent (Sela 1998).
Despite the decline in oil revenues and economic interdependence in mid 1980s,
the Arab states system did not experience revival of military coups and military
intervention, which illustrate the limits of the above explanation. Furthermore, financial
aid from Arab oil states to non-oil Arab states “became a constant source of bitterness in
inter-Arab relations” (Sela 1998: 26-27). The aid was less than the needs of the recipient
states and it was divided into installments so as to ensure the oil countries’ effective
control over the funds.
Liberal theories that seek to explain domestic and regional political orders by the
existence or absence of democracy also fall short in explaining political order in the Arab
states system. First, Liberal theories cannot explain the significant changes in regional
political order in the Arab World despite the continuity of non-democratic regimes and
weak regional organizations (the Arab League). Second, the constitutive rules and
practices of sovereignty are beyond the scope of rationalist liberal theories, which by
definition focus on regulative rules (Keohane 1998).
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Islam
According to the cultural accounts, the political instability in the Arab world is the
result of Islam, which perceive all Arab states as illegitimate, secular, artificial, and
obstacles to the creation of Islamic state. These accounts are generally reductionist and
timeless. They are unable to explain significant differences between Arab states despite
their common culture or religion. These accounts also have difficulty to explain change in
the Arab states system as they focus on continuity, not change, which is explained by
constant religious values and principles. Thus, they have difficulty to explain the
significant changes in the practices of sovereignty in the Arab world.34
International Level of Analysis
Polarity and Great Powers
The explanations that fall under this category are mostly realist, focusing on great
powers and international polarity. Gause (1992), for example, addresses the role of great
power in the consolidation of sovereignty in the Arab states system as evidenced in their
intervention in the region to support the ruling regimes. The United States, for example,
sent its military troops to Lebanon in 1958 to protect the pro-Western government in
Beirut from the revisionist polices of Nasser and his allies inside Lebanon. The U.S.
military intervention included 15,000 troops on the ground, dozens of naval ships off the
coast, and 11,000 sorties by naval aircraft that made frequent low-level flights over
Beirut. The military intervention in Lebanon lasted three months without firing a shot,
and the last American forces left on October 25, 1958.
34

On critical perspectives of the cultural account see Halliday (2009: 16-17), Owen (2004: 19),
and Gause 1992: 452)
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Britain also sent troops to Jordan in July 17, 1958 to protect Jordan from the Iraqi
Revolution that put an end to Hashemite regime in Iraq. Britain also sent troops to
Kuwait to protect the territorial integrity of Kuwait from Iraq. And US air force troops
were deployed in Saudi Arabia in 1962 following the Egyptian intervention in Yemen
(Gause 1992: 455). Britain intervention in Egypt reached its peak with the ‘Tripartite
Aggression” (along with France, and Israel) on Egypt in 1956 (The Suez Crisis). There is
no doubt that great powers played role in the regional order in the Arab world but their
intervention has been supported by international norms. They mobilize international
norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity to protect their allies in the Arab world.
International polarity, on the other hand, seems to have little impact on state
sovereignty in the Arab states system. The consolidation of state sovereignty (understood
as a decline of intervention and military coups) did not correlate with changes in the
distribution of power at the international system. The transformation in internal and
external sovereignty in the Arab world in 1970s occurred despite the continuity of the
international bipolarity.
The 2011 Arab Spring also occurred despite the continuity of unipolarity in the
international system. In the same vein, the realist Benjamin Miller also argues hat
“regional variations under post-Cold war unipolarity may suggest that the structure of the
international system is indeterminate with regard to regional outcomes” (Miller 2007:
205).
It is striking that the existing literature that provide international explanation to
Middle East regional politics overlook international norms and practices. The
international society (Bull 1977) is overlooked in the alternative accounts (Miller 2007;
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Halliday 2005; Gause 1992). The omission of international society is particularly striking
given the fact that Middle East is “the most penetrated international relations subsystem
in today’s world” (L.C. Brown 1984: 3-5; quoted in Miller 2008: 133). Great powers
intervention in the Middle East, I argue, is largely influenced by the norms of
international society.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I critically reviewed the alternative arguments and highlighted
their shortcomings. Besides the specificities of each account addressed above, they share
common problems.
First, the literature on state sovereignty in the Arab state system imposes a fixed
and timeless definition of sovereignty. The literature does not explore the real meanings
of sovereignty held by the Arab states themselves. To fill this gap, I explore the meanings
of sovereignty in the Arab state system and international system and examine their
impact on practices of intervention.35
The existing literature also suffers from the absence of clear definition of
intervention. Where do the authors draw the line between intervention and nonintervention? Do they refer to political, military, or economic intervention? Do they
distinguish between acts of mere influence and acts of intervention?36 Do they mean
overt or covert intervention?
35

For similar approaches on sovereignty see Finnemore (2004), Hall (1999), Weber (1995), and
Briesker and Weber (1996).
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“Operationally an intervention must be distinguishable from the notion of influence. The
problem in many respects comes from the entanglement of policies seeking to influence behavior
from those attempting to intervene” (Regan 2000:9).
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The absence of clear theoretical and operational definition is particularly
misleading when we discuss concepts that are inherently elusive. And intervention is one
of the most elusive concepts in international politics. “Intervention has a perplexing
vagueness of meaning” (Winfield 1932: 236; quoted in Rosenau 1969:153), it “has
always been and remains an imprecise and extremely ambiguous concept” (Little 1987:
49). Stanley Hoffman’s observation that “[t]he subject [of intervention] is practically the
same as that of international politics in general from the beginning of time to the
present,” clearly illustrates the absence of clear definitional boundaries that distinguish
intervention from other practices (1984: 7). This conceptual challenge should be
addressed otherwise it opens the door for a misleading confusion of intervention with
other political practices. For example, “some analysts are inclined to term any foreign
policy behavior as interventionary when a power tries to change the behavior of another
power” (Schwarz in Little 1987: 49). Others even adopt Talleyrand’s remarks that “nonintervention is a metaphysical and political concept which means about the same as
intervention” (little: 49).
Fortunately, the problem of ambiguity is the beginning not the end of the story of
intervention in IR discipline. Hedley Bull (1984), Martha Finnemore (2003), Richard
Little (1975), Pearson and Baumann (1993), Pickering and Kisangani (2009), James
Rosenau (1968, 1969), R.J. Vincent (1974), Hidemi Suganami (2007), and Cynthia
Weber (1995) among others have provided useful insights and tools to address the
conceptual challenges surrounding intervention but the literature on intervention in the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has overlooked the recent IR literature with high
costs.
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The confusion on what constitute sovereignty and intervention led to many
imprecise explanations of the frequency of interventions in the Arab state system. For
example, scholars often confuse political unity agreements between Arab states as
violation of sovereignty. But political unity treaties do not constitute illegal intervention
and violation of sovereignty if they are formed by consent of the member states. The
political unity between Egypt and Syria in 1958 was not a violation of sovereignty
because the United Arab Republic (the political unity between Syria and Egypt) was
formed by consent of the governments of Syria and Egypt. The political unity between
Iraq and Jordan in 1958, which was also formed by consent, was compatible with the
rules of sovereignty and it did not constitute illegal intervention. Thus, political unity
projects should not be seen as empirical evidence to measure institutionalization of
sovereignty in the Arab world. Scholars have fallen in this conceptual trap because they
overlook the elusive definitions of intervention and sovereignty.
The actual meaning (or meanings) of intervention hold by Arab states themselves
are also missing in the literature. Yet interventions do not occur in vacuum but in
domestic, regional and international normative contexts that give meanings to the deeds
of intervention. Sovereignty and intervention are practices—deeds that embody shared
inter-subjective knowledge—we cannot ignore the inter-subjective elements of
sovereignty and intervention (Adler and Pouliot 2011).
The existing literature also strikingly ignores the international society; namely,
international norms and practices. Yet, institutionalization of the rules of sovereignty and
non-intervention in the Arab state system are at least partly constituted by the practices of
sovereignty and intervention in the international system. We cannot ignore the
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international society within which the Arab states are embedded. This knowledge is
important in order to avoid the risk of immature orientalist and Arab exceptionalism
explanations.
In the same vain, the literature does not explore the complex relationship between
intervention and sovereignty. The relationship is anything but simple. Not every
intervention is a violation of sovereignty. Practices of intervention and non-intervention
actually constitute the meaning of sovereignty and vice versa (Biersteker and Weber
1996: 12-13). Different types of sovereignty (dynastic; national, or popular) constitute
different patterns of interventions and vice versa.
Besides the definitional or conceptual problems, the existing literature lacks a
systematic review of intervention in the Arab state system. From the above arguments we
only know that intervention, whatever it means, was unusually common in the region.
But this observation does not take us far enough.
The literature does not inform us about the total number of interventions in the
Arab world and the changes in its frequency over time. There is also no cross regional
comparison that allows us to observe the distinctive patterns of intervention in the Arab
world. The literature does not even help us much to answer the following basic questions:
Who intervene? Where they intervene (target)? How they intervene? And why they
intervene? The literature does not tell us whether intervention practices were hostile or
friendly, direct or indirect, unilateral or multilateral, legitimate or illegitimate, covert or
overt, successful or failure. Do different Arab states involved in different types of
intervention or they conduct similar types of intervention? What are the nature, purpose
and patterns of intervention? Do they vary across states and over time? The current
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literature does not answer these questions. In other words, the literature lacks a
systematic classification of intervention practices in the Arab state system.
Finally, the literature is also limited in the period of time it covers—the Cold War.
The Arab state system, however, has been going through substantive transformations
since the end of the Cold War culminated in the ongoing wave of popular uprisings—the
Arab Spring—with serious ramifications upon sovereignty and intervention. Most of the
literature also overlooks the inter-war period when the Arab state system was formed. But
the formation process of the Arab state system had significant impact on the subsequent
evolution of the practices of sovereignty and intervention in the region. To fill this gap, I
explore sovereignty and intervention in the Arab state system from the fall of the
Ottoman Empire to the present time, including the Arab Spring.
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PART II: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
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CHAPTER THREE: INSTITUTIONS: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Institutions keep society from falling apart, provided that there is something to
keep institutions from falling apart.
— Elster (1989: 147)
Sovereignty is a social institution of supreme authority. Therefore, we should
embed the study of sovereignty within the framework of social institutions and
institutional analysis. It is important to come back to the basics of institutions because
some of the confusions over sovereignty result from disagreements on the meaning of
institution itself.
The purpose of this chapter is to offer a clear definition of institution, an
analytical framework for the study of institutions, including causes of institutional
change, as well as sources of institutional power. I will apply this framework to the study
of sovereignty and intervention in the following chapter.
Definitions of Institution in Social Science
There are multiple definitions of social institutions in IR in particular and social
science in general. There is no consensus on the meaning of institutions. While there is
broad consensus that sovereignty is an institution (Keohane 2002), there is much less
consensus on the meaning of institution. Thus, it is important to offer clear definition and
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analytical framework of institution because various approaches of institutions lead to
different perspectives on sovereignty.
From the rationalist perspective, the neorealist John Mearsheimer defines
institutions as “sets of rules that stipulate the ways in which states cooperate and compete
with each other” (1994-5:8). The neoliberal intuitionalist Robert Keohane defines
institution as “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe
behavioral roles, constrain activity and shape expectations” (1989:3).37 Both authors
restrict institutions to regulative institutions, excluding constitutive ones from their
definitions.
Keohane’s definition is the most common in IR although it suffers from some
shortcomings. First, Keohane’s definition of institution is tautological for including the
effects of institutions in the definition itself. In Keohane’s definition, compliance to
institution is built into the definition of institution. But the behavioral outcome
(prescribed roles, shaped expectations and constrained activity) that ought to be explained
by institutions should not be part of the definition of institution but a matter of empirical
test (Simmons and Martin 2001: 194). By doing so, Keohane limits the concept of
institutions only to successful institutions (i.e. institutions that successfully constrain
activity and shape expectations). But only if we exclude the behavioral outcomes (shaped
expectations and constrained activity) from the definition of institution, we can
differentiate between strong and weak institutions, discuss level of institutionalization as
well as violation of institutions.
37

“To be institutionalized, the rules must be durable and must prescribe behavioral roles for
actors, besides constraining activity and shape expectations.” (Keohane1988: 384).
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Second, Keohane also restricts institutions to “persistent” rules, which implies
that institutional change is unusual matter and institutional persistence is normal fact. But
both institutional persistence and institutional change are outcomes as highlighted by
contemporary institutional economists. “Approaches positing institutional persistence as
a matter of fact, and then thinking of institutional change as unusual events will not be
satisfactory. Both phenomena have to be analyzed as part of the same dynamic
equilibrium framework” (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005: 463).
Finally, Keohane also includes “to shape expectations” and “to prescribe
behavioral role” within the same definition, which is also redundant. “Behavioral role” is
“behavioral expectation” so it is redundant to include “behavioral role” and
“expectations” within the same definition.
From the IR constructivist camp, O. R. Young defines social institutions as
“recognized practices consisting of easily identifiable roles, couples with collections of
rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of these roles (Young
1986: 107; Keohane 1998:384). The prominent English School scholar, Hidemi
Suganami defines institution as
a cluster of social rules, conventions, usages, and practices: it is not a mere
outwardly observable behavior–pattern but a set of conventional assumptions held
prevalently among society-members to provide a framework for identifying what
is the done thing and what is not in the appropriate circumstances. It connotes
normativeness. It is to be distinguished from organizations such as NATO and
UNO although these bodies come into existence through the working of
institutions (1983: 2365).38
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The primary concern of the institutionalist school (English School), according to Suganami is,
“to enquire what common assumptions are held about how things are to be done in international
relations by those who speak and act in the name of states and how these assumptions affect the
maintenance of order at the international level. In other words, the school is engaged in a search
for the institutional basis of international order. Hence the label institutionalists” (1983: 2365).
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While constructivists’ definitions are more inclusive than the rationalist ones, they also
have some shortcomings. Suganami’s definition, for example, is like a black box that
includes a mix of stuff (rules, conventions, usages, practices, behavior pattern, and
conventional assumptions) without addressing how they are related to each other.
Suganami does not address how the “cluster” is organized as a whole. In other words, he
does not address the structure of the institution—the relationships among the different
elements that compose institution.39 Constructivists also lack clear criteria of what
constitute an institution. Even Hedley Bull “never gave a full definition of what
constitutes an institution, nor does he set out criteria for inclusion into or exclusion from
this category” (Buzan 2006: 78). Some constructivists (e.g. Sikkink 1991) define
institution as “set of understandings”, which also suffers from the same pitfalls as Bull
and Suganami.
The school of historical institutionalism defines institutions as “formal
organizations and informal rules and procedures that structure conduct.” Peter Hall, in
particular, defines institution as “the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard
operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of
the polity and economy” (Thellen and Steinmo 1992: 2).
John Campbell offers a broader definition of institutions as “sets of formal and
informal rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, and systems of meanings that
define the contexts within which people and organizations interact. They result in durable
practices that are legitimated by widely held beliefs” (2004: 174). Notice that Campbell
39

This problem is common in IR in general, rationalists and constructivists alike. For criticism of
this perspective of institutions, see Campbell (2004).
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regards practices as a consequence of institution whereas Suganami and Young see
practices as part of the definition of institution.
Even the disciplines of Philosophy and Economics lack consensus on the meaning
of institution. The philosopher John Rawls defines institution as:
A public system of rules which defines offices and positions with their rights and
duties, powers and immunities, and the like. These rules specify certain forms of
action as permissible, others as forbidden; and they provide for certain penalties
and defenses, and so on, when violations occur … An institution may be thought
of in two ways: first as an abstract …system of rules; and second, as the
…[realized] actions specified by these rules (Rawls 1971:55).
What I find particularly useful in Rawls’s definition is the inclusion of social positions,
which is excluded in IR definitions mentioned above. He also distinguishes between
abstract rules and the practices.
The philosopher John Searle provides a different definition of institution as
any collectively accepted system of rules (procedures, practices) that enable us to
create institutional facts. These rules typically have the form of X counts as Y in
C, where an object, person, or state of affairs X is assigned a special status, the Y
status, such that the new status enables the person or object to perform functions
that it could not perform solely in virtue of its physical structure but requires as a
necessary condition the assignment of the status. The creation of an institutional
fact is, thus, the collective assignment of a status function (Searle 2005: 21-22).
Searle explicitly emphasizes the role of language in constructing institutions as he puts it,
“instead of presupposing language and analyzing institutions, we have to analyze the role
of language in the constitution of institution” (2005: 2). Both Rawls and Searle’s
definitions go beyond the regulative rules; they explicitly contain the constitutive
dimensions of institutions.
In Economics, Olinor Ostrom defines institution as “prescriptions that human use
to organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions” (2005:3). Acknowledging
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the disagreements on the definition of institution in social science, Ostrom decided to
focus on one component of institution, social rules. She defines rules as “shared
understandings by participants about enforced prescriptions concerning what actions (or
outcomes) are required, prohibited, or permitted (2005: 18; italic original). “Wellunderstood and enforced rules operate so as to rule out some actions and rule in others”
(Ibid.).
Ostrom also highlights the language character of institutions. “All rules are
formulated in human language. As such, rules share problems of lack of clarity,
misunderstandings, and change that typify any language-based phenomenon.”
The stability of rule-ordered actions is dependent upon the shared meaning
assigned to words used to formulate a set of rules. If no shared meaning exists
when a rule is formulated, confusion will exist about what actions are required,
permitted, or forbidden. Regularities in action cannot result if those who must
repeatedly interpret the meaning of a rule within action situation arrive at multiple
interpretations…Even if shared meaning exists at the time of the acceptance of a
rule, transformations in technology, in shared norms, and in circumstances more
generally change the events to which rules apply (20).
The economist Douglass North offers a different definition, “institutions are the
rules of the game in a society, or more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that
shape human interaction…In consequence they structure incentives in human exchange,
whether political, social, or economic” (1990:3). Ostrom and North’s definitions
emphasize the regulative dimensions of institutions over the constitutive dimensions.
Finally, March and Olsen define institution as
a relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in
structures of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of
turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and
expectations of individuals and changing external circumstances. (2009)
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Common Shortcomings in the Literature on Institutions
The short review of definitions of institutions clearly illustrates the absence of
clear consensus on the meaning of institution. “A lot of work [still] must be done on
determining exactly what goes under the title of an “institution” (Plott 1979:160; in
Ostrom 1986: 3). Thus, it is important to clearly define institution before discussing the
institution of sovereignty. Different definitions of institution above could lead to different
approaches to the study the particular institution of sovereignty. For example, Searl’s
definition of institution leads to a particular perspective on sovereignty, which is very
different from our perspective on sovereignty if we adopt Mearshiemer or Keohane’s
definitions of institution.
Besides the definitional problem, the literature on institutions does not provide
much help to conduct research on institutional change. “While institutional analysis has
earned prominent place in contemporary social science, the vast literature that has
accumulated provides us with precious little guidance in making sense of processes of
institutional change” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010:2).
The current literature tends to perceive institution as undivided whole, limiting the
capacity to identify different dimensions of institutional change. But “institutions are
multidimensional entities” (Campbell 2004:174). Unpacking the multi-dimensional
aspect of institution is important for the study of institutional change. “If we want to
better identify patterns of institutional change and avoid mistaking one pattern for
another, then specifying important institutional dimensions and mapping them over an
appropriate time frame is important” (Campbell 2004: 61). Some dimensions of the
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institution might change while others remain constant. Also, different elements of the
institution might change at different time pace (Campbell 2004: 31-39).
Regarding institution as a black box or undivided coherent whole also overlooks
endogenous causes of institutional change. Endogenous causes of institutional change
result from interaction between the different elements that compose institution (Mahoney
and Thelen 2010: 1-37). By not unpacking institutions, researchers restrict the causes of
institutional change only to exogenous forces (outside the institution itself) (Ibid.)
The current literature on institutions also tends to regard institutions as discrete.
There is tendency to study particular institutions as they operate in institutional vacuum,
overlooking interactions between institutions as well as combined effects of institutions.
In the following section, I will offer a framework of institution that overcomes the
above shortcomings in the literature. It includes the constitutive and regulative
dimensions of institution, allows us to unpack institution into its components, which is
helpful for the study of institutional change, and it also allows us to study interactions
between institutions and their combined effects.
Social Institution: A New Definition and Framework
Social institution is a cluster of interconnected rules, roles, positions and
practices. Rules, positions, roles, and practices are the four elements or dimensions of
institution. They can also be seen as four levels of analysis of an institution.40
For the purpose of this dissertation, I define social institution as a set of connected
(formal and informal) rules that define social positions, prescribe their behavioral roles,

40

Ostrom discusses levels of analysis of rules, not institution (1986: 17-21).
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and state how these roles are performed on the ground (i.e. practices). Of course this
definition exclude some dimensions that included in the above definitions but in my view
these four elements are still the most fundamental ones and they are particularly useful
for the study of sovereignty and change in sovereignty.
Social institutions perform the following four functions:
1) Defining social positions;
2) Stating how participants enter or leave social positions;
3) Prescribing the behavioral roles of the social positions--which actions
participants in these positions are required, permitted, or forbidden to take;
4) Specifying how the social roles are performed on the ground (practices).41
Roles are “behavioral norms and expectations associated with social position”
(Donnelly 2011: 11). They specify the rights, duties as well as permitted, required, and
forbidden behavior of the occupants of social positions. Institutional practices are the
realized patterns of behavior that are prescribed by the roles of the institution. Realized
practices embody, act out and possibly reify the inter-subjective content of the institution
(rules, positions, and roles).
Realized practices are the highest level of institutionalization of an institution.
Realized practices are the realized patterns of behavior that are prescribed by the
institution. But not all institutions reach this high stage of institutionalization. It is an
empirical question whether institutions reach the stage of realized practices.

41

This aspect is discussed in Ostrom (1986: 5).
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Not all patterns of behavior are institutional practices. Patterns of behavior
become institutional practices only when they embody rules, roles, and positions of the
institution (inter-subjective knowledge). The pattern of behavior of balance of power in
Kenneth Waltz theory (1979), for example, is not institutional practice. But the pattern of
behavior of balance of power in Hedley Bull’s Anarchical Society is institutional practice
(1977).
This definition includes constitutive and regulative dimensions of institution. It
includes defining social positions (constitutive dimension) and prescribing behavioral
roles (regulative dimension). This definition does not specify the origins of the
institutions. They might be human-designed projects (which are the focus of rationalist
theories) or they can evolve out of historical patterns of behavior, routines, and for
granted assumptions (which is what Constructivists focus on). My definition of institution
also allows the researcher to test empirically the impact of institution on the behavior and
expectations of the actors instead of including institutional effects within the definition of
the institution.
Unpacking the structure of the institution into rules, positions, roles and practices
is also helpful for a more sophisticated research on inter-subjectivity of the institution.
This definition allows us to explore the inter-subjectivity of the different elements of the
institution (rules, position, roles, and practices). The level of inter-subjectivity may differ
across the roles, rules, positions and practices of the institutions. For example, an
institution might enjoy absolute shared meaning at the level of rules and positions but
experience different interpretations at the level of roles and practices. The formal rules of
the institution might be shared inter-subjective fact but the roles and practices of the
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institution might not. Also, different institutions offer different degrees of discretion at
the level of interpretation of behavioral roles and the level of enactment of roles
(practices).42
This definition is also helpful for studying institutional change. Accordingly, there
are four dimensions of institutional change: rules, positions, roles, and practices. Not all
elements of the institution change simultaneously. Changes in one dimension may or may
not cause changes in the other. Rules can remain formally the same but the behavior
expectations are interpreted and enacted in new ways. Also it might take time for changes
in formal rules to be translated into changes in practices. And changes in roles do not
necessarily cause changes in positions or formal rules. In contrast, IR rationalist and
constructivist perspectives on institutions, which see institution as undivided whole,
cannot account for this variation inside institutions.
This perspective on institutions also offers new insights on the relative power of
agency and institution. Agency has more freedom for creativity and change at the levels
of practices and roles. Institutional ambiguities at the level of role and practices “provide
critical openings to creativity and agency” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 12). “The fact
that rules are not just designed but also have to be applied and enforced, often by actors
other than the designers, opens up space (as both an analytic and a practical matter) for
change to occur in a rule’s implementation or enactment” (13).
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Similarly, Donnelly (2013) unpacks the institution of human rights into principle,
interpretation, and implementation. He argues that human rights are universal (which in my view
he means universal inter-subjective fact) only at the principle level but less so at the levels of
interpretation and implementation.
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Change in institution could occur “in the “gaps” or “soft spots” between the rule
and its behavioral interpretation [roles] or the rule and its practices” (14). “There is
simply a great deal of “play” in the interpreted meaning of particular rules or in the way
the rules are instantiated in practice” (11). Therefore, “Institutional stability ultimately
depends not only on the continuity of the rules themselves but also on the ways in which
those rules are instantiated in practice” and also on the interpretations and enactments of
roles (13).
The relations between the four dimensions of institution (rules, positions, roles,
and practices) are mutual, interconnected and interdependent. They are all equally
important. Yet, we can still identify the structure of institution, for analytical purposes, as
the following top-down relationship.

Rules

Positions

Roles

Practices

Figure 1: The structure of social institution.
This particular top-down structure is justified by the following relations between
the elements of the institution. Patterns of behavior must embody inter-subjective
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knowledge (rules, roles, and position) to be called practices. Otherwise it is just
mechanical patterns of behavior. Also, practices are the performance of the roles. No
practices without roles. Notice also that there are no roles without positions. Roles are
behavioral expectations of social positions, so positions must exist before roles. Finally,
there are no positions without rules that define these positions. But practices not only
sustain but they also may change the above elements of the institution (roles, positions,
and rules).
How do we see social institutions? The obvious indicators of institutions are the
formal written ones but there are also the informal institutions. They can be seen
when actors make reference to them and orient their action around them. An
informal institutional rule exists to the extent that actors refer to a rule when
considering action, when justifying or legitimizing action, and when interpreting
action…[And] there are the practices that are part of the institution and that also
instantiate the rules (O’Mahoney 2013: 4).
Institutional change has multiple sources such as change in preferences and distribution
of power. But in this dissertation, I focus on two institutional sources of Institutional
change:
1) Endogenous sources of change: The interaction among the four elements of
the institution (rules, positions, roles, and practices) is an endogenous source
of change. For example, changes in practices could result from changes in
roles. Or changes in roles could ultimately cause changes in positions and
even rules. Changes occur in roles, rules, positions and practices. They do not
have to be simultaneous or at the same pace. We should also distinguish
between change in level of inter-subjectivity (level of shared understandings)
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and content of inter-subjectivity: Change in the degree of shared
understandings; and change in the content of what is shared.
2) Exogenous sources of change: The institution’s Complementary Institutions.43
This is an exogenous source of institutional change. Change in
complementary institutions could cause changes in the focal institution. For
example, change in territoriality affect territorial sovereignty (see below).
Sources of Institutional Power
There are multiple sources of institutional power but here I will focus on two
sources that often either assumed or overlooked in the literature.
Inter-Subjectivity of the Institution
The power of social institution is a variable rather than constant. The level of
inter-subjectivity of the institution is a major source of its power. The power of institution
“relies on the dominance of particular shared understanding than simply control over
military technology” (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 24). In order to pose effective constraints,
the institution has to be inter-subjective social fact (shared meaning) (Ruggie 1998).44
Institutions with low level of inter-subjectivity are less effective than institutions with
high level of inter-subjectivity.
The level of inter-subjectivity is an important variable. It is not constant. Thus, we
should explore the inter-subjectivity of institution empirically instead of assuming it.

43

I address the concept “complementary institutions” below.
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Inter-subjectivity is also what Searle calls “collective intentionality” (2005:6).
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Both the content of the institution and the level of inter-subjectivity of the institution are
variables.
Researching the level of inter-subjectivity of institution is similar (but not
identical) to Zacher’s emergence, acceptance and consolidation stages of norms (Zacher
2001). It is also similar (but not identical) to Finnemore and Sikkink’s the emergence,
cascade and internalization stages of international norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).
Investigating the level of inter-subjectivity of international institution is very
important because there is a significant difference between violation of institution (at low
level of inter-subjectivity or emergence stage) and violation of institution (at high level of
inter-subjectivity or internalization stage). If we ignore Level of inter-subjectivity and
assume all institutions are highly inter-subjective we ignore an interesting institutional
explanation of violation and/or compliance with international institutions. Therefore, the
research on intervention requires investigating the content and level of inter-subjectivity
of sovereignty instead of assuming sovereignty. This suggests that both sovereignty and
intervention must be empirically examined at the same time rather than assumed by the
analyst.45
Knowing the differences in the level of inter-subjectivity (including stages of
emergence, cascade, and internalization) of various international norms could help us to
explain why some norms are more violated than others. The relative level of intersubjectivity of norms influence why some norms are more violated than others. States
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Most of IR and MENA literature on intervention, however, often start with assumption on ideal
type of territorial sovereignty and ask why intervention occur and violate this ideal type. See
Weber (1995: 17-29) for a critical review of IR literature on sovereignty and intervention.
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prefer not to violate highly inter-subjective norms (at internalization stage) because the
sanctions against violation are high. But the sanctions against violation of norms in their
low level of inter-subjectivity (emergence stage) are relatively low.
The state’s decision of which international norm to violate depends, inter alia, on
the particular level of inter-subjectivity of international norms. The latter affect the
legitimacy and the costs of violating particular norms. In other words, the relative level of
inter-subjectivity of international institutions is a structural explanation of state violation
of a particular institution. The choice of which institution or norm the state choose to
violate is affected by the relative power of the norm (level of inter-subjectivity of the
norm). As North puts it, “essential part of the functioning of institutions is the costliness
of ascertaining violation and the severity of punishment” (North 1990: 4). The severity of
punishment against violators of international norms depends, inter alia, on the level of
inter-subjectivity of the norm (I use norms and institutions interchangeably because norm
is a particular type of institution).
For example, After World War II the international sanctions against violating the
norm of non-intervention are lower than the international sanctions against violating the
norm of territorial integrity. In this sense, intervention is the lesser evil because the costs
of the alternative actions (use of force and occupation of land) are higher. The norms of
territorial integrity are harder to violate because they are more inter-subjective and more
internalized.
Complementary Institutions
The power of institution is also contingent upon its complementarity institutions.
“Two institutions can be said to be complementary if the presence (or efficiency) of one
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increases the returns from (or efficiency of) the other…Conversely, two institutions can
be said to be “substitutable” if the absence or inefficiency of one increases the returns to
using the other (Hall and Soskice 2001: 17-18).
Institutions do not operate independently from each other; they exert combined
influence on the state. The concept “complementary institutions” suggests
the importance of viewing norms not as individual “things” floating atomistically
in some international social space but rather as part of a highly structured social
context. It make more sense to think of a fabric of interlocking and interwoven
norms rather than to think of individual norms concerning a specific
issue….Change in one set of norms may open possibilities for, and even logically
or ethically require changes in, other norms and practices. Without attending to
these relationships, we will miss the larger picture (Finnemore 2003: 57).
Pierson and Skocpol (2002: 696) also emphasize the importance of hypothesizing “about
the combined effects of institutions and processes rather than examining just one
institution or process at a time.” Nobel Prize Laurite, The Late Elinor Ostrom, also
emphasizes the importance of examining “how particular combination of rules affect
actions and outcomes?” She warns us that if we do not understand how combinations of
rules affect actions, “rule change may produce unexpected and, at times, disastrous
outcomes” (2005: 7). North also addresses the relations between institutions and their
impact on politics, ““when there is a radical change in the formal rules that makes them
inconsistent with the existing informal constraints, there is unresolved tension between
them that will lead to long run political instability (1990” 140)
In IR, Barry Buzan also calls upon his colleagues at the English School for
researching relations between institutions:
Those classics in the English School that subordinate the exploration of tension
among primary institutions to the concern for order, block one of the most
interesting insights to be gained from the study of primary institutions: that
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tensions among them are a key driving force in the evolution of interstate society
(2004: 186).
Martha Finnemore also calls upon constructivists to seriously address the relations
between different institutions and their combined effects on the international system:
“Constructivists have not made an integrated argument about how the various norms in
different areas fit together…Without such an argument about the content of a systemic
social structure, constructivism cannot provide an alternative to systemic theories” (1996:
327). Finally, Robert Keohane also acknowledges the importance of addressing the
relations between different institutions: “Values, norms and practices vary across
cultures, and such variations will affect the efficacy of institutional
arrangements…institutions that are consistent with culturally accepted practices are likely
to entail lower transaction costs than those that conflict with those practices (1988: 38990). He added, “Each set of institutions to be explained is viewed within an institutional
as well as material context: prior institutions create incentives and constraints that affect
the emergence or evolution of later ones” (1988: 390).
Despite the above assertion on the importance of researching the relations
between institutions, IR had given scant attention to this important aspect of international
politics. Instead, IR still tends to treat institutions as concrete and independent from each
other.

68

Institutions and Behavior: The Theoretical Contributions of Social Roles
Roles have been received scant theoretical or empirical attention in IR even
though they figure prominently in the definitions of institutions.46 This is unfortunate
omission of a very important concept in institutional analysis.
The sociologists have acknowledged the significance of the concept of role
already in the mid of the twentieth century as asserted by the prominent sociologist
Robert Merton in 1957 that “however much they differ in other respects, contemporary
sociological theorists are largely at one in adopting the premise that social statuses and
social roles comprise major building blocks of social structure” (Merton 1957: 110). But
fifty years later IR theory has yet to adopt this important concept despite the
acknowledgment of its importance by perhaps the two most famous IR theorists.
Alexander Wendt, for example, asserts that “the concept of “role” should be a key
concept in structural theorizing about the international system” (Wendt 1999: 251). Even
Kenneth Waltz emphasizes the importance of roles. In a meeting of a US Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations on the post-Cold War international affairs, Waltz
acknowledges, “the old and new great powers will have to learn new roles and figure how
to enact them on shifting stage. New roles are hard to learn, and actors easily strip when
playing on unfamiliar sets” (quoted in Thies 2003:546).
Social Roles are very useful for understandings important dimensions of
institutional stability and change. The concept of role sheds new lights on the above
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See, for example, Keohane and Young definitions of institution above.

69

issues of inter-subjectivity of the institution, institutional power, as well as the impact of
roles on practices.
Role Acquisition
The process of role acquisition, for example, influences the level of intersubjectivity of the institution, which in turn affects the stability and power of the
institution.
Learning new roles and adjusting to them, is continuous, dynamic process rather
than a one-step process. It is an episode that takes place over time (Kahn et al. 1964). It
contains different stages of interaction between the role and its occupant. The process of
role acquisition entails four stages: anticipatory, formal, informal, and personal. “A role
is not fully acquired until an individual has anticipated it, learned anticipatory, formal and
informal expectations comprised in it, formulated his own expectations, reacted and
reconciled these various expectations, and accepted the final outcome” (Thornton and
Nardi 1975: 873). This reflects the complexity that is inherited in the process of role
acquisition. Formal recognition of the sovereignty of the Arab state, accordingly, is only
one single, even early, step in the process of sovereign role acquisition.
The early stages of sovereign role acquisition could be causes of disorder because
the behavioral expectations have yet to be internalized by the actor. “[A]ctors do not
adopt new roles the first moment they interact in a new environment; some experience
and time are needed before new roles are adopted” (Beyers 2005: 917). “Relatively new
states will often have a difficult time trying to achieve roles as they enter the international
system” (Thies 2010: 709). And “the role performance is generally more effective in the
later stages than in the earlier ones” of role acquisition (Thornton and Nardi 1975: 883).
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From this perspective of role acquisition, the ineffective performance of the sovereign
role by the Arab states following independence is a “normal” situation for new states.
Unfortunately, IR and Middle East area studies adopt the
traditional approach to role acquisition that views it as synonymous with the
acquisition of a new position in the social system. Role acquisition is thus
considered a one step event whereby the individuals assume new social positions
and conform immediately to the expectations consequently directed at them
(Thornton and Nardi 1975: 870).
This view underestimates the destabilizing effects of role acquisition on intersubjectivity, behavioral expectations, and order in the system. This traditional view also
underestimates the complexity of role acquisition, especially the variance in role
performance overtime (870-871).47 It also conflates social positions with social roles,
overlooking the interactions between the two.
Role Ambiguity
The concept of role ambiguity is also relevant to the above debate on intersubjectivity and power of the institution. A role is ambiguous “when expectations within
it are incomplete or insufficient to guide behavior” (Biddle 1979: 382). Van Sell, Brief
and Schuler (1981: 44) offer a more detailed definition:
Role ambiguity has been defined as the degree to which clear information is
lacking regarding (a) the expectations associated with a role, (b) methods for
fulfilling known role expectations, and/or (c) the consequences of role
performance (Craen, 1976; Khan et al., 1964). In other words, role ambiguity
could possibly take one or all of the following forms: (a) information is unclear
regarding which potential role expectation—A, B, or C—should be performed;
(b) it is understood that expectation A should be met, but information is unclear
47

The dynamic of role acquisition is also overlooked in IR agent/structure debate. Both IR
constructivist and rationalist account of agent/structure are reductionist, or conflationist to use
Margaret Archer’s term. They overlook the interplay between role and its occupant—overlooking
the interplay between agent and structure.
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regarding what behavior will in fact yield A; (c) the consequences of behavior A
are unclear (Van Sell, Brief and Schuler: 50).
Most studies in sociology and psychology report a positive relationship between role
ambiguity and tension or anxiety (Ibid.). Some roles are more ambiguous than others.
The roles of sovereignty is one of the most ambiguous roles in international system. The
ambiguity of the roles of sovereignty has significant effect on the “practices of
sovereignty.” When the “roles of sovereignty” are ambiguous, it is unclear what
constitutes “practice of sovereignty.”
The ambiguity of social role provides structural context that allows for different
and even conflicting interpretation of the role and its enactment (practices). The
ambiguity of social role allows states to strategically manipulate its meaning. For
example, the ambiguity of the roles of sovereignty provided a structural opportunity for
different interpretations of sovereignty in the Arab state system. Some states fused
sovereignty with autonomy such as Syria under the Ba’th regime while others fused
sovereignty with Arab unity such as Egypt under Nasser. Following independence, Saudi
Arabia regarded strategic cooperation with the West as manifestations of its sovereignty
while Syria and Egypt perceived strategic cooperation with the West as a violation of
sovereignty. Egypt under Nasser argued that Arab unity was the only path to Arab
sovereignty even though Arab states already enjoyed formal sovereignty. Jordan on the
other hand, claimed that Arab unity is a violation of sovereignty or even an act of
imperialism. The ambivalent content of the roles of sovereignty enabled conflicting
interpretations of roles and practices of sovereignty in the Arab state system.
Role ambiguity has positive relationship with role conflict:
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[F]orms of role ambiguity may exhibit a reciprocal causal relationship with
dimensions of role conflict. Thus, even though role conflict and role ambiguity
are conceptually distinguishable types of role stress, one should not expect their
empirical indices necessarily to be unrelated. (Van Cell, Brief, and Schuler, 1981:
44)
Role Conflict
Role conflict affects the level of inter-subjectivity and power of the institution. It
also affects the stability of the inter-subjectivity of the institution. “[R]ole conflict is
problematic, because it disrupts the minimum predictability needed for interaction”
(Stryker and Macke 1978: 71). “Role conflict is only one of several structural conditions
that are thought to cause problems in social systems. Others have included role
ambiguity…” (Biddle 1986: 83).
Role conflict is caused by the simultaneous occupancy of conflicting structural
positions. The role expectations and norms associated with these positions are
assumed invariant across situations and not easily modified because of their
functional importance. (Stryker and Macke 1978: 70)
Role conflict exists
when there are contradictory expectations that attach to same position in a social
relationship. Such expectations may call for incompatible performances; they may
require that one hold two norms or values which logically call for opposing
behaviors; or they may demand that one role necessitates the expenditure of time
and energy such that it is difficult or impossible to carry out the obligation of
another role. (Stryker, 1980:73)48
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According to this view, each social position involves only one single role, and role conflict
occurs as a result of simultaneous occupancy of conflicting social positions. But as Robert K.
Merton argues, each social position could also involve an array of roles instead of one single role.
Role-set refers to the complex of multiple roles associated with a single social status; “that
complement of role-relationships in which persons are involved by virtue of occupying a
particular social status” (Merton 1957: 110-111).
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Role Socialization
The inter-subjectivity of the roles of sovereignty is also contingent upon the
power of international society to socialize states to internalize the role of sovereignty.
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann define socialization as “the comprehensive
and consistent induction of an individual into the objective world of a society or sector of
it” (1966: 130). For Stryker and Statham, “socialization is the generic term used to refer
to the processes by which the newcomer—the infant, rookie, or trainee, for example—
becomes incorporated into organized patterns of interaction” (1985: 325). David
Armstrong defines socialization as the process “whereby an increasing entanglement
within an existing structure of relationships brings about an increasing degree of
adaptation to the normal behavior patterns of that structure” (Armstrong 1993: 7-8;
quoted in Thies 2010: 694).
Socializating new states to internalize the role of sovereignty is a continuous
process that takes place over time. The socializing power of international society is a
also variable. For example, the socializing power of the United Nations in 1945 is much
less comparing to its socializing power in 1990s (Barnett and Finnemore 2004).
The above aspects of social roles illustrate the analytical benefits of unpacking
institution. It also clearly shows how role-ambiguity, role-acquisition, role-conflict and
role-socialization, affect the level of inter-subjectivity and in turn the power of institution.
They also influence institutional stability and change.
Conclusion
This chapter offers a new analytical framework for the study of institutions. My
framework includes analytical dimensions that have been overlooked in IR literature on
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institution. It unpacks institutions into its elements and studies their relations; it takes
seriously level of inter-subjectivity and institutional complementarity as sources of
institutional power; and it also highlights the analytical advantages of social roles in the
study of institutions.
Institutional analysis does not explain everything but at least an important part of
social reality that we should not overlook:
whether institutions are strong or weak, substantial or nominal, we cannot
understand behavior very adequately without making reference to them. Politics is
to a very significant extent an activity of conceiving, making, accepting,
changing, enforcing, defying, ignoring, evading, avoiding, and corrupting rule
which seek to prescribe behavior. (Jackson and Rosberg 1986: 29)
The above analytical institutional framework provides important contributions to
our understanding of international structure. First, the variables “level of intersubjectivity”, “institutional complementarity”, and “role conflict” highlight the
importance of addressing the relations between the different elements of the structure
instead of assuming the structure as “perfectly integrated system, where every element
was interdependent with every other” (Archer 1985: 334). Second, the variables level of
institutionalization, role conflict, institutional complementarity, role ambiguity and role
acquisition shed new light on structural causes of uncertainty that goes beyond the
absence of government. They help to provide institutional analysis of uncertainty. Third,
the concepts of role acquisition and role socialization contribute to better understanding
of the mutual relations between agent and structure.
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Structural analysis in IR would benefit significantly from the advanced literature
on institutions. Both structural analysts and institutional analysts in IR would benefit
significantly from their mutual cooperation.
In the next chapter, I will utilize only part of my institutional framework for the
study the practices of intervention. I argue that patterns of intervention are practices of
sovereignty. They are constituted by roles, rules, and positions of the institution of
sovereignty. In addition, I also explain the impact of sovereignty’s complementary
institutions (territoriality) on intervention.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE INSTITUTION OF SOVEREIGNTY
Sovereignty: Definition and Institutional Framework
Sovereignty is a social institution that allocates jurisdictions of supreme authority
in the international system. Sovereignty is connected sets of (formal and informal) rules
that define social positions of supreme authority (sovereigns), prescribe the behavioral
roles of the occupants of the positions of supreme authority, and state how these roles are
performed on the ground (i.e. practices).
The institution of sovereignty:
1) Defines the positions of supreme authority (Who is the sovereign?)
2) States how does one enter or leave the position of supreme authority (How
does one acquire the position of supreme authority? or leave it?)
3) Prescribes the social roles of the sovereign (What are the rights and duties of
those holding the position of supreme authority? What are the required,
permitted, and forbidden action of the sovereign?)
4) Specifies how the social roles, positions and rules prescribed by sovereignty
are performed and embodied in the ground? (What are the practices of
sovereignty?)49

49

This is similar but not identical to Philpot’s three faces of authority (2001).
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It is impossible to determine the domain of jurisdiction of supreme authority and
to draw the line between domestic sovereignty and external sovereignty before knowing
the historically contingent content of sovereignty (rules, positions, roles, and practices).
What counts as internal sovereignty and external sovereignty cannot be defined prior to
filling the historical content of the above four dimensions of the institution of
sovereignty.
Sovereignty is not a timeless institution; its content is socially constructed
(Philpott 2001; Hall 1999; Biersteker and Weber 1996; Reus-Smit 1999; Suganami
2007). “Sovereignty is a practical category whose empirical contents are not fixed but
evolve in a way reflecting the active practical consensus among coreflective statesmen”
(Richard Ashley in Reu-Smit 2001: 526). “States define the meaning of sovereignty
through their engagement in practices” (Biersteker 2002: 157). Thus, “it is necessary to
abandon the prevailing, highly categorical conceptions of sovereignty and to treat it
instead as a variable, practically constituted institution” (Reus-Smit 2001: 526).50
Sovereignty must not be confused with the state. State is an actor that has specific
social roles designed to it by the institution of sovereignty (Biersteker and Weber 1996).
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Similarly, Weber also asserts that “while the word sovereignty denotes a state of being—an
ontological status—sovereignty in fact expresses a characteristic way in which being or sovereign
statehood may be inferred from doing or practice…to speak of the sovereign state at all requires
one to engage in the political practice of stabilizing this concept’s meaning” (Weber 1995: 3).
Kratochwil also defines sovereignty as sets of practices. Sovereignty “is not a thing but represent
certain practices and actions, or rather the entitlement to certain practices and actions.
Consequently, sovereignty cannot be conceptualized as a homogenous quantity or position.”
Sovereignty, like democracy, does not refer to objects of the world out there. Neither democracy
nor sovereignty “runs around like a black dog so that the only question remaining is whether it is
a Labrador, black shepherd, or some other mutt. Even though the use of noun mistakenly suggests
a similarity to designing objects, the only reference we can make out, after some reflection, is to
an assembly of practices and actions” (Kratochwil 2008: 91).
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Sovereignty “is an historically contingent social rather than an inherent quality of
stateness” (Wendt and Friedheim 1996: 397).51
Furthermore, “sovereignty is never without an adjective” (Philpott 2001: 17).52
Different (Types) of sovereignty differentiate polities differently. Different institutions of
sovereignty constitute different domains of supreme jurisdictions. State-territorial,
national, dynastic, popular, and absolute sovereignty, for example, differ across the above
four dimensions of sovereignty: “If sovereignty is a shared set of understandings and
expectations about the authority of the state and is reinforced by practices, then a change
in sovereignty will come about by transforming understandings and practices” (Sikkink
1993: 414).
Unpacking the institution of sovereignty into rules, positions, roles, and practices
is helpful for identifying nuanced changes in sovereignty. Change in sovereignty can
occur in at least one of the following dimensions: rules of sovereignty; positions of
sovereigns; roles of sovereigns; and practices of sovereigns.
For example, the impact of globalization on sovereignty can be addressed from
the dimensions of practices, roles, positions, or rules. The impact of globalization on
roles and practices of sovereignty has been more significant than globalization’s impact
on social positions and formal rules of sovereignty. Globalization has not caused any
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Sovereignty is not “just a unit level factor, or a “property” of the units which may be assumed
to foster self-seeking of self-interested behavior.” The types of sovereignty are “collective
identities whose development is contingent upon both domestic and international sources” (Hall
1999: 11-12). Sovereignty (dynasty, nation, territory, citizen etc) and the state (the institutional
manifestation of sovereignty) should be ascribed equal ontological status (Hall 1999: 27-28).
52

“The organizing principle of sovereignty has never been a self-referential value”(Reus-smit
2001: 520).
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significant change in the international formal rules of sovereignty but it definitely
changed the economic role of the sovereign.
To some extent of exaggeration, the literature on sovereignty can be categorized
according to its primary focus: roles, rules, position, and practice of supreme authority.
For example, the literature on divisibility of sovereignty falls under the category of
positions of supreme authority. This literature focuses on the distribution of the positions
of supreme authority in the international system. The research on sovereignty in
European Union also discusses the re-distribution of the positions of supreme authority in
Europe. The relationship between great powers and colonial states also falls under this
category of distribution of the positions of supreme authority. Jack Donnelly’s discussion
of “sovereign inequality” and “divisible sovereignty” at least partly falls under this
category (2006).
The literature on humanitarian intervention and sovereignty falls under the
category of the roles of sovereignty. For example, the emerging norm of “Responsibility
to Protect” is about new behavioral expectations (behavioral roles) of both the individual
sovereign states and the international community of sovereign states. The literature on
sovereignty and decolonization, on the other hand, falls under the category of changes in
formal rules of sovereignty as illustrated in Jackson’s distinction between juridical
sovereignty and empirical sovereignty (Jackson 1990). The literature on recognition and
non-recognition, and intervention and non-intervention falls under the category of
practices of sovereignty (Biersteker and Weber 1996; Weber 1995).
Of course the four dimensions of the institution of sovereignty (rules, positions,
roles, and practices) are very interconnected. Yet, unpacking the four elements of
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institution of sovereignty could increase our understandings of sovereignty and its
variation over time.
Institutional Causes of Change in Sovereignty
Like any institution, there are multiple causes of change in sovereignty but in this
dissertation I focus on two institutional causes of change:
1) Endogenous causes of change: Interaction among the rules, roles, positions,
and practices of sovereignty. The interaction among the four elements of the
institution of sovereignty is an important source of its stability and change.
The interaction among the elements of the institution of sovereignty should
not be assumed but examined. For examples, changes in the roles of
sovereignty could cause changes in practices of sovereignty. Changes in
position of supreme authority could also constitute changes in the roles and
practices of sovereignty and vise versa.
2) Exogenous causes of change: change in sovereignty’s complementary
institutions: sovereignty does not exist in institutional vacuum. Changes in
complementary institution can cause changes in sovereignty. For example,
territorial sovereignty is contingent upon the institution of inter-state borders.
Changes in territoriality cause changes in territorial sovereignty. Popular
sovereignty is contingent upon institutional rules. Replacing institutional
rules with personal rules makes it impossible for popular sovereignty to
function. Sovereignty is not a discrete institution (Reus-Smit 2001).
Sovereignty’s complementary institutions even constitute at least some of the
content of the institution of sovereignty.
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Change in sovereignty occurs not only in the content of sovereignty (content of
rules, practices, roles, and positions) but also in the level of shared understandings of
sovereignty. For example in post-World War II, the Arab states did not share the same
understandings of the roles of sovereignty. There was conflict on the meanings of the
roles of sovereignty. Only around 1980 the Arab states did adopt shared inter-subjective
understandings of the roles of state-territorial sovereignty. The level of shared
understandings of sovereignty is a variable and should not be imposed by the researcher.
The Institutional Power of Sovereignty
The institutional power of sovereignty is also a variable. The power of
sovereignty is contingent upon its level of inter-subjectivity as well as the effectiveness
of its complementarity institutions.
Inter-Subjectivity of Sovereignty
The institutional power of any type of sovereignty relies on its level of intersubjectivity. Changes in the level of inter-subjectivity of sovereignty affect its
institutional power. Sovereignty does not effectively bind states when it is not intersubjective or suffer from low level of inter-subjectivity.
Researchers, however, often assume (or impose) an ideal type of inter-subjective
sovereignty and ask why it is violated by external intervention. But sovereignty is not
necessarily always an inter-subjective social fact. The level of inter-subjectivity of
sovereignty (like any institution) is a variable. Thus, we should explore the level of intersubjectivity of sovereignty empirically instead of assuming it. Both the content and the
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level of inter-subjectivity of sovereignty are variables. The stability or instability of intersubjective understandings of sovereignty is also a variable (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 13).53
Constructivists assert “there can be no mutually comprehensible conduct of
international relations…without mutually recognized constitutive rules resting on
collective intentionality” (Ruggie 1998: 880):
The mutual recognition of sovereignty…is a precondition for the normal
functioning of a system of sovereign states. Sovereignty, like money or property
rights, exists only within a framework of shared meaning that recognize it to be
valid—that is, by virtue of collective intentionality. (Ruggie 1998: 870)
But the “collective intentionality” of sovereignty or the inter-subjectivity of
sovereignty is an empirical issue and should not be assumed by the researcher. When
there is no shared meaning on sovereignty, the international system is very unstable. For,
“constitutive rules [including sovereignty] are the institutional foundation of all social
life. No consciously organized realm of human activity is imaginable without them… But
their durability remains based in collective intentionality” (873).
Therefore, to explain the practices of intervention in the Arab state system we
must explore both the content of the institution of sovereignty and its level of intersubjectivity. Both the content and level of inter-subjectivity of sovereignty are variables
that affect the practices of intervention and non-intervention in international and regional
systems.
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Constructivism contributed significantly to our understanding of how inter-subjective social
facts affect behavior. But constructivists have done little contribution on “the concrete processes
whereby individual elements, including ideas, are transformed to become social facts” Ruggie
1998: 858). They do not offer much help to understand the rise and decline of inter-subjectivity.
How inter-subjectivie social facts emerge, consolidate and decline has yet to receive enough
attention in constructivism research project.
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Sovereignty’s Complementary Institutions: Borders
The institutional power of any type of sovereignty is also contingent upon its
complementary institutions. Sovereignty does not operate in a vacuum but within an
institutional context that has influence on its binding power. In the contemporary
international society, for example, the effectiveness of territorial sovereignty is
contingent upon its complementary institution: inter-state borders.
“Borders are a human institution” (Holsti 2004: 75-76). They are “institutions for
organizing understandings about jurisdiction over territory” (Simmons 2005: 824).
Borders are “sets of rules, compliance procedures, and moral and ethical behavioral
norms designed to constrain behavior” (827). “International borders and the explicit
demarcation of the exclusive territorial sovereignty that they imply are akin to a
fundamental article in the “international constitution” of the modern state system” (827).
“An institutional perspective on borders suggests that borders coordinate the expectations
and behavior of both international and domestic actors” (Carter and Goemans 2011: 282).
Searle also sees borders as an institution. He convincingly claims that
international border functions not merely in virtue of its physical structure (line of stones
as example),
but in virtue of the fact that the people involved continue to accept the line of
stones as having a certain status. It has the status of boundary… the line of stones
has a function not in virtue of its physical structure, but in virtue of the collective
assignment of a status [of boundary] (Searle 2005:8)
The level of institutionalization of international border is a variable.
Institutionalization of borders is a process that takes place over time. A new border is
unlikely to stabilize expectations overnight (Carter and Goemans 2011: 284). “Interstate
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boundaries tend to evolve through various stages to reach full maturity…A fully mature
boundary is one recognized by both parties, is demarcated, and is effectively
administered and maintained” (Drysdale and Blake 1985: 77).
There are many factors that determine the level of institutionalization of the
institution of borders including the age of border (whether border is new or not), whether
the border is disputed or not, technology, the ambiguity of the norms of borders,54 how
the borders are originally drawn; and whether they are compatible with prior
administrative frontiers (Carter and Goemans 2011; Murphy 1990; Simmons 2005;
Vasques 1995).
High level of institutionalization of inter-state borders enhances the effectiveness
of territorial sovereignty. But inter-state borders, when they are weak, reduce the
effectiveness of territorial sovereignty. Low level of institutionalization of inter-state
borders, furthermore, constitutes a particular type of state—composite state—rather than
unitary state. Composite state lacks the extensive domestic integration and the strong
international boundaries. System of composite states constitutes a particular practice of
sovereignty that is different from systems of unitary states. Composite states also
“produces distinctive patterns of collective action and collective mobilization from those
associated with states-under-anarchy framework” (Nexon 2009: 16). This point also
illustrates the interconnection between territorial sovereignty and borders.
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Vasques addresses the ambiguities of norms on borders and war and his explanation is
applicable to intervention as well: “A shift in norms governing territory should lead to wars as
states raise territorial issues on the basis of the new norms and demand transfers. Likewise, the
more ambiguous norms are, the more wars; the less ambiguous, the few wars” (288).
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The concepts “institutional complementarity” and institutions of inter-state
borders are particularly relevant to the globalization-sovereignty debate. Global forces
has affected state-territorial sovereignty by changing its complementarity institution—
territoriality (Elden 2009; Kahler and Walter 2006). Territoriality is a process tracing that
links globalization with sovereignty.
Sovereignty and Intervention
The concept of sovereignty does not logically entails the principle of absolute
non-intervention (Suganami 2007: 523-526). “The meanings attached to sovereignty and
the practices which follow from them [including intervention and non-intervention] are
historically and geographically variable” (Weber 1995: 16).55
Different understandings (types) of sovereignty constitute different meanings and
practices of intervention and non-intervention. Different types of sovereignty draw
different lines between intervention and non-intervention. The meaning and practices of
intervention and non-intervention in a system of territorial sovereignty are different from
the meaning and practices of intervention and non-intervention in a system of national
sovereignty, dynastic sovereignty, or popular sovereignty.56
“In the most fundamental way, intervention policies [also] define sovereignty and
the state” (Finnemore 2003: 7). They “raise the very question of sovereignty. Intervention
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The literature on sovereignty in the Arab state system, however, adopts a constant, fixed, legal
definition of sovereignty. But, as R.B.J. Walker puts it, “the very attempt to treat sovereignty as a
matter of definition and legal principle encourages a certain amnesia about its historical and
culturally specific character” (Walker: 1993: 116; quoted in Biersteker and Weber 1996: 2).
56

Rodney Bruce Hall provides convincing empirical evidence showing how “the international
system of national-sovereign actors is in many ways, though not in every aspect, an essentially
different system from the territorial-sovereign system” (1999: 12).
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practices participate in stabilizing the meaning of sovereignty” (Weber 1995: 4). For
example, “the refusal of some states to intervene in “civil” wars of others is one way in
which intervention (or non-intervention, in this case) serves to define the meaning of
sovereignty” (Biersteker and Weber 1996: 12-13). The meaning of sovereignty and
intervention, as well their relationship are historically and socially contingent. Therefore,
“one must refuse to position oneself outside of history with respect to questions of
sovereign statehood and intervention” (Weber 1995: 9).
The type of sovereignty influences the practice of intervention through the
behavioral roles it prescribes to the state in the system. Different types of sovereignty
prescribe different behavioral roles to the states because they provide different answers to
the following questions: Who is the sovereign? What is the legitimating principle57 of the
sovereign, and what is the social purpose58 of the sovereign?59 National, dynastic, stateterritorial, popular and geographical sovereignty60 answer these questions differently as
we see in the following table:
57

Legitimating principles are the principles that legitimate the holder of sovereignty. “The
sovereign is the person, institution, or community in which legitimate social authority is lodged in
accordance with the legitimating principles of the social order” (Hall 1999: 31). The principles
that legitimate sovereignty are the principles that legitimate the social order that provides an intersubjective social meaning to sovereignty (Hall: 43). The legitimating principle informs us on
how sovereignty has been justified.
58

The social purpose refers to the “reasons” of the state. Social purpose is similar what Reus-Smit
calls “moral purpose of the state”(1999: 31-33) Ruggie also discuss the concept of social purpose
in his analysis of embedded liberalism (1983).
59

The three questions fill content of sovereignty. “Sovereignty has no purposive content. Without
reference to some other higher-order values it cannot independently inform plans of action or
strategies to achieve them. Furthermore, the principle of sovereignty provides an inadequate
justificatory basis for action” (Reus-Smit 1999: 30).
60

These five types of sovereignty are the most relevant to the Arab states system. There are other
types of sovereignty. Krasner (1999), for example, offers a different typology of sovereignty:
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Table 2
Types of Sovereignty
Sovereignty

The holder of
sovereignty

The
legitimating
principle of the
sovereign

The social
purpose of
the sovereign

Inside/Outside
Differentiation61

Dynastic

Dynasty

Religion
(divinely
ordained
authority) and
dynastic kinship

Dynastic
Interest

Kingdom and
Realm

National

Nation
Geography
(place)

State-Territorial

Territorial state

National
Interest
Restoring the
integrity
of historical
lands
Raison d’état

Nation

Geographical

National Selfdetermination
History of
Geography

Popular

Citizen

Protecting
human rights
of the citizen

Contingent on
the willing &
ability of
domestic
government
regarding
“Responsibility
to protect (R2P)

Recognized
international
borders
Democracy and
human rights

Geography
(place)
International
Borders

“Interdependence sovereignty refers to the ability of a government to regulate the movement of
goods, capital, people, and ideas across its borders. Domestic sovereignty refers both to the
structure of authority within a state and to the state’s effectiveness or control. International legal
sovereignty refers to whether a state is recognized by other states, the basic rule being that only
juridically independent territorial entities are accorded recognition. Westphalian sovereignty,
which actually has almost nothing to do with the Peace of Westphalia, refers to the autonomy of
domestic authority structures—that is, the absence of authoritative external influence” (Krasner
2001: 2). Jackson offer another typology: juridical sovereignty, which is “derived from a right
of self-determination—negative sovereignty—without possessing much in the way of empirical
statehood, a capacity for effective and civil government—positive sovereignty” (Jackson 1987:
529). Barnett (2010: 45-62) also distinguishes between juridical sovereignty and empirical
sovereignty.
61

The principles on “which the constituent units are separated from one another” (Ruggie 1983:
274).
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Different types of sovereignty constitute different behavioral roles that justify
some interventions and disallow others. Practices of intervention could be role
performance of particular type of sovereignty. Popular sovereignty, for example,
constitutes particular type of intervention (humanitarian intervention and Responsibility
to Protect). National sovereignty constitutes a different type of intervention that is
justified by the principles of self-determination and independence of the nation. Dynastic
sovereignty constitutes another type of intervention that is justified by dynastic rights and
duties. In other words, they type of sovereignty could be a cause of intervention;
intervention is not necessarily always a violation of sovereignty.
The legitimacy of interventionist acts is also contingent upon understandings of
sovereignty. Humanitarian intervention, for example, is illegitimate and even unthinkable
in international system of absolute sovereignty. In contrast, humanitarian intervention is
perceived as a legitimate right and even a responsibility in the current international
system of popular sovereignty and “responsibility to protect” (R2P). The new
understandings of sovereignty as popular sovereignty constitute (make possible) new
types of intervention (humanitarian intervention) (Bellamy 2009; Finnemore 2003;
Wheeler 2000).62

62

In the same vein, different understandings of sovereignty constitute different practices of
recognition and non-recognition. The conditions of diplomatic recognition as sovereign state vary
across dominant understandings of sovereignty in the system. Changes in the practices of
recognition and non-recognition manifest transformations in understandings of sovereignty. The
conditions of recognition of new states in post-Cold War era are different from the conditions of
recognition in post-World War II period, which were very different from the conditions of
recognition in inter-war period. The differences in the practices of recognition are constituted not
by changes in distribution of power but changes in institution of sovereignty (Biersteker 2012;
Fabry 2010; Jackson 1993; James 1999; Philpott 2001).
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Therefore, the first step to explain external intervention in the Arab states system
is to explore the dominant type (or types) of sovereignty in the Arab states system. For,
the acts of intervention might be the practice of particular type of sovereignty; the acts of
intervention might be role performance of a type of sovereignty. We must not assume
territorial sovereignty or any type of sovereignty. Instead, to explain intervention we
should explore empirically the type of sovereignty in the Arab state system.
The behavioral differences in patterns of intervention and non-intervention in the
Arab state system are explained here as manifestations of the transformation of the
historically contingent notions of behavioral roles that drive from the distinct types of
sovereignty.63
Because there are multiple types of sovereignty, we should not assume that one
and only one type of sovereignty operate in the political system. We should not exclude
the possibility that different types of sovereignty operate or even compete within the
same regional or international system. We should not rule out the possibility that different
types of sovereignty compete against each other on being the hegemonic ordering
principle of regional or international system. The question on whether one or different
types of sovereignty within a political system is an empirical question not a theoretical
question. The complementarity or contestation of norms of sovereignty could affect the
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Similar to the above discussion of external intervention, practice of recognition and nonrecognition are also contingent upon the particular type of sovereignty in the international system.
Dynastic, national, territorial, popular, and historical sovereignty constitute different rules and
practices of recognition and non-recognition. Different types of sovereignty prescribe different
behavioral roles that affect practices of recognition and non-recognition. Changes in the practices
of recognition and non-recognition are explained here as manifestation of transformation in the
behavioral roles prescribed by distinct sovereign identities.
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(in)stability of shared understandings of sovereignty, which in turn affect order,
ontological security, and uncertainty in the system.
Besides exploring the understandings of sovereignty in the Arab state system, I
also explore the practices of sovereignty and intervention in the international system. The
Arab states system does not exist within an international vacuum. The practices of
sovereignty and intervention are elements in the international normative structure that has
impact on the Arab states. The international normative structure affects the legitimacy of
the Arab states’ practices of intervention and non-intervention. It also affects the
international reactions to these regional practices. Exploring the understandings and
practices of sovereignty in the international system is also helpful to avoid
unquestionable “Arab Exceptionalism” accounts.64
International “changes in the content and understanding of sovereignty can greatly
affect the ways in which [Arab] states are constrained or enabled to act in their
international relations” (Barkin and Cronin 1994: 110). International norms of
sovereignty influence the contestation on regional norms of sovereignty. As Finnemore
nicely put it:
Norms that fit logically with other powerful norms are more likely to become
persuasive and to shape behavior…Mutually reinforcing and logically consistent
norms appear to be harder to attack and to have advantage in the normative
contestations that occur in social life. In this sense, logic internal to norms
themselves shapes their development and, consequently, shapes social change
(Finnemore 2003: 71).
64

It is striking that the international normative context (international norms and practices of
sovereignty) is utterly ignored in the literature on sovereignty and intervention in the Middle East.
Even the constructivist literature on sovereignty in the Middle East (Barnett 1998) ignores the
norms and practices of sovereignty in international society. This wrongly implies that the regional
system operate within an international normative vacuum.
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I argue that the level of inter-subjectivity and content of inter-subjectivity of sovereignty
in the Arab state system and international system constitute the practices of intervention
in the Arab state system. Changes in level and content of inter-subjective sovereignty
constitute changes in the practices of intervention.
Sovereignty’s Complementary Institution (Borders) and Intervention
The changes in the level of institutionalization of international borders, I argue,
constitute changes in practices of external intervention. When international borders suffer
from low level of institutionalization, they constitute, in the sense of making possible,
acts of intervention. For, the weakness of the institution of international borders blurs the
distinction between the “international” and “domestic” arenas and “make a hash of
international-relations theory’s level of analysis” (Nexon 2009: 22). Low level of
institutionalization of international borders also enables “internalization” of “domestic”
disputes and the “domestication” of “international” conflicts, increasing the security
interdependence and fear between neighboring states. Low level of institutionalization of
borders also causes territorial disputes (Vasques 1995). Consequently, acts of external
intervention increase in inter-state systems with low level of institutionalization of
international borders. It is not coincidence that new states, whose borders are new and
still in early stages of institutionalization, experienced the highest number of intervention
since 1945 (Tillema 1989).
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The Social Construction of Sovereignty, Autonomy, and Capacity Relationship
Sovereignty is often confused with capacity and autonomy, especially in the
literature on globalization and its effect on the state. But the three concepts are
analytically separate and independent. Furthermore, the content of each as well as their
mutual relationships are socially constructed. As already stated, the meaning of
sovereignty is a variable. The content of autonomy as well as the content of capacity are
variables too.65
The relationship between sovereignty and capacity is socially constructed.
Capacity was a condition of sovereign-state recognition at least until the end of World
War II. But in the post-colonial world, the new rules of sovereignty have separated
sovereignty from capacity. The latter is no longer a necessary condition for recognition of
sovereign states. Jackson’s Quasi States (1990) is the best documentation of this change
in sovereignty-capacity relations.
In the same vein, the relationship between sovereignty and autonomy is also
socially constructed. In the post-Colonial World, sovereignty and autonomy had intimate
relationship. The loss of autonomy was perceived as a threat to sovereignty. But in the
globalized world, sovereignty-autonomy relations have changed, as captured by Chayes
and Chayes:
Traditionally, sovereignty has signified the complete autonomy of the state to act
as it chooses, without legal limitation by any superior entity… [but in
contemporary interdependent system] sovereignty no longer consists in the
freedom of states to act independently, in their perceived self-interest, but in
membership in reasonably good standing in the regimes that make up the
65

Autonomy is under theorized concept is IR theory. The relations between autonomy and
sovereignty are particularly relevant to the study of globalization and its impact on the state.

93

substance of international life…Sovereignty, in the end, is status—the vindication
of the state’s existence as a member of the international system. In today’s setting,
the only way most states can realize and express their sovereignty is through
participation in the various regimes that regulate and order the international
system. (Chayes and Chayes 1995: 26-27; emphasis added)
The changing relationship between autonomy and sovereignty in globalized world is also
implicit in Robert Keohane’s institutional account of sovereignty. Under the conditions of
complex interdependence,
the meaning of sovereignty changes. Sovereignty no longer enables states to exert
effective supremacy over what occurs within their territories…what sovereignty
confer on states under conditions of complex interdependence is legal authority
that can either be exercised to the detriment of other states’ interest or to be
bargained away in return for influence over others’ policies and therefore greater
gains from exchange. Rather than connoting the exercise of supremacy within a
given territory, sovereignty provides the state with a legal grip on an aspect of a
transnational process, whether involving multinational investment, the world’s
ecology, or the movement of migrants, drug dealers, and terrorists. Sovereignty is
less a territorially defined barrier than a bargaining resource for a politics
characterized by complex transnational networks. (Keohane1995: 177; emphasis
added)
Thus, we must avoid imposing timeless relations between sovereignty, autonomy, and
capacity. Instead, we should explore the historically and socially constructed relations of
sovereignty, autonomy, and capacity.
Sovereignty, Survival, and IR Theory
Some might underestimate the relevance of sovereignty to security and strategic
studies. Instead, this dissertation actually illustrates that sovereignty is inherently a
security issue. Sovereignty constitutes particular notions of strategic interest, strategic
threats as well as particular security concerns and definitions.
Sovereignty constitutes a particular notion of survival. The meaning of survival of
sovereign-state in anarchy is different from the survival of non-sovereign states in
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anarchy. Protecting the survival of sovereign-state is not the same as protecting the
survival of non-sovereign state. Also, the notion of survival in a system of dynastic
sovereignty is different from the notion of survival in systems of national sovereignty or
territorial sovereignty. Different types of sovereignty constitute different notions of
survival, which constitute different strategic interests, threats, and behaviors.
Neorealism, on the other hand, defines survival in a timeless way regardless of
whether the unit is sovereign or non-sovereign. The English school only sees sovereignty
as institution that protects the survival of states in international anarchy (Jackson 1990:
167-173). But the relationship between sovereignty and survival is more complex.
Sovereignty actually constitutes a particular notion of survival and even security that is
different from the notion of survival and security in non-sovereign systems. Sovereignty
is not only a solution to timeless notions of survival and security; sovereignty actually
constitutes particular notions of survival and security.
Sovereignty constitutes distinctive security threats. “A physical threat of
extermination is not required to threaten the will to manifest [sovereign] identity” (Hall:
38). Sovereignty also underpins interests. “Military resources may be used to meet
external threats, but the definition of who or what must be protected determines the
appropriateness or efficiency of those weapons systems. Positing survival as the most
basic interest presumes a self to be preserved.” The type of sovereignty in the system
defines the self to be preserved (Klotz and Lynch: 86).
Furthermore, without shared understandings of sovereignty, there can be no
stability and order in the system. “The mutual recognition of sovereignty…is a
precondition for the normal functioning of a system of sovereign states” (Ruggie 1998:
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870). When there is no shared meaning on sovereignty or any constitutive rules, the
system is very unstable (873).
The fact that sovereignty is often taken for granted does not mean it has no
effects. The most powerful principles are actually those that are taken for granted as
acknowledged by realists and constructivists alike. “Legitimizing principles triumph by
being taken for granted” as aptly put by Henry Kissinger (Finnemore 2003:85).
The ability to create the underlying rules of the game, to define what constitutes
acceptable play, and to be able to get other actors to commit to these rules because
they are now part of their self-understandings is perhaps the most subtle and
effective form of power” (Barnett and Adler 1998: 424).
My analytical framework of sovereignty sheds new lights on IR theories.
Different IR theories are based on different implicit assumptions on state sovereignty.
The latter play important explanatory role in the theories of neorealism, neoliberalism,
and English School than often acknowledged. Neorealism’s balance of power theory is
based on an implicit distinctive notion of sovereignty. Realists overlook the fact that
different types of sovereignty constitute different practices of balance of power. The
practice of internal and external balancing in system of dynastic sovereignty, for
example, is different from practice of balance of power in system of national sovereignty
or territorial sovereignty.
The neoliberal account of international institutions, complex interdependence, and
globalization is based on distinctive notion of sovereignty, which is different from
neorealism’s notion of sovereignty. Globalization requires particular understandings of
sovereignty otherwise it is impossible to have a globalized world (Keohane 1995).
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The different meanings of sovereignty in IR theories are largely originated from
the different function that each theory assigns to sovereignty. Realism’s (following
Hobbes) sovereignty is a solution to the problem of domestic anarchy. English school’s
sovereignty is a solution to the problem international anarchy. Liberal sovereignty is a
solution to problem of predator leader. Sovereign equality is a solution to the problem of
empire. Popular sovereignty is a solution to problem of complex interdependence and
globalization. Put it differently, IR theories’ account of sovereignty are based on different
reference points (domestic anarchy; international anarchy; absolute leaders; empire;
globalization).66 The function of sovereignty differs across the problem it is assigned to
solve (Keohane 1995).
But despite its relevance to the explanatory power of the theory, sovereignty is
often implicit in IR theories. But as put by Kahneman, “the errors of a theory are rarely
found in what it asserts explicitly; they hide in what it ignores or tacitly assume”
(Kahneman 2011: 274-275). Making explicit the implicit assumptions of sovereignty in
IR theory should help us to construct better IR theories.

66

On the importance of reference points to the formation of theories see Kahneman (2011).
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PART III: SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERVENTION IN THE ARAB STATE SYSTEM
AFTER EMPIRE: 1922-1960s
Sovereignty and Intervention after Empire
External Intervention was a common practice in the Arab state system following
independence from great powers:


“The Sovereign norm of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states
was flouted with stunning and unapologetic regularity” (Gause 1992: 448).



In the Arab world, “[v]iolations of territorial borders by more powerful
neighbours…occur on a regular basis” (Burgis 2009:71)



“There is one area in which a distinctive regional norm operates. This is not as is
conventionally asserted, in the realm of cultures and values, but in the realm of
foreign policy, and in particular in the predisposition of Middle Eastern states,
more than in any other part of the world, to interfere in each other’s internal
affairs.”… “‘[T]he low salience of sovereignty’ is indeed a remarkable and
distinct feature of regional international politics…such a level of sustained
intervention and interference… is on a scale unseen elsewhere in the world
(Halliday 2009: 15-16).
Argument in Brief
The Arab state system experienced high frequency of external intervention

because of the dominance of distinctive types (subjective understandings) of external
sovereignty in the Arab state system: dynastic sovereignty (Iraq and Jordan under rule of
the Hashemite Dynasty), national sovereignty (Egypt under Nasser), and geographical
sovereignty (Syria and Iraq). The three types of external sovereignty constituted practices
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of intervention because they prescribed behavioral roles to the above states that allowed,
legitimized, and justified practices of intervention in other Arab states.
The social roles prescribed by dynastic, national and geographical sovereignty
also disallowed recognition of other Arab states. The Hashemite dynasty in Transjordan
and Iraq (dynastic sovereignty) did not recognize the sovereignty of Syria and Saudi
Arabia; Syria (geographical sovereignty) did not recognize the sovereignty of Lebanon;
Iraq (geographical sovereignty) did not recognize the sovereignty of Kuwait; and Egypt
under Nasser (national sovereignty) did not recognize the ruling regimes in Arab
monarchies as legitimate supreme authority. Non-recognition of the sovereignty of the
other states also constituted interventions in the target states.
Constructivists hold that “the mutual recognition of sovereignty…is a
precondition for the normal functioning of a system of sovereign states” (Ruggie 1998:
870). But this very same precondition was actually missing in the Arab state system. 67
The simultaneous existence of the four types of external sovereignty (dynastic, national,
state-territorial and geographical) within the same regional Arab state system precluded
the consolidation of shared inter-subjective understandings of sovereignty.
Consequently, the Arab state system was not structured by a shared intersubjective institution of sovereignty. Rather, the Arab state system was structured by
conflicting types of sovereignty—conflicting subjectivities of the rules, positions, roles,
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My distinctive arguments of types of sovereignty shows that Walt’s Balance of Threat (1987)
politics was embedded within a distinctive structure of constitutive rules of sovereignty in the
Arab states system; the regulative rules of the Arab League were not binding because the
constitutive rules of sovereignty were contested; and search for legitimacy in state-society
relations (Hudson 1977) did take place within contested regional and international inter-state
rules of sovereignty.
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and practices of sovereignty. Instead of being the shared inter-subjective institution (as
often assumed in IR), the institution of sovereignty was actually deeply contested in the
Arab state system. The members of the Arab state system were engaged in conflict over
the meaning of the rules, positions, roles, and practices of sovereignty instead of acting
upon shared meanings of sovereignty.
The absence of shared meanings of sovereignty is a structural cause of uncertainty
and fear, and in turn, intervention driven by uncertainty and fear. The absence of the
minimum recognized rules regarding who is the legitimate sovereign and the legitimate
roles of sovereignty increased uncertainty and fear as well as intervention driven by
uncertainty and fear.68
Furthermore, the interventions that were driven by dynastic, national and
geographical sovereignty were not recognized as legitimate acts by other Arab states,
which induced the latter to conduct fear-based “counter-interventions.” For example,
Iraq’s interventions in Kuwait caused counter-interventions by Saudi Arabia and Egypt
who did not recognize Iraq’s sovereignty claims over Kuwait and feared the rising power
of Iraq. The Hashemite’s interventions in Syria caused counter intervention by Egypt and
Saudi Arabia who did not recognize the legitimacy of the Hashemite’s sovereignty rights
over Syria and feared the increasing power of the Hashemite dynasty. The acts of
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The absence of shared meaning of sovereignty causes significant effects on security and order.
Realism’s security dilemma is much more severe in international systems that lack shared
meaning of sovereignty and mutual recognition of sovereignty. Neoliberalism’s regulative rules
and regimes are much more difficult to construct and respect in international systems whose
constitutive rules of sovereignty are seriously contested. Constructivism’s logic of
appropriateness is more difficult to follow in systems whose fundamental rules of sovereignty are
contested.
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counter-interventions increased the total number of interventions in the Arab state
system.
At the international system, the norms of non-intervention and state-territorial
sovereignty were actually far away from being the hegemonic rules of the game of the
international system. As I will elaborate below, the rules of non-intervention and
territorial sovereignty were still in their diffusion stage and have yet to reach their high
stage of consolidation. The international system in fact experienced high frequency of
intervention during this period. Thus, the structure of international system (norms and
practices) did not pose robust constraints against the acts of intervention in the regional
Arab state system.
At the same time, sovereignty’s complementary institution, inter-state borders,
suffered from low level of institutionalization, constituted practices of intervention by
blurring the division between internal and external affairs and constituting acts of
intervention. For, the concept and practice of territorial borders were new in Arab
politics. The Arab world had no experience of territoriality. It was a new political practice
that entered the Arab state system only after the expansion of interventional society into
the Arab world.
The three variables—sovereignty in Arab state system, sovereignty and nonintervention in international system, and inter-state borders in the Arab state system—
constituted the high frequency of intervention in the Arab state system from the fall of the
Ottoman Empire to 1960s.
In the following chapter, I will discuss sovereignty and intervention in the Arab
state system after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, emphasizing the impact of the three
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explanatory variables on the practices of intervention. In chapter Six, I will discuss
sovereignty and intervention in the Arab state system in 1950s and 1960s.
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CHAPTER FIVE: DYNASTIC SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERVENTION: THE ARAB
STATE SYSTEM 1922-1950S
Sovereignty and Intervention in the Arab State System
The Arab state system was formed on the ashes of the Ottoman Empire:
Although the emerging system was deeply penetrated by Britain and France, the
intense interactions among the core Arab states indicated that they enjoyed
considerable leeway which allowed them to pursue their own interests and form
an Arab system with its own patterns and features…The main features of the Arab
system had already crystallized in the mid-1930s and that the formation of the
Arab League only institutionalized the existing patterns. (Podeh 1998: 50)
The Arab system in its formative years was limited by necessity due to great powers
penetration:
Prior to the mid-1930s, most key Arab states (Egypt, Syria, Iraq) were only semiindependent, under various forms of European tutelage, while the only two fully
independent Arab states, Yemen and Saudi Arabia, were basically concerned with
domestic (mainly tribal) issues, and played a minor role in inter Arab
affairs…Even though the quest for independence consumed most nationalist
energies, it did not preclude the possibilities of inter-Arab rivalries. (Ben Dor
1983: 142)69
During the interwar period, the most powerful Arab political units were in fact
two dynasties: the Hashemite dynasty and the Saud dynasty. The house of Hashem ruled
Transjordan, Iraq and Greater Syria (Lebanon and Syria; only for twenty months) and the
house of Saud ruled the Hejaz (Saudi Arabia). Egypt did not perceive itself an Arab state
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Tibi also acknowledges the existence of a dynastic Arab states system in the interwar period
(1997: 203).
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(Seale: 16-24). During Paris Peace Conference in 1919, Sa’d Zaghlul, the head of the
Egyptian delegation, repeatedly demanded “full national independence for Egypt” and
when he was asked by the representatives of Syria, Lebanon, and Transjordan to join
them to form a united group to pressure the great powers for the independence of the
Arab world as a whole, he refused and asserted that “our problem is an Egyptian problem
and not an Arab problem” (Lawson 2006: 25). Egypt eventually acquired the new Arab
identity only in the late 1930s (Seale: 16-24).
The Hashemite dynasty in Iraq and Jordan was the most powerful political actor
but also the most revisionist one in the Arab state system. Iraq and Jordan were the most
frequent interveners in the system. They particularly intervened in Syria and Saudi
Arabia, threatening the independence and territorial integrity of these two states. Iraq and
Jordan “national interest” was to impose the Hashemite sovereignty on these two
countries.70 During the interwar period, Iraq and Jordan were also the only Arab states
that pursued Arab unity programs (Maddy-Weitzman 1993; Masalha 1991; Porath 1986;
Seale 1986).
I argue Iraq and Jordan frequently intervened in Syria and Saudi Arabia because
of their dynastic sovereignty. Their practices of intervention embodied their dynastic
sovereignty. Their Dynastic sovereignty prescribed distinctive social roles that
constituted their practices of intervention in Syria and Saudi Arabia. Their dynastic roles
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The Hashemite case refutes the argument that the most powerful state in the system is a status
quo state. Iraq and Jordan under the Hashemite rule were the most powerful countries but at the
same time they were revisionist states not status quo states.
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of sovereignty also disallowed their diplomatic recognition of the sovereignty of Saudi
Arabia and Syria. And non-recognition caused intervention (see Figure 2).

Iraq and
Jordan's
Dynastic
sovereignty

dynstic
sovereign
role

Dynastic
soverign
practices

nonrecognition
and
Intervention
in Syria and
Saudi Arabia

Figure 2: Iraq and Jordan’s Dynastic sovereignty as the constitutive cause of their
practices of intervention.
The dynastic sovereignty of Jordan and Iraq under the rule of the Hashemite is
clearly embodied in their perceived legitimating principles of their practices of
intervention and non-recognition of Iraq and Jordan. They legitimized their sovereign
rights over Greater Syria and Saudi Arabia by dynastic principles—the members of the
Hashemite dynasty were the kings of Greater Syria and Saudi Arabia in the past before
they even became sovereign states.
Members of the House of Hashem ruled Syria and Saudi Arabia until the French
Mandate expelled King Faisal from Syria in July 1920 and the House of Saud expelled
the Hashemite dynasty from Hijaz in 1926 (Porath 1986: 2). Their sovereign claims over
these countries were justified by the historical fact that members of the Hashemite
dynasty ruled Saudi Arabia and Syria in the past.71
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Similar to the European Dynasties, The Hashemite in Iraq and Jordan also legitimized their
authority by religious principles, claiming that the Hashemite dynasty is the ancestor to prophet
Mohammed. On the dynastic sovereignty of European state system, see Reus-Smit (1999).
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Therefore, the perceived sovereign role (behavioral expectations) of Iraq and
Jordan was to return Hijaz and Greater Syria to the sovereignty (jurisdiction of supreme
authority) of the House of Hashem. The origins of these roles go back to the original plan
of the Hashemite dynasty, long time before it ruled Iraq and Jordan as evidenced in the
following report by a British government official, Sir Alec Kirkbride, who was very close
to Hashemite family:
He [Husayn]72 and his sons agreed that Ali, the eldest, should succeed their father
as King of the Hejaz; that Abdullah, the second, should be King of Iraq and that
Faisal, the third, should become King of Syria… At the end of fighting in 1918
Faisal found himself in Damascus and proclaimed himself King of Syria a few
months later, thereby carrying out this part of the family programme. The father
became King of the Hejaz with the Amir Ali as his Heir Apparent, and because
the future of Iraq was still uncertain, the Amir Abdullah became his father’s
Minister for Foreign Affairs in the hope that his kingdom would come into being
in the meanwhile. The plan, however, soon brook down, because Faisal could not
come to terms with the French, who had ambitions in Syria, and he was ejected
from his new kingdom by a French army in July 1920. Instead of going home to
the Hejaz a defeated man, Faisal shrewdly went to the Peace Conference in Paris,
from which he emerged after various manoeuvres as the candidate for the throne
of Iraq who had the backing of His Majesty’s Government. He succeeded in
winning the support of the Iraqis and was crowned King at Baghdad in October,
1921.
When Faisal became the chosen candidate for the throne of Iraq the Amir
Abdullah was, not unnaturally, furious, but there was not much that he could do
about it as he was out of the picture internationally and failed to establish any
degree of contact with the Iraqi politicians who alone could have given the means
of achieving his ambition. While all this was going on, a mandate over Palestine,
a geographical term which included Transjordan also, was granted to Great
Britain in July, 1920.
‘Abduallah, seeing that he could not become King of Iraq, recruited a private
army and announced his intention of marching on Syria to expel the French. On
his way north in January 1921 he entered British mandated territory east of the
Jordan where he set up a central administration in Amman, taking over the whole
72

Sharif Hussaim of Mecca “had always aimed at becoming the Arab Caliph, or at least the king
of the Arabs” (Tibi 1997: 20).
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country in March 1921. It was not until the following July that His Majesty’s
Government decided to follow its usual policy of accepting a fait accompli and
announced that they were prepared to recognize the Amir Abdullah’s rule over
that part of the mandated territory which lay east of the river Jordan, provided (a)
he recognized the validity of the mandate in question and (b) renounced his
avowed intention of attempting to conquer Syria. Being well content with the way
matters had fallen out, the Amir accepted both conditions without argument”
(quoted in Searle 1986: 7-8).
As soon as Abdullah and Faisal became the rulers of Iraq and Jordan, they
constituted particular dynastic sovereign identity, roles and practices of the two states.
The new sovereign role of Iraq and Jordan was to retain the Hijaz and Greater Syria to
the sovereignty of the Hashemite dynasty (Podeh 1998). The principles of dynastic
sovereignty explicitly justified their practices of intervention and non-recognition.
Iraq under the Hashemite Dynasty
The endeavor to get for himself [King Faisal] or one of his family possession of
the Syrian throne …had become the main motive in Faisal’s policy since the end
of 1929.
—Porath (6-7)
Iraq’s practices of intervention in Syria included the creation of a monarchist
political party in 1928 and the opening of the Al-Mirsad newspaper in Damascus, which
was the mouthpiece of King Faisal. Both the new political party and the newspaper
advocated for the establishment of monarchical regime is Syria compatible with
Hashemite’s regime.
King Faisal also recruited Syrian politicians to promote his sovereign rights over
Syria and he also frequently met with Syrian notables including the leaders of the Druze
community in November 1932 to convince them to support his efforts to retain the
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Damascus throne. His supporters in Damascus frequently distributed petitions “in favor
of entrusting to King Faisal the mission of protecting the rights of the country [Syria]”
and to work internationally for the Syrian independence (Porath 1986: 12).
Under the rule of King Faisal, Iraq recruited many Syrians to work as official
employees of the government of Iraq in Baghdad. Iraq even recruited Sati’ Al-Husri as
the Director of Iraq’s Ministry of Education. Sati’ Al-Husri is the most prominent thinker
of Arab nationalism. Before arriving in Baghdad, Al-Husri filled important positions in
Damascus and Istanbul. He was Syria’s former minister of Education and he also worked
as education official for the Ottoman Empire in Istanbul. After the collapse of the
Ottoman Empire, he found himself unemployed:
Consequently, he went through a swift transformation from pan-Ottomanism to
pan-Arabism…Under Faisal, Husri emerged as a prominent Arab nationalist
ideologue, and did more than any other figure to inculcate and disseminate the
idea of Arab unity in schools, clubs and colleges in Iraq. (Masalha 1991: 680)
Internationally, Iraq’s efforts focused on convincing France and Britain to restore
a Hashemite’s king in Syria. In April 1921 Faisal’s envoy, General Haddad, met French
Foreign Minister M. Berthelot to convince him that a Hashemite King in Syria will
improve the relations between the French and the Arabs (Porath: 4). In February 1926
Iraq’s foreign minister, Nuri al-Said (who became the main advocator of Arab unity plans
in 1940s) met with the French High Commissioner for Syria and Lebanon, General
Wegand, to convince him to install Ali, the Last Hashemite King of Hijaz, who was
expelled by the House of Saud, as the king of Syria. Ali himself also visited Lebanon and
met with General Wegand for the same purpose.
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Even King Faisal himself visited Paris on November 1925 to convince the French
to restore his kingship in Syria (Masalha: 681). After another visit to France in 1931,
King Faisal supported rumors that he would soon be the king of Syria as promised by the
French government. He even sent Rustum Haider, Faisal’s confident Syrian extraction
and his finance minister, to Damascus to supply a political and financial support to the
pro-Faisal propaganda there. “While in Syria, Rustum haider had let it be understood that
Faisal would soon become King of Syria…[and] Iraqi inspired loyalists paraded the
streets of Damascus carrying Faisal’s portrait” (Masalha: 687).
Iraq also tried to convince France to install a monarchical regime rather than
republication regime in Syria, to ease the conditions for a future political union between
Iraq and Syria (Porath: 5). The Hashemite in Iraq and Jordan also tried to convince
France, Britain and Zionist organizations in the West that Hashemite sovereignty over
Palestine and Syria would solve the Arab-Jewish problem in Palestine (Porath 1986).
King Faisal died in 1933 without fulfilling his dream. But his death did not stop
the Hashemite dynasty to continue in promoting their sovereign rights over Syria and
Saudi Arabia. One of the heirs of Faisal was Prince Abdullah, the most effective
Hashemite ruler in Iraq from 1939 to 1958.73 Until his death in 1958, “[Regent
Abullah’s] gaze remained fixed on his grandfather’s kingdom of Hijaz, lost to Ibn Sa’ud,
and on his uncle Faisal’s lost kingdom of Syria…his ambition was to revive the throne of
Damascus for himself” (Seale: 9).
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He held the title of Regent from 1939 to 1 May1953 when Faisal II was crowned king of Iraq.
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Iraq even drawn a plan of military invasion of Syria in 1953 after realizing that
other forms of intervention in Syria failed to bring Syria back under the sovereignty of
the Hashemite dynasty in Baghdad. The military invasion plan did not take place only
because the Iraqi military generals rejected it for practical difficulties (Seale: 267-8).
“Most Iraqi governments have made it a principle to interfere in the internal
affairs of Syria” as admitted by Major-General Ghazi al-Daghistani, deputy chief of staff
of the Iraqi army in 1950s (in Seale: 266. Only a military coup in Baghdad in 1958 did
succeed to end the Hashemite dynasty rule in Iraq as well as its ambition to impose the
Hashemite sovereignty over Syria.
Jordan
Jordan was also a frequent intervener in Syria and Saudi Arabia due to dynastic
principles. Amir Abdullah was unsatisfied with his new position as Amir of Jordan. He
was supposed to be the king of Iraq according to the original family program outlined
above but his brother Faisal “stole” the throne from him. Thus, he believed that he had
the sovereign right to Faisal’s lost kingdom of Syria.
Imposing Abdullah’s sovereignty over Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine
(Greater Syria plan) became the sovereign role of Jordan. Soon after independence on 28
March 1946, Abdullah’s “Greater Syria” plan (political unity of Jordan, Lebanon, Syria
and Palestine) became a formal principle of Jordan’s foreign policy.
King Abdullah publicly emphasized his dynastic sovereign rights over Greater
Syria, as told in a Lebanese news source and Al-Ahram on 31 August 1946:
My father [Sharif Husayn) fought neither for the independence of Lebanon, nor
for that of Syria, nor that for Transjordan; he fought and died for the Arab
countries as a whole…My policy is clear: I want a state which includes Syria,
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Transjordan, Palestine, and Lebanon; yes, Lebanon … There is neither great nor
little Syria. There is only a single country bounded to the west by the sea, to the
north by Turkey, to the east by Iraq and to the south by the Hejaz—which
constitute Syria. (quoted in Searle: 13)
Like Iraq, Jordan also frequently intervened in Syria and Saudi Arabia. For
example, Jordan supported a rebellion against the Saudi monarchy in 1932. Abdullah’s
followers distributed leaflets in Saudi Arabia calling upon the people to expel the house
of Saud from Hijaz, so Saudi Arabia could return to its rightful rulers (the Hashemite
dynasty) (16, 27).
Iraq and Jordan intervened more in Syria than in Saudi Arabia only because they
assumed the Saud kingdom will collapse after the death of Ibn Saud and it would
eventually return to the Hashemite sovereignty (8, 13).
The principles of dynastic sovereignty were also embodied in Jordan and Iraq
bilateral relations, especially political unity plans between the two countries. King
Abdullah of Jordan initiated political unity plans with Iraq to empower his status as the
senior member of the Hashemite family. In 1946-47 Abdullah pursued a treaty of
common foreign, defense, and financial policies with Iraq. He also suggested the pooling
of the Iraqi and Jordanian embassies abroad and “the flying of the Hashemite flag of the
Hijaz alongside their respective flags” but his proposal was rejected by Iraq “even though
these proposals did not impinge upon on either party’s independence and sovereignty”
(Maddy-Weitzman 1990: 65). Later on April 14, 1947 Iraq and Jordan concluded a
“Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance,” which was almost completely empty of operative
values (Ibid). Both Saudi Arabia and Syria expressed concern that the inter-Hashimite
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unity plans would be the first step toward imposing their sovereignty over Syria and
Saudi Arabia.
After the assassination of King Abdullah of Jordan in the spring of 1951, Iraq also
proposed a political unity with Jordan “to preserve the Hashemite throne there” (70). To
do so, Iraq intervened politically in Jordan through providing financial support to
Jordanian politicians to advocate the idea of unity. They also published articles in
Jordanian newspapers that unity with Iraq would serve the sovereignty of Jordan and
support the Palestinian case. However, the interference of Iraq in Jordan was perceived
“as direct interference in Jordan’s internal affairs” by Jordanians as well as other Arab
states (70).
The last inter-Hashimite unity plan was conducted in 1958 with the creation of the
Arab Federation. According to the unity agreement, the federation flag would be the
Hashimite flag of the Hiijaz and Iraq’s king Faisal II serve as the president of the federal
government while King Hussyn serve as president in the absence of Faial II. Even though
the federation jurisdiction included foreign and defense affairs, establishment and
management of armed forces, it also emphasizes, “each state was to preserve its
independence and existing governmental structure” (72). The federation between Iraq and
Jordan was described as a “family compact.” But on July 14, 1958 a military coup ended
the rule of Hashimite dynasty in Iraq, after four decades in power. One day later, on July
15, Iraq’s new regime dissolved the federation with Jordan.
The principles of dynastic sovereignty were also embodied in the political
discourse. The discourse of the Hashemite often includes the word “sovereign” referring
to personal sovereignty rather than national or territorial. Accordingly, the Hashemite
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family, rather than the territory or the nation, is the sovereign. Abdullah and his
supporters in Syria, for example, repeatedly insisted, “Amir Abdullah was the only
sovereign capable of realizing Arab unity” (Porath 1984: 178).
Iraq and Jordan’s Arab Unity Plans
The Hashemite dynasties in Iraq and Jordan were the only Arab states who
seriously promoted Arab unity plans between 1920 and early 1950s. Hardly surprising,
the Arab unity plans were compatible with Iraq and Jordan dynastic ambitions. Iraq
promoted the Fertile Crescent unity plan and Jordan promoted the “Greater Syria” unity
plan (Searle: 8). The link between the dynastic sovereignty of Iraq and Syria and their
unity plans were nicely captured by Patrick Seale’s remarks on Iraq:
The determination to return and liberate Syria consumed [Faisal and his] heirs and
became a main plank in the pan-Arab programme…Hashemite claims to Syria
based on Faysal’s twenty-month rule in Damascus from 1918 to 1920 provided a
good part of the justification for the plan of Fertile Crescent unity advanced by the
Iraqi statesman Nuri al-Sa’id during the Second World War. (Searle: 8)
The goal of the unity between Iraq and Syria was motivated by dynastic rather
than national legitimating principle. Even George Antonious, the author of The Arab
Awakening and propagandist of Arab nationalism, admitted already in 1936 that “there is
no connection between Iraq and Syria, that the Iraqis constituted a people on their own,
that a wide desert separated Iraq and Syria, that King Faisal had erred in pursuing the
unity of these two countries and that there is a strong Iraqi national feeling” (Porath 1984:
174).
The Hashemite in Iraq and Jordan did not seek the unity of all Arab states; rather
they wanted to unite only the countries that the Hashemite dynasty ruled in the past. Iraq
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and Jordan also tried to maneuver the talks on the Arab League to place a member of the
Hashemite family on the Syrian throne (Porath 1984: 91). During the negotiations over
the Arab league, Abdullah of Jordan sent a memorandum to the participants of the
conference of autumn 1944 in which he emphasizes “the part played by the House of
Hashim in the Arab awakening and therefore his right for leadership” (Porath 1984: 184).
But the Hashemite failed to achieve their goal and the Arab League eventually adopted
the rules of state-territorial sovereignty and non-intervention, delegitimizing the practices
of dynastic sovereignty.
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Syria imposed the rules of non-intervention
and state-territorial sovereignty on the Arab League Charter to delegitimize the dynastic
sovereignty claims of Iraq and Jordan. “The careful and specific safeguards of the
sovereignty of member states written into the League Charter precluded any attempt by
Iraq and Transjordan to merge with Syria or to change her form of government from a
republic to a monarchy” (Seale: 23).
It is not surprising that The Arab League Charter was rejected by Abdullah of
Jordan: “Everyone knows that the Arab League was no more than a game organized by
Nahas Pasha [Egypt’s Prime minister] for his own ends…” (Seale: 13). Abdullah also
accused the Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Said of “the betrayal of the Hashemite House” for
his role in the final charter of the Arab league (in Porath: 57).
Most Arab states did not accept Iraq and Jordan’s dynastic sovereign rights over
Greater Syria and Saudi Arabia. In September 1944 the Syrian Prime minister Sadallah
al-Jabari welcomed the new Jordanian consul in Damascus with a statement that
delegitimizes Jordan’s sovereignty claims over Syria:
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the Syrian government favors the formation of greater Syria but without alteration
of the present republican regime. Trans-Jordan is part of Syria and should be
reunited with republican Syria. The wishes of the inhabitants of both territories in
regard to regimes could be tested by a plebiscite. As regards Lebanon the Syrian
Government desire complete reunion or, if this is not possible, reduction of
Lebanon to its original (i.e., pre-World War I) boundaries. (Porath 1984: 185-186)
The Syrian’s prime minister’s statement challenged the Hashemite’s legitimation
principles by imposing alternative legitimation principle that subordinate Jordan to Syrian
sovereignty based on historical geographical principles. President Quwatli of Syria also
publicly denounced Jordan’s Greater Syria plan on his reelection in 1947. The Syrian
chamber met in special session in 1947 to “protest unanimously against the [Greater
Syria] project which conceals personal ambitions, Zionist designs as well as ties which
threaten Syria’s independence, sovereignty and her republican regime...” (quoted in
Seale: 13). On the other hand, some members the ruling elites in Syria and Lebanon
perceived the practices of the Hashemite as legitimate and even helped them to impose
the Hashemite sovereignty on Syria and Lebanon. The Druze notables in Jabal Druze (the
Druze Mountains) in southern Syria, for example, invited Abdullah to enter Jabal Druze
and take over the area. They even met with the French representative in Syria expressing
their interest to be under the sovereignty of Amir Abdullah of Jordan.
Egypt did not have serious concerns about Iraq and Jordan in 1920s and 1930s
because it did not perceived itself as an Arab state. Even by the beginning of the Second
World War “there was as yet little which could be described as a coherent view of
Egypt’s place in the Arab world” (Seale: 18). Only after acquiring the identity of Arab
states and joined the “family of the Arab states” in the early years of World War II,
she [Egypt] quickly saw that her national interest lay on containing the
Hashemites, in preventing the emergence of the Eastern Arab world of power
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strong enough to challenge her, in preserving the status quo of small sovereign
nation-states subordinate to her. To retain her primacy, she needed in particular to
prevent Syria from falling under the influence of either Baghdad or Amman.
(Seale: 23)
Saudi Arabia also feared the dynastic ambitions of Iraq and Jordan. Amir Faisal,
son of Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, expressed his profound concerns to a British official: “how
detrimental it would be to his [Ibn Saud’s] interest if a third neighboring country [Syria]
were placed under Hashemite rule” (Porath: 38). Some of the Palestinian leadership also
opposed the Hashemite’s claims over Palestine. Raghib Nashashibi, one of the prominent
Palestinian notables, told a British official that “he preferred the continuation of British
rule in whatever form, including the transformation of Palestine into a Crown Colony, to
its incorporation into Greater Syria under Abdellah’s sovereignty” (Porath: 38). Arab
nationalists were also suspicious of Hashemite “Arab unity” plans for their close relations
with Great Britain and Abdullah’s relations with Zionist organizations (Seale: 14).
To prevent Iraq and Jordan’s plans, Egypt and Saudi Arabia also intervened in
Syria, provided political and financial support to the domestic politicians who rejected
the Hashemite policies. All in all intensified the practices of intervention in the Arab state
system.
The notable dynastic features of the Arab state system in its first four decades is
acknowledged by the prominent Arab scholar Bassam Tibi: “Politically, the history of
Arab nationalism in the period 1920 to 1952 was a royal history of kings struggling for
larger entities to sustain their power” (Tibi: 1997: 22).
To sum this section, Iraq and Jordan were the most frequent interveners in the
Arab state system between 1922 and 1950s. Their practices of intervention embodied and
116

constituted by rules, position, and practices of dynastic sovereignty. Their dynastic
sovereignty also constituted their diplomacy towards the Arab political unity plans and
the Arab League.
On the other hand, the other Arab states did not accept Iraq and Jordan dynastic
rights, roles and practices. They perceived the dynastic roles and practices of Iraq and
Jordan as a threat and they attempted to contain Iraq and Jordan by supporting political
forces in Syria who opposed the Hashemite plans, imposing the rules of non-intervention,
territorial sovereignty and territorial integrity on the charter of the Arab League and
pressuring the great powers to oppose the Hashemite plans.
The structure of the Arab state system was not structured by shared intersubjective meanings of sovereignty but competing meanings on sovereignty. The Arab
states were engaged on a conflict on defining the legitimate position of sovereignty (who
is a legitimate sovereign?) and the legitimate roles and practices of sovereignty. The
absence of shared rules of sovereignty constituted uncertainty and fear as well as
interventions driven by uncertainty and fear.
The alternative accounts, on the other hand, impose or assume an ideal type of
state-territorial sovereignty in the Arab state system without exploring the actual
meanings of sovereignty embodied in the political practices of intervention in the Arab
state system.
The dynastic sovereignty practices of intervention of Iraq and Jordan as well as
the counter interventions by the other Arab states in the Arab state system during the
interwar period were conducted within a distinctive international context. The

117

international context within which Arab states were interacted with each other (and
intervened into each other’s affairs) is too important to be ignored.
Sovereignty and Intervention in International System during the Interwar Period
Neither state-territorial sovereignty nor non-intervention was shared intersubjective norm in the international system between 1920s and late 1950s. Stateterritorial sovereignty and non-intervention were far from being a consolidated
(internalized) norm in the international system during this period as evidenced in both
international treaties and practices (Zacher 2001; Elden 2009; Bull 1984; Agnew 1994;
Finnemore 2003; Vincent 1974).
In fact, “interventions proliferated” in the international system during the interwar
period (Hoffman 1984:14).74 “The period from 1914 to 1945 is one in which there was no
clear “order”[on intervention and non-intervention] at all. Indeed, the large wars of this
period have often been viewed as wars fought to determine the kind of order that should
prevail” (Finnemore 2003: 95). According to Hedley Bull,
after the founding of the League of Nations there was a growing feeling that the
ideas of sovereignty, equality, and non-intervention were an obstacle to the
progressive development of international organization. Even by the time of the
Second World War these ideas were far from having been fully realized even
within the European or Western World (the White nations of the British
Commonwealth, for example, were preoccupied with the pursuit of equal status
throughout the interwar period), quite apart from their lack of effective
application to the non-European or non-Western world, and indeed during the
Second World War they were wholly repudiated in their application to the
European continent itself by the hierarchical system of Hitler’s New Order. (1984:
4)
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According to Hoffman, interventions proliferated “because there is no agreement on the
principles of domestic legitimacy” (1984: 14).
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During the interwar period, the principle of “territorial integrity” was still in the
emergence stage and far from reaching its institutionalization stage (Zacher 2001: 236).
Even “the great powers were divided in their commitment to the territorial integrity norm,
and the supporters lacked the commitment to use force to uphold states’ territorial
boundaries” (Zacher 2001: 220).
This was the international context within which the Hashemite dynasty (in Iraq
and Jordan) repeatedly attempted to impose their sovereignty on Syria and Saudi Arabia
during the inter-war period. The Hashemite attempts to restore their sovereignty over
Saudi Arabia and Syria were conducted at the same time the international rules of
sovereignty and non-intervention were seriously contested in the international system.
They were far from being hegemonic rules of the game in the international system.
In other words, the Hashemite dynasty in Iraq and Jordan were not constrained by
international inter-subjective norms of territorial sovereignty and non-intervention.
Ignoring this international context excludes an important part of the story on Hashemite
intervention in Syria and Saudi Arabia. Telling the story on the Hashemite interventions
in Syria and Saudi Arabia from the perspective of an ideal type of territorial sovereignty
and non-intervention without taking into account the historical norms and practices of
international system is a misleading story.
Sovereignty’s Complementary Institution: Interstate Borders in the Arab
State System
The Arab state system experienced high frequency of intervention also because
inter-state borders were still in their low level of institutionalization in the Middle East.
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The practices of intervention and non-intervention in modern international society
are contingent upon the rules of territoriality (including the institution of inter-state
borders). 75 But territoriality rules suffered from low level of institutionalization in the
early stages of the Arab state system because they were alien rules, incompatible with
traditional political practices in the Arab world (Mendelson 1998).
The rules of territoriality entered Arab politics only after the expansion of the
international society to the Arab world in the twentieth century. The Post Colonial Arab
state is actually the first territorial political unit that ever established in the Arab world. It
is also the first unit with political borders. Arab politics has tradition of neither
territoriality nor political borders.
The theory and practice of Islam76 lack territoriality and political borders.
“[N]either internal sovereignty, with it conception of citizenship and national identity
and loyalty, nor external sovereignty, with its idea of mutual recognition of boundaries
and authority over that territory, has a real counterpart in Arabic-Islamic history” (Tibi
1990: 127; emphasis added).
The Islamic state was not a territorial state. “The basis of the Islamic state was
ideological, not political, territorial or ethical and the primary purpose of government
was to defend and protect the faith, not the state” (Lamton 1981:13; quoted in Joffee
1994: 2; emphasis added).
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I use them territoriality and borders interchangeably even though they are not exactly the same.
Elden (2001) discusses on the relations between territoriality and borders through history.
76

On Islam in the world of nation states see Piscatori (1986).
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Sovereignty (siyada), then, was seen as a divine attribute, not an inherent attribute
of a secular political construct or of authority within such a construct. The crucial aspect
of this type of constitutional structure was that it was concerned primarily with
community and not with territory. Sovereignty was exercised over the community and, by
definition therefore, there could be no prior notion of sovereignty over unoccupied
territory (Joffee: 2-3; emphasis added).
Islam has no tradition of territorial wars, “Raids by one tribe into the territory of
another were common, but such incursions were generally aimed at snatching movable
property, and not for territorial expansion” (Hashmi 2007: 194; emphasis added).
“[t]erritorial expansion is prominently absent from all the motives presented in the Quran
for fighting (qital)” (Hashmi 2007: 200).77 Put simply, political territorial units were
absent in Islam.
Political borders were also absent in Islam: “Physical demarcations of a tribe’s
boundaries were likely rare, and if present, constructed crudely of stones, stakes, or
shallow ditches” (Hashmi 194). “The works of early Muslim geographers also indicate
that the idea of well-defined territorial boundaries was lacking with respect to both the
frontiers separating dar al-Islam from dar al-harb, as well as the internal boundaries that
divided dar al-Islam” (Hashmi: 197). Historically, “the frontiers of Dar al-Islam always
remained extremely fluid” (197). Ralph Brauer’s work on boundaries in Islam from the
ninth though the fourteenth century found that boundaries existed only
77

The absence of territorial politics is also manifested in the importance of hijra (migration) in
Prophet Mohammed life. For some scholars, hijra became a religious duty for true believers who
withdraw from corrupted societies. The Quran also emphasize the importance of hijra: “Was the
earth not spacious enough for you to migrate [away from evil]?” ((4:97) Hashmi: 196-197).
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in the sense that as one progressed in a direction away from the center of a state,
one would sooner or later pass from one sovereignty to another or that one’s taxes
would flow to different places on either side of such a division. Yet, clearly in the
minds of these cartographers such boundaries were constituted not as sharply
defined boundary lines but rather a transition zones of uncertain sovereignty
between two states. (quoted in Hashmi 197; emphasis added)
The notion of maritime territory was also absent in Islam:
On the whole, it seems to be the case that Arab governments did not in the past
attach much importance to maritime sovereignty. The sea was simply somewhere
to catch fish, dive for pearls, navigate in pursuance of trade, and so on…. Similar
considerations tended to apply to small and uninhabited islands. On the whole,
Arab rulers seem, until the present century, to have treated them in much the same
way as the sea: they were not much concerned about the question of sovereignty
over them….” (Mendelson 1998: 135)
The Arabs did not have developed “notions of property when it came to wells and waterholes, grazing areas and so on; but even these proprietorial rules were mitigated to some
extent by considerations of hospitality and humanity” (134).
The lack of territorial units and political border is hardly surprising from the
perspective of Islamic thoughts. Both the Quran and sunna (moral injunctions and
example) lack any reference to territorial units. In the Quran, “the main functionality of
territory is not to serve as a basis for a political unit, or even as a basis for the
implementation of the Shari’ah, but as a place in which a people find shelter, security,
and a livelihood” (Abou El Fadl 2007: 220; emphasis added). Even Dar al-Islam and Dar
al-Harb are non-territorial units (Hashmi 196-198).
The Quran and sunna has no reference to territorial or political boundaries but
they do have many references to social, religious boundaries that separate humanity
based on theological and ideological differences as illustrated in a famous verse in The
Quran: “O humanity! We created you from a male and a female, and made you into
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peoples and tribes that you may know one other…” ((49:13) In Hashim 182-183).78 The
word boundary (Hadd) appears 14 times in the Quran but it always appears in plural
(huddud) and refers to “the limits or ordinance established by God for one who would
live a righteous life” (Hashmi: 182).
Theoretically, “the Qur’anic discourse challenges the legitimacy of formal
borders—a challenge that is consistent with the notion of Islam as a universal moral
message that cannot be confined or limited by territorial constraints” (Abou El Fadl 2007:
215). This is similar to Hashmi argument that the idea of political boundaries is
incompatible with the idea of Dar al-Islam because the goal of the latter is to expand and
annex Dar al-harb (196). Khan also came to similar conclusion that “the Quranic
concept of sovereignty is universal, that is non-territorial, transcendental, meaning
beyond human agency, indivisible, inalienable and truly absolute” (Ijtihd, December
30,1999; emphasis added).79
The nobility territorial borders in the Arab state system were captured by British
officials reports as the one by the Residency Agent after his visit to Arabia in the summer
of 1937:
In his report, the Agent said that the rulers had admitted that they had no fixed
frontiers with their neighbours, but that they had given him instead details of what
they considered their ihram (sacred possession, and therefore inviolable). The
only ruler who was absolutely sure of the extent of his territory was Sa’id of
78

Some scholars argue that artificial territorial dividers are not compatible with this verse as they
would pose an obstacle to mutual exploration and edification between peoples and tribes (Abou
El Fadi 2003: 225).
79

Yet, the Quran and sunna do include many references to sacred spaces; namely, Mecca,
Medina, and Jerusalem (Hashmi: 186). But these sacred spaces are not territorial political units
with political boundaries.
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Dunai. The Sultan of Sharjah, by contrast, was the only one who refused to state
which territory he claimed. (Said Zahlan 1978: 148; quoted in Joffee 1994)
The British Officer Dickson also recalls his conversation with Faisal al-Shiblain, a
leader of Ikhwan, a powerful Bediun warriors groups in Saudi Arabia. After the
demarcation of political borders in the region, Dickson warned Faisal not to cross
political border for the risk of being bombed, but Faisal answer was striking: “Where is
the boundary? We don’t know any boundary, we have never been told anything. If you
mean Iraq or Kuwait tribes, we [Ikhwan] understand, and I tell you they are safe” (Helms
1981: 272; quoted in Korany 1987: 65).
The contemporary rules of supreme authority and non-intervention are dependent
upon the rules of territoriality but the above discussion shows that territoriality rules were
new concepts, rules and practices in Arab politics. Their low level of institutionalization
made it harder to institutionalize the rules of state-territorial sovereignty and nonintervention. In other words, the low level of institutionalization of territoriality and
political borders made the institutionalization process of sovereign territorial states
system in the Arab world a longer and difficult process.
My argument on territoriality is different from the cultural and post-colonial
accounts. The alternative arguments posit that the new territorial borders are not
compatible with the “natural” borders of traditional indigenous groups. They also argue
that inter-state borders suffered from low level of institutionalization because they
divided the Islamic umma and the Arab nation.
Instead, I argue that the notion of political borders and territorial units themselves
were absent in the political history and practice of Islam. They suffered from low level of
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institutionalization because they were new political practices. It is the newsness of the
borders that explain their low level of institutionalization. Thus, Arabism did not create
the a-territorial politics in the Middle East. The absence of political boundaries was
common practice in the Middle East way before the emergence of Pan-Arabism.
Conclusion
The Arab state system experienced high frequency of intervention between 1920s
and 1950s because of the dominance of dynastic sovereignty in the Arab state system;
lack of shared inter-subjective sovereignty in the Arab state system; the absence of shared
inter-subjective norms of territorial sovereignty, non-intervention and territorial integrity
in the international system, and low level of institutionalization of inter-state borders in
the Arab world. In the following chapter, I turn to discuss sovereignty and intervention
in the Arab state system in 1950s and 1960s.
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CHAPTER SIX: NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERVENTION: THE ARAB
STATE SYSTEM 1950S-1960S
The practices of intervention in the Arab state system did not abate after the end
of World War II. Rather, it even intensified.
There was a general disregard for borders and for national sovereignty when it
came to trying to influence an Arab neighbour, to put pressure on it or to try to
stop it from pressuring you. Over the years this has taken the form of direct
military intervention, assassinations, kidnappings, bombings, sabotage, newspaper
and radio campaigns, and support for the political opponents of rival
regimes(Owen 2004: 66).
The most frequent interveners during this period were Egypt under Nasser, Iraq and Syria
under the Bath. Exploring the meanings of sovereignty embodied in their practices of
intervention reveals that they were driven by distinctive meanings of sovereignty. Egypt’s
acts of interventions were constituted by and embodied national sovereignty. Syria’s acts
of intervention in Lebanon and Iraq’s acts of intervention in Kuwait were constituted by
and embodied geographical sovereignty.
Following World War II, the practices of intervention in the Arab state system
embodied distinctive understandings of sovereignty, particularly national sovereignty and
geographical sovereignty but also dynastic sovereignty of Iraq and Jordan, at least until
1958 coup in Iraq that ended the Hashemite regime in Baghdad. National, dynastic and
geographical sovereignty constituted distinctive roles of sovereignty that called upon the
above Arab states to intervene into domestic affairs of other state. Their acts of
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intervention also led to counter-interventions, driven by fear, multiplying the acts of
intervention in the system.
Consequently, the Arab state system was structured by the absence of hegemonic
and shared meaning of sovereignty. Rather, the Arab state system was structured by
conflicting meanings of sovereignty. The Arab states held conflicting meanings on the
positions of sovereignty (who is the legitimate sovereign?) And on what constitute
legitimate roles and practices of sovereignty. The position, roles, and practices of
sovereignty were actually contested. The Arab states engaged in a conflict on defining the
legitimate inter-subjectivity of sovereignty instead of acting upon shared meanings of
sovereignty.
At the international level, the rules of non-intervention and territorial sovereignty,
which are often assumed in IR and Middle East area studies literature, were still not
hegemonic. They were more consolidated and institutionalized compared to the interwar
period. Still, they have yet to reach the highly institutionalized stage; they have yet to
reach the highest stage of consolidated, internalized shared inter-subjective norms.
At the same time, sovereignty’s complementary institution, interstate borders in
the Arab state system, still did not reach the high level of institutionalization even
thought it became more institutionalized compared to the interwar period.
The combination of the three variables— dominance of national, dynastic and
geographical sovereignty and absence of inter-subjective meaning of sovereignty in the
Arab state system, the low level of inter-subjectivity of norms and practices of territorial
sovereignty and non-intervention in international system, and low level of
institutionalization of inter-state borders in the Arab world—constituted the high
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frequency of intervention in the Arab state system during the three decades following
World War II.
Sovereignty and Intervention in the Arab State System
Egypt’s National Sovereignty and Intervention
The traditional role of Egypt in the Arab state system was to contain the
Hashemite dynasty in Iraq and Jordan:
Once Egypt opted for membership of the Arab family she quickly saw that her
national interest lay in containing the Hashemites, in preventing the emergence in
the Eastern Arab world of a power strong enough to challenge her, in preserving
the status quo of small sovereign nation-states subordinate to her. To retain her
primacy, she needed in particular to prevent Syria from falling under the influence
of either Baghdad or Amman. (Seale: 23)
The dynastic sovereignty of Iraq and Jordan, particularly its associated roles and
practices of intervention and non-recognition, constituted a threat to Egypt. Driven by its
fears from the dynastic ambitions of Amman and Baghdad, Egypt fought for
orchestrating an alternative regional order based upon the principles of territorial
sovereignty and non-intervention.
Egypt efforts culminated in organizing the conferences preceded the formation of
the Arab League. During the negotiations, Egypt, in cooperation with Saudi Arabia and
Syria, orchestrated the Charter of the Arab League to make sure it includes the principles
of state-territorial sovereignty and non-intervention. In fact, the main goal of the Arab
League Charter, which strongly adopts territorial sovereignty and non-intervention, was
to delegitimize the dynastic roles and practices of Iraq and Jordan.
The traditional practices of Egypt in the Arab state system, including its acts of
intervention in Syria and its efforts to institutionalize the principles of territorial state
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sovereignty and non-intervention in the Arab League, embodied and reified Egypt’s
distinctive notion of state-territorial sovereignty and its associated principle of Raison
D’état.
The 1953 Free Officers military coup, however, ended Egypt’s traditional notion
of state-territorial sovereignty and its associated legitimating principle of raison d’état,
roles and practices. After the coup, Egypt’s new rulers adopted a new principle of
sovereignty that constituted distinctive sovereignty roles and practices. Egypt’s new
regime adopted a new principle of sovereignty—national sovereignty. The new leader of
Egypt, Gamal Abed Al-Nasser, through his discourse and practices, transformed Egypt’s
traditional territorial-state-sovereignty into national-sovereignty.
By adopting pan-Arabism as its official policy (Searle: 197), Egypt’s transformed
from state-territorial-sovereign state to national sovereign state. Egypt’s new sovereign
identity—national sovereignty—constituted new sovereign roles and practices that were
in conflict with the rules of territorial sovereignty and non-intervention.
Why did Egypt’s national sovereignty constitute acts of intervention in the
domestic affairs of Arab states? The new sovereign identity—national sovereignty—
replaced the territorial-state legitimating principle of raison d’état with a new legitimating
principle of national self-determination (Hall 1998: 150).
According to Egypt’s national sovereignty, the Arab nation is the new sovereign
in the Arab world, replacing the old sovereigns, who were the ruling dynasties and
nobilities in the Arab world.
The notion that the Arab nation is the legitimate wielder of the sword of state
sovereignty altered the roles and practices of Egypt’s foreign policy. Consequently,
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Egypt’s sovereign role became protecting the independence, sovereignty and selfdetermination not merely of Egypt but also the Arab nation as a whole. Put slightly
different, Egypt under Nasser adopted “national sovereignty,” which replaced its
traditional identity of “state sovereignty” (Barkin and Cronin 1994).
Due to its national sovereign identity, Egypt perceived intervention in other Arab
states a legitimate practice as long as the goal is to protect the sovereignty, independence,
and self-determination of the Arab nation. Furthermore, changes in Egypt sovereign
identity, modified its perception of international boundaries within the Arab homeland.
Under its new sovereign identity, the international borders in the Arab homeland are
malleable in the sense that they should not be an obstacle for pursuing the much higher
value of self-determination, sovereignty and independence of the Arab nation. The latter
are much higher in value than international borders. This change in Egypt’s value of
borders reflects a change from state-territorial sovereignty ( borders are fixed and
territorially determined) to national sovereignty (Rodney Bruce Hall 1999; Barkin and
Cronin 1994).
Simply put, Egypt’s pan-Arabism foreign policy was not a violation of
sovereignty as often asserted by IR and Middle East area studies. Rather, Egypt’s panArabism embodied a particular type of sovereignty, national sovereignty, which
constituted roles and practices that were in conflict with the roles and practices
constituted by state-territorial sovereignty. The conflict in the Arab state system was not
between sovereignty and pan-Arabism (Barnett 1988); rather, the conflict was between
different types of sovereignty.
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Figure 3: Egypt’s national sovereign identity as a constitutive cause of its practices of
intervention.
Egypt’s national sovereignty, which perceives the Arab nation as the new
sovereign, legitimized and constituted Egypt’s acts of intervention in other Arab states.
Muhammad Hassanin Haykal, one of Nasser’s closest officials and the editor of AlAhram, was very explicit on the legitimacy of Egypt’s intervention in domestic affairs of
other Arab states:
As a state, Egypt deals with all Arab governments, whatever their forms or
systems, she takes her place beside them in the Arab League and at the United
Nations and concludes defense, trade, cultural and other agreements with
them…As a revolution, Egypt should deal only with the people. This does not
imply interference on our part in the affairs of others, since the fundamental
premise of our struggle is that that Arab people are a single nation. If Egypt as a
state recognizes frontiers in her dealings with governments, Egypt as a revolution
should never hesitate to halt at frontiers, but should carry her message across
them. (Kerr 1971: 29; emphasis added)
Dawisha also emphasizes the relations between Egypt’s national sovereignty and
intervention:
Since Arab nationalism was the primary ideological and emotional identification
of every Arab…According to Nasir, Egypt had the not just the right, but the duty
to intrude into the affairs of other countries that were not conducting themselves
in accordance with Arab nationalist principles. (Adeed Dawisha 2003: 152;
quoted in Lawson 2006: 144; emphasis added)
Inter-state borders were clearly not the foundation of Nasser’s relations with Arab states
as he claimed on the second anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, 23 July 1954:
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Compatriots, Egypt has started a new era of relations with the Arabs—an era
based on true and frank fraternity, facing up to and thinking out problems and
endeavoring to solve them. The aim of the Revolution Government is for the
Arabs to become one Nation with all its sons collaborating for the common
welfare…The revolution also believes that the weight of the defense of Arab states
falls first and foremost on the Arabs and they are worthy of undertaking it. (Seale
198; emphasis added)80
Nasser’s Arab Unity Plans and Sovereignty
To pursue the self-determination, sovereignty and independence of the Arab
nation, Egypt fought for Arab unity but Nasser’s meaning of Arab unity did not include
political union. This position of Egypt regarding Arab unity is often overlooked in the
literature.
Egypt’s national sovereign identity did not constitute a national interest in
territorial or political union of Arab states. Unlike Iraq and Jordan, Egypt did not seek
annexation of Arab states under its sovereignty. Yet, Egypt’s national sovereign identity
legitimized Egypt’s intervention in domestic affairs of Arab states, including unseating
hostile governments.
Arab unity meant, above all to him [Nasser], the unification of the Arab struggle;
it meant ‘to stand in one rank in face of imperialism’. When he preached Arab
80

Nasser was explicit about Egypt’s a-territorial role in the Middle East already in his 1953 book,
Faslfat althwara (The Philosophy of the revolution):
I do not know why I always imagine that in this region in which we live there is a role
wandering aimlessly about seeking an actor to play it. I do not know why this role, tired
of roaming about in this vast region which extends to every place around us, should at
last settle down, weary and worn out, on our frontiers beckoning us to move, to dress up
for it and to perform it since nobody else who can do so.
Here I hasten to point out that this role is not a leading one. It is one of interplay of
reactions and experiments with all these factors aiming at exploding this terrific energy
latent in every sphere around us and at the creation, in this region, of a tremendous power
capable of lifting this region up and making it play its positive role in the construction of
the future and humanity… We, and only we, are impelled by our environment and are
capable of performing this role” (Seale: 194; emphasis added).
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unity before the union with Syria, he meant Arab solidarity on foreign policy
under Egyptian direction and not unity in any territorial or constitutional sense.
He wished to control the foreign policy of his Arab neighbors—if necessary by
unseating a hostile Government—but not to annex or merge with them. (Seale:
312; emphasis added).
Nasser was very explicit in his view of Arab unity in an interview with New York Times:
When the Arab countries united, they were always be able to face and stop
aggression…When the Arab peoples gave up their unity, they were an easy target
for foreign control. The meaning of this is clear—to safeguard the Arab countries,
there has to be one Arab front. For further definition, all Arab countries have to be
independent and have to be far from foreign influence which divides up these
countries in order to divert their attention. This, however, is one thing and
constitutional considerations are another. As a matter of fact, we were surprised
when we first had to deal with constitutional considerations, when unity took
place between the two regions of the UAR…Once again, this does not necessarily
mean that Arab unity means that all Arab countries should be combined in one
country. What I care for is the creation of Arab solidarity as well as a unified
Arab struggle because the Arab destiny and future are similar…The most
important thing is that solidarity should prevail among Arab countries under any
circumstances” (In Seale 225-226).
Kerr also asserts that “Nassir consistently affirmed that meaningful step toward
Arab unity must be predicted on the underlying principle of self-determination.” Thus, he
opposed Iraq’s plan to impose its sovereignty over Kuwait in the summer of 1961 for
being an illegitimate act, which he called “annexation” (Kerr 1971: 20; in Lawson 2006:
144). The successor of Nasser, Anwar Sadat published a book titled the Story of Arab
Unity, which published in December 1957, less than two months before the political
union with Syria. The book, however, includes “no hint ...of the aspirations for territorial
and political union” between Arab states (313).81
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Mahmud Riad, Egyptian Ambassador in Damascus form 1955 till the establishment of the
United Arab Republic (UAR) also emphasized this fact: “We [Egypt] never asked for union with
Syria. We always argued that it was premature. We told each pressure group in favor of unity that
we would always refuse a union brought about by force. We believed that it would never last if
brought about by army” (Quoted in Seale: 314).
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Nasser defined Arab unity not as threat to sovereignty but a mechanism to secure
the true sovereignty and full independence of the Arab nation. For Nasser, the Arab unity
was the foundation of true Arab sovereignty.
In his speech on the establishment of the United Arab Republic, Nasser asserts
that Syria and Egypt “came to the conclusion that this unity which is the fruit of Arab
nationalism is the Arab’s path to sovereignty and freedom” (Niva 212). He also adds that
“the door is open for participating to any Arab state desirous of joining them in a union or
federation for the purpose of protecting the Arab people from harm and evil,
strengthening Arab sovereignty, and safeguarding its existence” (212-213; emphasis
added).
Arab unity was a guarantee for full Arab independence, as Nasser puts it:
We shall proceed together, brethren, united as one man with one heart in order to
achieve the principles of true dignity and true grandeur, and in order to establish
throughout the Arab homeland and the Arab nation a true political independence
and a true economic independence. (quoted in Seale 261; emphasis added)
Nasser searched for Arab unity in the sense of “Arab solidarity” and a “unified Arab
struggle” was driven by “the recognition of the essential unity of the struggle of the Arab
states in the cause of total independence from their Great Powers mentors” (Searle :313).
For Nasser, Arab nationalism was also the only path for the security of Arab
states:
By Arab nationalism we mean that we should be independent and that
independence is born of our conscience. We should no longer be in servitude to
any other country or imperialism, any more than we should be a part of any
sphere of influence. That is what Arab nationalism: Arab nationalism is union,
unity, solidarity, which should be erected on the rights, the interests of the Arabs
and not on those of imperialism or spheres of influence…that is why, from the
very first day of this revolution, we were led to declare that Arab nationalism
constituted the only possible security for an Arab country. We said that the
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defense of the Arab nationalism should arise out of its own inner being and not
from pacts dominated by Great Powers (Niva: 212).
But if Egypt did not seek territorial unity, why Nasser accepted the political unity with
Syria in 1958? Nasser was
trapped by his role of champion of Arab rights and arbiter of Arab destinies: he so
often urged the Arabs to unite behind him that now that a full-blooded political
union was offered he could not retreat; it was too late to explain that by unity he
had meant solidarity alone. (Seale 325)
Barnett provided a similar explanation:
Although he [Nasser] privately feared that this agreement would lead nowhere
good, he felt that he had no choice but to follow his words with deeds. Nasser was
not only a creator of the political agenda, he was also a creature of it. As a hero
who occupied a role in Arab politics, he would soon by captured by the normative
expectations of that role, and to deny the role would be to deny the very fabric of
his leadership. (Barnett 1998: 121-122)
In his decision to accept the political unity with Syria, Nasser was driven by the “will-tomanifest-identity” more than the “will-to-power” (Bruce Hall 1999: 38-39). While
Egypt’s “will-to-power” called for protecting the territorial status quo and rejecting the
political unity with Syria, Egypt’s will-to-manifest-identity (national sovereign identity)
trapped Egypt and Nasser in political unity that they did not desire. This is why Seale
concludes that “United Arab Republic “was not a logical outcome of Egypt’s Arab
policy; it shattered the territorial status quo which she had been at such pains to defend”
(Seale: 314).
The behavior of Nasser reflects the effectiveness of national sovereignty on the
state. As Young notes, the “effectiveness of an institution is determined by “the extent
that its operation impels actors to behave differently than they would if the institution did
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not exist or of some other institutional arrangement were put in its place” (Young 1992:
161)
The Arab States and Egypt’s National Sovereignty
Nasser’s view of Arab unity as mechanism to guarantee the full independence and
true sovereignty of the Arab nation was not shared by all Arab states. King Hussain of
Jordan rejected Nasser’s views portraying it as a new form of imperialism:
My own conception of Arab nationalism…is quite different from… Nasser’s…He
believes that Arab nationalism can only be identified by a particular brand of
Arab unity…I disagree…It is nothing more than a new form of imperialism, the
domination of one state by another. (Walt 1987:213)
After allying with Egypt against Iraq and Jordan’s dynastic ambitions, Saudi
Arabia saw Egypt’s national sovereign practices as a threat to the territorial status quo.
Saudi Arabia continued in its fighting for protecting territorial sovereignty as the ordering
principle of the Arab states system. Saudi Arabia’s role in protecting territorial
sovereignty in the system originated long time before it became an oil exporter country. It
was driven by its fear of Hashemite’s ambitions of annexing Saudi Arabia and greater
Syria. The Ba’th of Syria, who pursued the political unity with Egypt, had much more
ambitious goals that Nasser; they “were devoted to the pursuit of Arab unity: they
envisaged the creation of a unitary Arab state” (Seale 310). Lebanon also rejected
Egypt’s intervention in its internal affairs and it complained against UAR in the Arab
League and the United Nations Security Council.
U.S. Secretary of States Allen Dulles also reflected on Nasser’s views of
sovereignty:
Now the thing we are up against is a rather extreme view which the Arab
countries in general, and Egypt in particular take on this thing which they call
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nationalization and “sovereignty.” Nasser can hardly speak more than a couple of
sentences but what he has to bring in “sovereignty”—“sovereignty”—they
apparently conceive it as being the right to prove that you can step on other
people’s toes with impunity. But we all know, who have some maturity in these
matters, that sovereignty—its best expression involves harmonization of policies,
coordinating them and working for the common good. But countries that have
newly won their wings of independence incline toward taking initially an extreme
view. They are hypersensitive about this thing. But it is so demonstrable that in
the long run it is going to hurt Egypt and other Arab countries (Niva 1999: 163).
To sum this section, the above discussion shows that Nasser’s unity plans are
completely different from Iraq and Jordan unity plans because they are originated from
different sovereign identities, legitimating principles and roles. The behavioral difference
between Egypt on the one hand and Iraq and Jordan under the Hasehmite on other, are
explained as manifestation of the historically contingent notions of roles, practices and
interests that derive from distinct sovereign identities and rules (dynastic vs. national
sovereign identities).
The changes in Egypt’s policy after 1953 manifests changes in the collective
sovereign identity of Egypt from territorial to national sovereignty. This change brought
with it changes in the notion of sovereign role, national interest, and practices of Egypt. 82
The changes in sovereign identity constitute changes in the system; “change in the
international system occurs with changes in the collective identity of crucial social actors
who collectively constitute the units from which the system is emerged” (Hall 1999: 28).
The Arab state system evolved from a system of dynastic sovereignty to a system
of national sovereignty. As put by Bassam Tibi, the history of Arab nationalism can be
looked at from two different perspectives. The first is the history of the ideas of Arab
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For an excellent discussion of sovereign identities and their impact on state interests and
behavior see Bruce Hall (1999).
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nationalism (the perspective of his book), and the second perspective is the one that looks
at Arab nationalism:
As an ideology of an evolving state system. In its earlier period (between the two
World Wars) the Arab states system was royal in that it was carried out by
dynasties. The Hashimites in Iraq and Jordan, the Saudis in Arabia and
Muhammad ‘Ali dynasty in Egypt were the Arab rulers. They were the champions
of the search for Arab unity. The early Arab states system unfolded in the years
1945-54. With the rise of Nasserism (1952) this regional system assumed a
populist character. The aspiration of a United Arab Kingdom that was born at the
time of Sherif Hussain of Mecca switched into the claim for a United Arab
Republic, as articulated by Nasser and realized in 1958. This change marks a
transformation of Pan-Arabism from royalism to populism” (Tibi 1997: 203).
Iraq and Syria’s Geographical Sovereignty and Intervention
Iraq and Syria were also frequent interveners in the Arab state system after World
War II. Iraq frequently intervened in Kuwait and Syria frequently intervened in Lebanon.
Iraq and Syria even did not recognize the sovereignty of Kuwait and Lebanon
respectively.
Iraq and Syria’s practices of non-recognition and intervention embodied their
understandings of what constitute legitimate sovereign (who is legitimate sovereign? and
how to fill the position of sovereign?). Their practices reflect the notion that historical
geography is a legitimizing principle of sovereignty. Lebanon and Kuwait are not
legitimate sovereignty because they were part of the historical geography of Iraq and
Syria.
Iraq perceived Kuwait as part of its natural historical geography that was taken
from Iraq by great powers. Thus, Iraq perceived its sovereign role to return the historical
lands of Kuwait to Iraq. Similarly, Syria perceived Lebanon part of its historical land of
Bilad Al-sham (Greater Syria) that taken from Syria by great power. Iraq and Syria did
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not see Kuwait and Lebanon as legitimate sovereign states. They were perceived as
illegitimate states and must be returned to their historical owners. Their practices of
intervention and non-recognition were driven by their distinctive notion of sovereignty.
On June 19, 1961 Kuwait declared independence. Six days later, the Iraqi prime
minister, General Abdul Al-Karim Kassem, held a press conference (25 June) in which
he asserted:
The Iraqi Republic has decided to protect the Iraqi people in Kuwait and to
demand all the land, arbitrarily held by imperialism, which belong to the district
of Kuwait which is entirely associated with the province of Basra. The Iraqi
republic will not ready to cede a single inch of this land. When we say this, it
means that we can execute it. Accordingly, we will issue a republican decree
appointing the present esteemed Shiekh of Kuwait as Qa’imaqam of the district of
Kuwait, who shall come under the authority of the Basra province. We will warn
the Sheikh of Kuwait not to act arbitrarily with regard to the right of the Kuwaiti
people which is the right of the Iraqi people themselves. If this Sheikh
misbehaves, then he will be severely punished and regarded as an insurgent.”
(quoted in Zinadini 1977: 181).
Iraq even threatened to invade Kuwait but the existence of British and Arab league troops
in Kuwait deterred Iraq from implementing its plan. Although Iraq recognized Kuwait
after international pressure in 1963, Iraq continued to challenge Kuwait’s independence
until the invasion in 1990 (Miller 2007: 161,185-6).
Syria never recognized Lebanon as independent states. Until recently, Syria had
no formal relations with Lebanon and it refused to open a Syrian embassy in Beirut. Syria
perceive Lebanon as part of Greater Syria (bilad al Sham) as reflected in President Hafez
Assad’s remarks that Syrians and Lebanese “are one single people, one single
nation…The feeling of kinship runs deeper than it does between states in the United
States” (New York Times, 4 December 1983: A4; quoted in Drysdale 1994: 23). In
September 1944 the Syrian Prime minister Sadallah al-Jabari also asserts Syria’s policy
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toward Lebanon: “As regards Lebanon the Syrian Government desire complete reunion
or, if this is not possible, reduction of Lebanon to its original (i.e., pre-World War I)
boundaries” (Porath 1984: 185-186).
The rest of Arab states did not recognize the legitimacy of Iraq and Syria’s
sovereignty claims over Lebanon and Kuwait. Driven by fear, the rest of Arab states also
intervened in Kuwait and Lebanon to protect the sovereignty of Lebanon and Kuwait,
multiplying the acts of intervention in the system.
Sovereignty, Alliances, and Military Bases in the Arab State System
The Arab states did not even share the same meanings of legitimate roles of
sovereignty when it comes to relations with great powers. Practices that were perceived
by one state as a legitimate sovereign practice, others rejected it as a mere violation of
state sovereignty.
The conflict over the 1955 Baghdad Pact is particularly illuminating. It illustrates
the contested meanings on the roles and practices of sovereignty in the Arab state system.
The Arab states struggled on defining whether strategic cooperation with great powers is
a violation of sovereignty or not.
Iraq’s decision to join the strategic alliance with Western powers (Baghdad Pact)
was condemned viciously by other Arab states especially Egypt. The Cairo based “Voice
of the Arabs,” the mouthpiece of Nasser’s regime, reacted to the Baghdad Pact in the
following words:
We regret to announce that a communique has been issued in Baghdad stating the
Turkish-Iraqi alliance will be signed this evening and that the Iraqi Council of
Ministers has consented the final of this alliance. Thus Nuri al-Sa’id, rejecting the
unanimous decision of the Arab people, concluded an alliance with the Turks, the
enemies of Arabism, friends of Zionism—an alliance which will destroy Iraq’s
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aspirations to freedom, Palestine’s hopes of independence, and the Arabs’ hope of
unity, integrity and glory. The ‘Voice of the Arabs’, which has resisted this
alliance, declares to the entire world that the people of Iraq disown this alliance
and that the chains imposed by it on the noble people of Iraq tie only Nuri alSa’id. The people of Iraq are not bound by this alliance; they have not signed it
and will not sign it; they curse it and they will destroy this filthy piece of paper,
the Nuri-Menderes alliance. (quoted in Seale 222-223)
Egypt’s rejection of the Baghdad Pact reflects its view of non-alignment as the
main guarantee of state sovereignty and independence (Seale: 199). Nasser repeatedly
link non-alignment with sovereignty: “Our participation in any pact would destroy our
sovereignty, would make us followers in regards to our foreign policy and would
completely destroy Arab nationalism” (quoted in Niva: 4). In another speech, Nasser
repeated the same principle, “I am against the alignment of Arab countries with any big
powers. Such an alignment could open the door for the big powers to become dominant
and to bring back imperialism and colonialism to the Arab lands” (quoted in Niva: 205;
emphasis added).
On the other hand, Iraq insisted that participation in strategic alliance with
Western powers is necessary for the protection of its sovereignty. In his meeting with
Nasser on 15 September 1954, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said stated:
I cannot depend on the Arabs to defend my country. If I tell my people and my
foreign friends that I am going to depend on the Syrian, Saudi, and Lebanese
armies to defend Iraq, they will say “Nuri, you are fool!” The only way to defend
my country is to make an alliance with the West. (Seale: 207; emphasis added)
He also asserted that the Arab Collective Security pact is “mere ink on paper, and another
means [of defense] must be found” (Seale: 208).
Nuri Al-Said added another justification for his country alliance with great
powers. “if we can prove to the West that we have a constructive and affirmative policy,
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its attitude towards us will change. If we remain idle, the West will overpower us and
meddle with our rights and interests” (Niva: 208; emphasis added).
Iraq also rejected Egypt’ views of the Baghdad Pact as interference into its
domestic affairs. In his meeting with an Arab League delegation who visited Baghdad in
January 1955 to solve the conflict between Egypt and Iraq over Baghdad Pact, Nuri told
the Arab delegation before boarding the airplane back to Cairo, “I am not a soldier in
Abed al-Nasir’s army. Please tell him that I will never obey his orders” (Seale: 217). In
response to Egypt’s interference, the government of Iraq issued an official statement
emphasizing that “no one could dictate conditions to Iraq for cooperation” (quoted in
Niva: 207).
Iraq and Egypt competed against each other on convincing the rest of Arab states
to join them. Syria was divided with no clear role and voice (Barentt 1998: 113). Saudi
Arabia supported Nasser out of fear of Hashemite expansionist policies. Lebanon was
neutral on this issue. The Lebanese Prime minister even commented that he “could not
see what the fuss was all about” as Iraq was already a party to strategic alliances in 1937
and 1948 (Ibid).
Jordan already had strategic alliance with great powers and wanted to join the
Baghdad Pact. King Hussain feared the public reaction but after hesitation Jordan signed
the Baghdad pact. Nasser, in reaction, mobilized the streets of Jordan against their King.
Consequently, major riots erupted in the streets of Jordan by “Hundreds of thousands of
Jordanians listening avidly to the propaganda on Cairo Radio, saw in Nasser a sort of
mystical savior,” as reflected by King Hussain himself afterwards (quoted in Barnett:
117).
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Obviously there was a conflict on determining whether strategic relation with
Western powers is a violation of state sovereignty or not. While some adopted nonalignment as a guarantee of their sovereignty, other states adopted strategic relations with
great powers as an expression as well as protection of their sovereignty. Instead of acting
upon the rules of sovereignty, the Arab states were engaged in a conflict on defining the
legitimate rules, roles and practices of sovereignty. The Arab states did not even hold
shared meanings on whether military bases are a violation of state sovereignty or not.
After the end of Second World War, Britain tried to maintain its strategic position
in the Middle East and North Africa through extraterritorial jurisdiction. London sought
to maintain military bases in the Arab states and it did not view her military bases as
violation of state sovereignty. British officials tried to convince their Arab counterparts
that extraterritorial jurisdiction and military bases did not constitute violation of
sovereignty of the new Arab states.
The reaction of the Arab states was anything but united. There was no consensus
between Arab states on the relations between British extraterritoriality and state
sovereignty.
On the one side, Egypt under Nasser rejected Britain’s extraterritorial jurisdiction
as a mere imperialism and called for the complete evacuation of the British forces from
Canal Suez. Egypt appealed to the United Nation Security Council, asserted that British
troops inside the borders of Egypt constitute “an offense to [Egypt’s] dignity, a hindrance
to its normal development, as well as infringement on the fundamental principles of
sovereign equality” (quoted in Niva: 178).
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In his speech after the nationalization of the Suez Canal, Nasser cheerfully
declared that “Today, we actually achieve true sovereignty, true dignity and true pride”
(quoted in Niva: 201; emphasis added). Nasser nationalized the canal partly in response
to the conditions that the United States and Britain attempted to impose on Egypt in
return of providing financial support to Aswan High Damp. Egypt perceived the political
conditions for economic support as a threat to Egypt’s “independence” as put by the
‘Voice of the Arabs’:
No one would refuse honest aid from abroad; but the Arabs can do without any
pennies and bullets which bring enslavement and put back the cloak of Arab
progress. Aid of this kind is not based on respect for mutual interest and for the
rights of people to freedom and independence. This, O Arabs, is the policy of
Egypt. (quoted in Seale: 197)83
Egypt’s rejection of conditional foreign aid reflected its views of sovereignty. The
Arab news agency reported on 27 January 1953 that the new leaderships sent guidelines
to Egypt’s ambassadors around the world that Egypt neutrality principles means that
Egypt “refuse to accept ‘any sort of cooperation other than one based on a full
recognition of her rights, sovereignty, and national prestige’ (quoted in Seale 195;
emphasis added).
On the other hands, Jordan and Iraq did not perceive the presence of British
troops on their soil as a violation of sovereignty. In response to regional criticism against
the Anglo-Jordan treaty of alliance on March 22, 1946, the King of Jordan asserted that
the treaty did not compromise Jordan’s sovereignty:
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Egypt’s view of conditional foreign aid and sovereignty has changed since Nasser regime. In
the later1980s and early 1990s Egypt received conditional loans from the IMF and the World
Bank with conditions of structural adjustment programs.
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The new Treaty has recognized our complete independence and that the alliance
to be exclusively defensive and within the limits of Security Council, without the
stationing of any British troops except by agreement between the two parties and
in the case of defensive exigencies. (quoted in Niva: 176).
In contrast to Egypt policies, the rulers of the Arab kingdom in the Gulf actually
asked Britain to keep its forces within their borders. When Britain decided to withdraw
militarily from the Gulf by the end of 1971 partly due to financial constraints:
In response, Shaykh Zayed, the ruler of Abu Dhabi, told a British emissary that he
and his fellow rulers would be willing to bear the entire cost of British military
presence in the area. Shaykh Rashid of Dubai seconded Zayid’s offer. Moreover,
Saudi Arabia, worried about the spread of radical ideologies that had blossomed
in newly independent South Yemen, conveyed to London its willingness to help
fund a continued British presence. (Gause 2010: 18-19)
In contrast to Egypt, the Arab regimes in the Gulf did not see the British forces on their
territories as a violation of their sovereignty and independence.
In conclusion, different Arab states were driven by different meanings of
legitimate sovereignty. Dynastic, national, Geographical and territorial sovereign rules
constituted different roles and practices, which were in conflict with each other.
The emergence of conflicting meanings of sovereignty in the Arab state system
was partly constituted by the inherent ambiguity of the institution of sovereignty itself,
the limited socializing power of international society after World War II, and the mere
fact that Arab states were in early stages in the process of sovereign role acquisition (see
Chapter Three).
Thus, the structure of the Arab state system was filled not in shared intersubjective institution of sovereignty but conflict meanings of sovereignty, including
conflict meanings of legitimate position, roles, and practices of sovereignty. The
foundational institution of sovereignty, which is often the starting point in IR theory, was
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in fact severely contested in the Arab state system. The units of the Arab state system
were involved in a conflict over defining the foundational institution of sovereignty.
The absence of shared meanings of sovereignty and the dominance of national,
dynastic and geographical sovereignty constituted the high frequency of intervention in
the Arab state system from the end of World War II to 1970s. But the Arab state system
was embedded in a distinctive international society that also contributed to the frequency
of intervention in the regional Arab state system.
Sovereignty and Intervention in International System
The international context within which Egypt under Nasser intervened in other
Arab states was not very different from the interwar international system. Even after the
end of World War II, the norms of territorial sovereignty and non-intervention did not
reach the stage of high level of inter-subjectivity—high level of internalization. Both the
rules and the practices of international system embodied that territorial sovereignty and
non-intervention were still far away from being a highly consolidated norm in
international system.
The United Nation Charter did NOT explicitly address the issue of nonintervention as vividly put by R.J. Vincent, “Nowhere in the Charter is the principle of
non-intervention explicitly laid down as a rule governing the relations between the
members of the United Nation” (1974: 234).
The Charter, interestingly enough, is not a very satisfactory instrument when it
comes to the problem of intervention, because it deals with it in a very limited
way. It concerns itself first of all only with certain types of action. What it bans is
the use of force and threat of force…[but] there are many other ways of
intervening, in which force, or even the threat of force remain implicit, below its
visible surface. Furthermore, the Charter only aims at protecting the territorial
integrity and political independence of a state; it does not deal with other ways of
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undermining the state, such as trying to change the nature of its government.
(Hoffman 1984: 20-21)84
Stanley Hoffman concluded that the attempt to control intervention by international law
and the United Nations Charter in the post-World War II era actually “failed” (Ibid). In
terms of practices, the international system also experienced high frequency of external
intervention as evidenced in the International Military Intervention (IMI) dataset
(Pickering and Kisangani 2009, Pearson and Baumann 1993) and Overt Military
Intervention data set (Tillema 1989).
In other words, the practices of intervention in the Arab state system was not an
exceptional Arab norm. In fact, the international system itself also experienced high
frequency of intervention after World War II. This is important observation because the
alternative accounts asserted that the high frequency of intervention in the Arab state
system was exceptional and different from the norm and practice of intervention in
international system.
Following World War II, the norm of territorial sovereignty was not a universal
ordering principle. Even in the late 1950s, the principle of territorial sovereignty was far
from being universal:
The imperial powers were convinced as late as the 1950s that they would remain
in parts of Africa for many years to come. In 1954 a mission of the U.N.
Trusteeship Council reported that Tanganyika (Tanzania) could be independent in
20 years…In the mid-1950s, Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso),
and other territories that comprised French West Africa were conceived by a
leading scholar as emergent local government rather than candidates for sovereign
statehood. Until 1956 the French African territories were moving towards
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“The Charter is based on a model which draws a sharp distinction between external and domestic affairs;
the evil against which it is supposed to operate is that of the massive crossing of established borders by
armies; and that has not been the main problem [i.e. intervention] of post war international relations.”
(Hoffman 1984: 21).
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integration within the French empire…The political imagination did not easily
visualize colonies as states, certainly not all of them, and independent came as a
surprise to many. (Jackson and Rosberg 1986: 8)
After World War II, territorial integrity norm was still in the early period of its
acceptance stage (not consolidation stage):
The acceptance stage of [territorial integrity] norm development began with the
adoption of Article 2(4) in the UN Charter in June 1945, and it lasted until the
mid-1970s. It was not until the 1960s and early 1970s that broad and strong
backing for the norm became palpable. (Zacher 2001: 236-237)
It is important to emphasize this was the international context (treaties and practices)
within which Jamal Abed Nasser became the president of Egypt; this was the
international context when Egypt adopted national sovereignty in 1953 and interfered in
domestic affairs of other Arab states. This was the international context within which
Syria claims its sovereignty right over Lebanon and Iraq claimed it sovereignty rights
over Kuwait. This was the international context within which Arab states intervened in
each other’s internal affairs.
This was the international context within which the Arab states were engaged in
“Negotiations in Arab Politics” and debating Pan-Arabism-sovereignty relations (Barnett
1998). This was the international context within which the Arab states were involve in
the Arab Cold War (Kerr 1964) and Balance of the Threat politics (Walt 1987).
Overlooking the limited institutional power of territorial sovereignty and nonintervention in the international system risk a misleading account of sovereignty and
intervention in the Arab state system.
International society is the international stage or theater, where new Arab states
look at to learn how old states perform the roles of sovereignty. But the theater of
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international system clearly shows that territorial sovereignty and non-intervention were
far from being hegemonic inter-subjective norm. The old members (old states) of
international society were engaged in conflict on the legitimate meanings of the roles of
sovereignty (France and Britain repeatedly tried to keep some extraterritorial rights which
were rejected by the U.S. and U.S.S.R). The old members of the international society
were also involved in many external interventions. Also the United Nations Charter did
not prescribe clear and coherent roles of non-intervention during this period. The
principle of territorial sovereignty was not universal at that time as African continent was
still under European colonialism.
The international society did not prescribe clear and coherent roles to new Arab
states (role prescription and role ambiguity); the international society did not perform
clear and coherent roles of territorial sovereignty and non-intervention (role performance)
and thus the international society had limited power to socialize the Arab states (role
socialization) to internalize the appropriate roles of territorial sovereignty and nonintervention. For, there were no such appropriate roles of territorial sovereignty and nonintervention at the time. At the same time, the Arab states were still in the early stages of
their acquisition process of the roles of sovereignty (role acquisition) and they were
embedded in domestic and regional institutions (Dynastic, national, and geographical
sovereignty) that prescribed behavioral roles that were in conflict with the roles
prescribed by territorial sovereignty and non-intervention.
In the analysis of why Africa’s weak states persist, Jackson and Rosberg
emphasize the role of international society in supporting African states and they highlight
the historical fact that “the African states all became independent at a time when
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international society was highly organized and integrated” (1982: 20). But, in contrast to
the African states, most Arab states became independent when the international society
was neither organized nor integrated.
The literature on Arab politics has overlooked international society (particularly
international norms); instead, the literature adopted the realist’s definition of international
structure (international polarity and anarchy). The above discussion clearly shows that
international normative structure is too important to be ignored in our analysis of interArab politics. Focusing on polarity and anarchy cannot capture the above international
normative context within which the Arab states were embedded. The above discussion
clearly illustrate that the international normative structure did not impose robust
constraints against the acts of intervention following World War II.
Thus, imposing an ideal type of territorial sovereignty and non-intervention in
regional Arab state system and international system instead of exploring their level of
institutionalization distorts rather than illuminates the inter-Arab politics following the
end of World War II.
The above discussion also makes its crystal clear that the alternative accounts that
explain the political disorder and intervention in the Arab state system following World
War II by merely sovereignty-Pan Arabism conflict distort the history of Arab politics.
They impose a timeless meaning of sovereignty, a fixed meaning of Pan-Arabism without
exploring the actual historical norms and practices of sovereignty, pan-Arabism, and
intervention in the Arab state system and international system.
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Sovereignty’s Complementary Institution: Inter-State Borders in the Arab
State System
The institution of interstate borders was still a new institution as many of the Arab
states received independence after World War II. The low level of institutionalization of
inter-state borders increased the acts of intervention.
The low level of institutionalization of inter-state borders was featured in the
prominent historian Roger Owen’s generalization on inter-Arab politics. According to
Owen, there was
a general assumption that boundaries are porous and that neighbors will attempt to
interfere. This forces regimes to be much warier than they might otherwise be,
and, often, to try to preempt such interference by making a first move themselves.
More generally, this assumption has often led to attempts to weaken a
troublesome neighbor as a way of reducing its capacity to make trouble… the
close involvement with events and processes across Arab borders means that there
is less of a difference between domestic and foreign policy than in other parts of
the world. Regimes habitually attempt to find support, and even legitimacy, across
such borders while having to pay close attention to rival attempts to do just the
same. (Owen 2004: 66-67)
Elsewhere, Owen emphasized that the Arab state system experiences what he calls
“habitual willingness to acts across international borders that seemed unparalleled
elsewhere in the non-European world (Owen 2004: 66).
The practice of territoriality was new practice in Arab politics. The tradition of
non-territorial politics including the absence of political borders is manifested in early
years of Arabism. Both territoriality in general and political borders in particular are
absent in the definition of Arabism.
For Sati Al Husri, the preeminent theorist of Arab nationalism, “every person
who speaks Arabic is an Arab. Everyone who is affiliated with these people is an Arab”.
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For Charles Malik, “The word “Arab” denotes neither a race nor a religion. For the most
part, its connotation is “Arabic Speaking.” For George Antonious,
The connotation of the word Arab changed accordingly. It is no longer used solely
to denote a member of the nomad tribes who peopled the Arabian Peninsula. It
gradually came to mean a citizen of that extensive Arab world—not any
inhabitant of it, but that great majority whose racial descent, even when it was not
of pure Arab lineage, had become submerged in the tide of Arabisation; whose
manners and traditions had been shaped in an Arab mold; and most decisive of
all, whose mother tongue is Arabic. The term applies to Christians as well as to
Moslems, and to the off-shoots of each of these creeds, the criterion being not
Islamisation but the degree of Arabisation (quoted in Chalala 1987: 20-21).
This non-territorial definition is reflected in the practice of the pan Arabism movement at
least in its early stages when its main concern was with the status of Arab language and
culture within the Ottoman Empire; it did not even ask for territorial and political
independence from the Ottoman Empire. “The demand of pre- 1913 Arab nationalists did
not go beyond the call for local and cultural autonomy within the confines of
Ottomanism” (Tibi: 1997: 16-17).
The territorial concept of “The Arab Homeland” is actually a new concept that did
not exist before 1950s:
[The] supranational entity like the Arab Homeland is not a naturally existing
territory waiting to be defined and labeled; but instead it is a complex and fluid
construct that is intimately linked to a variety of geopolitical and cartographic
discourses. . . .Since the 1950s, maps have helped to discursively create the Arab
Homeland as a unified supranational Arab territory. But the emphasis on Arab
unity is not isolated to maps. Instead, the clear demarcation of the territory and the
adoption of the label “Arab Homeland” are part of wider geopolitical discourses
and practices. The cartographic creation of this territory emerged in the 20th
century as the pan-Arab movement gained strength against Ottoman, British and
French imperial powers. . . . The Arab Homeland as supranational discursive
construct because it is part of broader geopolitical discourses that have attempted
to unite the entirety of national entities into one territory (and less so because it is
a place of political networks or economic relations like the EU). (Culcasi, 2011:
421, 426, 418-419).
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Borders suffer from low level of institutionalization not because they divided the
Arab nation but rather because they were a new practice of politics. They suffer from low
level of institutionalization because they were new institution that has yet to reach its
high level of institutionalization. This is what constituted intervention.
In the next chapter, I will turn to discuss sovereignty and intervention after 1970s.
I will show that Arab state system experienced significant change in its institutions of
sovereignty and inter-state borders, constituting significant decline in acts of external
intervention. I will also show that this regional transformation is partly constituted by
major normative changes in international system.
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PART IV: SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERVENTION IN THE ARAB
STATE SYSTEM 1970S-2014
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CHAPTER SEVEN: STATE-TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY AND
INTERVENTION: THE ARAB STATE SYSTEM 1970S-2011
The Arab state system experienced significant decline in the practices of
intervention after 1970s. Multiple causes at the domestic, regional and international
levels contributed to this important change.85 In this chapter, I will focus exclusively on
the distinctive contribution of my three institutional variables: sovereignty in the Arab
state system, sovereignty in the international system, and level of institutionalization of
inter-state borders in the Arab state system. Changes in these three institutional variables,
I argue, constituted the decline in the practices of intervention in the Arab state system.
Sovereignty and Intervention in the Arab State System
Changes in the dominant norms of sovereignty in the Arab state system
constituted the decline in the practices of intervention. More specifically, the decline in
national, geographical, and dynastic sovereignty and the rise of state-territorial
sovereignty constituted the decline in the acts of intervention in the Arab state system.
The rise of state-territorial sovereignty and the decline of national, dynastic, and
geographical sovereignty in the Arab state system was a gradual process that began in
early 1960s and reached its zenith in 1980s. This was an evolutionary change not
revolutionary change.86 In other words, the change in the normative structure of the
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On revolutionary and evolutionary change in international politics see Gilpin (1981).
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Arab state system—norms of sovereignty—took place over extended period of time. This
complicated process should not be reduced to single events such as 1973 oil boom or
1967 Six Days War even though these two factors contributed to the consolidation of
state-territorial sovereignty
At the end of this gradually transitional process, the principle of state-territorial
sovereignty, which was supported by the weakest Arab states, Lebanon and Kuwait in
particular, became the dominant institution in the Arab state system. National,
geographical and dynastic sovereignties, which were promoted by the strongest Arab
states, eventually disappeared from inter-Arab relations.
Put differently, state-territorial sovereignty that was advocated by the weakest
states in the regional state system became the hegemonic rules of the game; whereas,
national, dynastic, and geographical sovereignty that were supported by the strongest
states in the system disappeared. Obviously, the realist’s variable of distribution of power
cannot explain this change in the rules of sovereignty in the Arab state system.
The practices of intervention declined because the newly dominant institution of
state-territorial sovereignty prescribed distinctive roles of intervention and nonintervention that strongly respected international borders and territorial jurisdictions of
supreme authority.87 The consolidation of state-territorial sovereignty and its associated
role of intervention and non-intervention constituted the decline in the acts of external
intervention in the Arab state system. Change in the normative structure—norms of
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As explained in Chapter Four, each of dynastic, national, territorial, geographical and popular
sovereignty prescribes distinctive role of intervention and non-intervention. The behavioral
expectations regarding intervention and non-intervention are constituted by the dominant type of
sovereignty in the system.

156

sovereignty—of the Arab state system is what constituted change in the acts of
intervention in the Arab state system.
The changes in the norms of sovereignty are embodied in the various discursive
and empirical practices of the Arab states. The consolidation of state-territorial
sovereignty is embodied, for example, in the end of the competition between Arab states
on the position of “Arab leadership”, which was a common practice in previous decades.
Beginning in mid-1960s, “Arab leadership suddenly ceased to be a plausible ambition” in
inter-Arab politics (Kerr1970: 129). While the competition over the position of the leader
of the Arab people was a feature of dynastic and national sovereign practices in previous
decades, the end of this competition in inter-Arab politics reflect the new status of stateterritorial sovereignty.
The consolidation of state-territorial sovereignty is also embodied in the decline
of political unity plans that driven by dynastic and national legitimating principles.
“Unification had already dropped off the political agenda by 1964,” wrote Michael
Barnett (1998: 163). “By the mid-1960s pan-Arabism had lost its luster,” even long
before the 1967 war (162).
The Arab states explicitly reaffirmed the principle of non-intervention in 1965
Arab summit. The resolutions of this summit “called on Arab states to cease their
propaganda wars and to recognize the principle of non-interference” (167).
The Arab states strongly reaffirmed the principle of state-territorial sovereignty
and non-intervention in the famous Khartoum Summit in 1967 in which
the Arab states agreed to recognize each other’s sovereignty and the legitimacy of
the separate Arab experiments, and they furthered the prospect of cooperation by
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pledging that they would desist from attempts to destabilize each other from
within through their media. (167)
The Arab leaders also reaffirmed the resolution of 1965 summit on non-intervention.
During the summit, Egypt and Saudi Arabia also signed an agreement to end their
military intervention in Yemen. Nasser even decided to close down the Sawt al-Arab
[Voice of the Arabs] radio broadcast.
During the Khartoum summit, many Arab states emphasized the principles of “coexistence” and “coordination” rather than “unification” and “integration” among Arab
states (Barnett 1998: 166-67; 170-171).
“What occurred in Khartoum was the birth of a new order . . . The Arab states
reiterated that sovereignty was the foundation of the Arab order,” wrote Barnett (1998:
170; emphasis added). Obviously, Barnett refers to state-territorial sovereignty. By the
conclusion of Khartoum summit, “the normative landscape had irrevocably changed” in
the Arab state system (Burgis 2009: 74). The emerging order regulated “inter-Arab
relations on the principle of state sovereignty” (Dawisha 2003: 286). “By September and
summit’s conclusion, the normative landscape had irrevocably changes: Waraniyya, or
state-based nationalism, had been “consecrated as the dominant ideology, regulating
inter-Arab relations on the principle of state sovereignty” (Burgis: 74).
The process of consolidation of state-territorial sovereignty continued in 1970s as
embodied in the Jordanian civil war, the Black September in 1970, when the ruling
Hashemite regime launched a military attack against the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) within its territory.
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King Hussein justified his military attacks against the Palestinian militias by the
principle of territorial-state sovereignty: “The State will exercise its full sovereignty over
everyone present on its territory. All shall respect that sovereignty” (Barnett 1998: 180).
All Arab states, except Syria,88 decided not to intervene militarily in Jordan’s
domestic affairs. Instead, the Arab leaders, including the king of Jordan, convened in
Cairo on September 22 to solve the conflict between Jordan and the PLO. Noticeably,
the Arab leaders repeatedly emphasized the legitimacy of state-territorial sovereignty
during the summit. Even Nasser himself called for the respect and protection of Jordan’s
sovereignty, a regime that Nasser himself repeatedly tried to overthrow in previous
decades. On September 27 the PLO and Jordan signed the Cairo Agreement that ended
the military conflict.
Following the 1973 war, Arab states signed separate cease-fire agreements with
Israel, which implicitly recognize the territorial-state sovereignty of Israel. Egypt went
much further by signing a separate peace agreement with Israel. The act was condemned
mostly by Syria and Iraq. But most of the Arab states respected Egypt decision based on
the principle of state-territorial sovereignty.
Saudi Arabia, the strongest Arab state in 1970s, responded to Egypt separate
peace negotiations with Israel that Saudi Arabia did “not give itself the right to interfere
in the private affairs of any Arab country, nor to dispute its right to restore its occupied
territories through armed struggle or through peaceful efforts insofar as that does not
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Syria’s military intervention in Jordan was very short—only three days. Syrian forces crossed
the border with Jordan on September 19 and retreated on September 22. Syria intervention was
condemned by other Arab states including President Nasser.
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clash with the higher Arab interests” (Barnett 1998: 193). Yet this did not prevent the
radical Arab states to expel Egypt from the Arab League in response to its peace
agreement with Israel.
During the 1980s, we also notice reaffirmation of state-territorial sovereignty and
non-intervention. The draft protocol of the 1985 Arab summit, for example, asserts that
Each Arab country will pledge to respect the system of rule in other Arab
countries, not to interfere in the domestic affairs of other Arab countries, and
refrain from assisting any elements that act against the sovereignty, independence,
and safety of the territory of any other Arab country. (Barnett 1998: 205)
The Arab League even decided to accept the new membership of Egypt in 1987
despite Egypt’s peace agreement with Israel. In his first speech at an Arab summit,
Egypt’s president Hosni Mubarak explicitly asserts the principle of non-intervention in
inter-Arab affairs:
We should be strictly committed to the principle of noninterference in the internal
affairs of each other, because the people of each country knows [sic] better than
others what realizes their own interests and are more capable of defining their
path at the internal level. It is unfeasible that we be enthusiastic in proposing this
principle in the sphere of international relations only to be incapable of honoring
it and consolidating it in our narrower pan-Arab sphere in which there are
common interests unavailable in the wider international circles (Barnett 1998:
207).
As a result of consolidation of state-territorial sovereignty, the normative structure
of the Arab state system became inter-subjective. The norms of sovereignty, which are
elements of the structure of Arab state system, became inter-subjective. In comparison,
the normative structure of the Arab state system between 1920s and 1960s was
characterized by competing norms of sovereignty rather than inter-subjective norms of
sovereignty. This change in the quality of the structure reduced structural causes of fear
and uncertainty as well as intervention driven by fear and uncertainty.
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This change in the normative structure of the Arab state system (inter-subjective
norm of sovereignty instead of competing norms of sovereignty) reflected the new
understandings among Arab leaders that “without an agreement on the basic rules of the
game Arab politics would only fragment further… Absent some general norms to guide
their relations in ways that might encourage cooperation, Arab states were likely to orient
their policies in disconnected directions (205). Regional “Order world be possible only
after collective meaning was established” (Adler and Hass, 1992: 368 in Barnett 289). To
contain inter-Arab conflicts and establish regional order, the Arab states established
“some rules of the game that were virtually synonymous with international society”
(Barnett 1998: 204).
During this period the norms of sovereignty in the Arab state system became
similar to the norms of sovereignty in international system. “Arab states once forwarded
pan-Arab ideals as the inspiration for cooperation; now they were looking to base their
cooperation on norms that were indistinguishable from those of international society,”
concluded Barnett his discussion of the political order in the Arab state system between
1967 and 1990 (204).
There are multiple causes of the simultaneous rise of state-territorial sovereignty
and decline of dynastic, national and geographical sovereignty in the Arab state system.
There is no one single magic cause of this significant change. As explicitly put by
Michael Barnett, “reductionism is to be avoided when searching for the ingredients of
macro historical change,” referring to the consolidation of state-territorial sovereignty in
the Arab states system (Barnett 1998: 209).
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Combination of domestic, regional and international forces caused this historical
transformation in the rules and practices of sovereignty in the Arab state system. Yet, I
argue that changes in norms and practices of sovereignty in international system as well
as change in the level of institutionalization in interstate borders in the Middle East
played a major role in consolidating state-territorial sovereignty and its associated role of
non-intervention in the Arab state system.
Sovereignty and Intervention in International System
Interestingly, the norms and practices of sovereignty in international society are
ignored in the literature on the consolidation of state-territorial sovereignty in the Arab
world. The relevant literature either ignores the international context utterly or addresses
only some aspects of the international context—anarchy, polarity, and great powers.
But the regional Arab state system is and has always been embedded not in
international anarchy but in an international society with distinctive norms and practices.
The international norms and practices of international society have considerable impact
on domestic and regional orders. They empower some states and constrain others in
regional systems. International norms also empower and/or constrain great powers
involvement in regional politics.
The importance of international system to state sovereignty is acknowledged by
numerous scholars from multiple disciplines. Charles Tilly, for example, argues that “the
later the state-making experience…the less likely…internal processes…are to provide an
adequate explanation for the formation, survival or growth of a state” (Tilly 1975: 46).
Evidently, the Arab states were among the latest new comers into the current
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international system, which requires serious consideration of the role of external
processes in the formation, survival, growth of the Arab state.
Anthony Giddens also emphasizes the importance of international system to state
sovereignty:
The sovereign power of modern states was not formed prior to their involvement
in the nation-state system, even in the European state system, but developed in
conjunction with it. Indeed, the sovereignty of the modern state was from the first
dependent upon the relations between states. (Giddens 2002: 61)89
David Strang also argues, “states are not individually empowered as sovereign actors…
who then establish relations with each other. Rather, notions of sovereignty imply a state
society founded on mutual recognition” (1991: 148). Similarly, Barkin and Cronin also
assert, “the sovereignty of the nation-state does not precede the development of the state
system” (1994:110).
The Middle East is by no means an exception. The Arab state system is anything
but independent sub-system as put by Fred Halliday:
Every phase of the international history of the Middle East, from the assault of
Catherine the Great in the 1760s and Napoleon’s occupation of Egypt in 1798, to
Iraq war of 2003, raises the issue of how, and how far, external factors determine
the politics and society of the region. The character and history of this external
involvement in the Middle East, and the impact of this on the Middle Eastern
politics and society, posed questions that go to the heart of analyzing the modern
international system and socio-economic character of the region. (2005: 162)
Changes in the norms and practices of sovereignty in the international system, I argue,
constituted the consolidation of state-territorial sovereignty and its associated role of non-
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Elsewhere Giddens also claims “‘International Relations’ are not connections set up between
preestablished states which could maintain their sovereignty without them: they are the basis
upon which nation-states exist at all” (1987: 263).

163

intervention in the Arab state system. The normative change in international system
constituted the shift to state-territorial sovereignty in the Arab state system.
The norms and practices of territorial sovereignty and non-intervention were still
far away from being universal inter-subjective norms in international society until late
1950s.90 But beginning in early 1960s the international society experienced major
transformation in the norms and practices of sovereignty, altering the international
structure within which the Arab states were embedded.
The international norm of state-territorial sovereignty and its associated role of
non-intervention entered the consolidation stage in early 1960s and reached their zenith
in mid 1970s, when state-territorial sovereignty and its associated role of nonintervention reached their highest level of inter-subjectivity—highest level of
institutionalization.
During this period, the international society experienced the following changes in
its normative structure:


Consolidation and globalization (universalization) of state-territorial sovereignty
as ordering principle of international society.



Consolidation and globalization of the role of non-intervention as prescribed by
territorial state sovereignty.



Consolidation and globalization of territorial integrity norm.
The significant transformation in the structure of international society is embodied

in both formal treaties as well international practices. Beginning in early 1960s, the

90

See Chapters 5 and 6.
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international society signed multiple treaties that explicitly endorsed state-territorial
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention as the new rules of the game in
international politics:


United Nations General Assembly Declarations on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 91 (1960). Article 6, in
particular, proclaims “any attempt at the partial or whole disruption of the
national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations” (Article 6). Article
7 also states that
all States observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
present Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference in the
internal affairs of all States, and their territorial integrity.



Organization of African Union Charter (1963). It proclaims strong support to
territorial integrity and non-intervention. Article 3, in particular, emphasizes that
member states “solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to “non-interference
in the internal affairs of States” and “Respect to the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence.”



Organization of African Union Cairo Declaration (1964) also provided support
to territorial integrity. It proclaims, “the borders of African states, on the day of
their independence, constitute a tangible reality.” It also “solemnly declare that all
Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their
achievement of national independence” (Jackson 1987: 524-525).

91

UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), December 14 1960.
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United Nations General Assembly Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention
in Domestic Affairs of States and Protection of their Independence and
Sovereignty (1965). 92 It states that
no state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state.
Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or
attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its
political, economic and cultural elements, are condemned. (Article 1)
Article 2 also proclaims that
no State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other
type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure from its
advantages of any kind. Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment,
finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed
towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere
in civil strife in another State.



UN Security Council Resolution 24293 (1967) explicitly emphasizes “the
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.”



United Nations General Assembly Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations94 (1970): It notes that “the Principle
Concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of
any state, in accordance with the Charter.” It proclaims that
no State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,
for any reason whatever, in the internal or the external affairs of any other

92

UN General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX), December 21, 1965.

93

UN Security Council Resolution 242 “the Situation in the Middle East,” November 22, 1967. It
was made after the 1967 war between Israel and Arab states.
94

UN General Assembly Resolution, 2625 (XXV), October 24, 1970.
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State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of
interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or
against its political, economic, and cultural elements, are in violation of
international law.
It also asserts
every State has the duty to refrain in its international relations from the
threat of use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State…Such a threat of use of force constitutes a
violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations and
she never be employed as a means of settling international issues.


United Nation General Assembly Declaration on the Strengthening of
International Security (1970)95 “solemnly reaffirms that states must fully respect
the sovereignty of other states.” It also “solemnly reaffirms that every State has
the duty to refrain from the threat of use of force against the territorial integrity
and political independence of any other state.”



Helsinki Final Act (1975) also asserts
the participating States will refrain from any intervention, direct or
indirect, individual or collective in the internal or external affairs falling
within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating State, regardless
of their mutual relations.
It also proclaims:
the participating States will respect each other’s sovereign equality and
individuality we well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by its
sovereignty, including in particular the right of every State to juridical
equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence.
In addition, “Frontiers can [only] be changed, in accordance with international
law, by peaceful means and by agreement.”96

95

UN General Assembly Resolution 2734 (XXV), December 16, 1970.

96

Signed on August 1, 1975.
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The above formal international treaties were accompanied and followed by
practices on the ground that embodied the changes in the status of state-territorial
sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention. The number of sovereign-territorial
states, for example, multiplied in 1960s. By the end of 1965 there were thirty-one
independent African states compared to only three countries in 1955 (Jackson 1987: 524525). The significant increase in the number of sovereign territorial states provided more
international support to sovereign territorial states in the Arab world. For, “massive
decolonization expanded the scope of the international community of mutually
recognizing states” (Strang 1991: 158-159).97
In addition to the globalization of state-territorial sovereignty, the norm of
territorial integrity also entered its highest level of the acceptance stage in 1960s and it
reached the highest level of institutionalization stage in 1976 as embodied in international
practices (Zacher 2001: 237). This is another major change in international society
within which the Arab states were embedded.
At the same time, international society also experienced significant qualitative
and quantitative change in the practices of intervention. The international society
experienced major decline in the number of acts of military interventions by super
powers and great powers. According to Tillemma’s data set on overt military
intervention, secondary great powers (France, UK, and China) intervened only 27 times
97

Similarly, Hendrik Spruyt explains the rise of territorial sovereign state in the European system
by the mutual empowerment of international system. The rise of territorial-sovereignty states
advanced “by the process of mutual empowerment. Sovereign actors only recognize particular
types of actors as legitimate players in the international system. Because the Hanseatic system of
rule proved to be incompatible with that of territorially defined states…it was not considered to
be a legitimate players in international relations” (In Hall: 63-64).
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between November 1965 and December 1985, compared to 95 military interventions
between September 1945 and October 1965. While Super powers (U.S and USSR)
intervened 13 times between September 1945 and October 1965, they conduct only 11
military interventions between November 1965 and December 1985 (1989: 185).
The frequency of great powers’ military interventions in the Middle East
significantly declined as well. According to Pearson and Baumann, military interventions
by major powers in the Middle East declined from 18 times in 1950s, to 4 in the 1960s
and only 3 in the 1970s (1983: 199-200).
Hedley Bull also identifies changes in both the quantity and type of interventions.
“There has emerged a new climate of international legitimacy unfavorable to
intervention… there has been a profound change in our moral and legal notions of the
justification of intervention” (Bull 1984: 146). “As the legal and political obstacles to the
older forms of intervention have become more serious, forcible intervention has tended to
give place to non-forcible, direct to indirect, and open to clandestine” (183).
The Western powers have substituted non-forcible forms of interference for
forcible ones, indirect intervention for direct, and clandestine or secret methods of
intervention for overt or open ones…The early 1970s is one period that provide a
good deal of evidence that such a change of style and method was taking place.
(150-151)
The new modes of intervention, identified by Bull, reflect significant change in
the norms of sovereignty because the new methods of intervention are much less
effective than the former methods of intervention. “It would not be true to say that the
new methods left the interveners in as dominant a position as they had been before, when
the old methods could still be used effectively.” Economic intervention, indirect

169

intervention and clandestine interventions are not as effective as the old methods of
intervention (152).
Developing countries forcibly advocated for the above changes in the norms and
practices of state-territorial sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention, which
helped to universalize these norms (Bull 1984, Jackson 1987, Zacher 2001). Furthermore,
the consolidation of the above norms took place in spite of Cold War divisions. “Despite
great differences in ideology and domestic institutions, the United States, the Soviet
Union, and the European states rarely supported secessionist movements either in Europe
or in the Third World” (Barkin and Cronin 1994: 125).
The practices of the United Nations also embodied and reified the above changes
in the norms of sovereignty. “The way that the United Nations provided a framework for
decolonization, especially Africa and Asia, helped to couple sovereignty with territorial
integrity, and the supposed “norm of sovereignty-as-territorial-integrity” has been
reinforced continually since” (Elden 2009: 145). Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore
also find that “the UN encouraged the acceptance of the norm of sovereignty-as–
territorial Integrity through resolutions, monitoring devices, commissions, and one
famous peacekeeping episode in the Congo in the 1960s” (1993: 713). Elsewhere Barnett
also asserts the role of the United Nations in globalizing sovereignty. “The principal
purpose of the United Nations was to facilitate the transition from the era of empires to
the era of sovereignty—to globalize and universalize sovereignty as the basis of relations
between states” (Barnett 2010: 49-50). Yet Barnett still excludes the role of United
Nations in his account on the consolidation of sovereignty in the Arab world.
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Ignoring the role of international society in consolidating state-territorial
sovereignty in the Arab World is particularly striking given the consensus in IR literature
on the role of international organizations in consolidating state-territorial sovereignty in
Africa. “International organizations have served as “post imperial ordering devices” for
the new African states, in effect freezing them in their inherited colonial jurisdictions and
blocking any post-independence movement toward self-determination” (Jackson and
Rosberg 1982: 21). It is odd that there is a consensus on the role of international
institutions and organizations on consolidating state-territorial sovereignty in Africa but
the very same international institutions and organizations are utterly ignored in the
literature on sovereignty in the Middle East.
New Norms of Sovereignty; New International Structure
The new highly-institutionalized norms of state-territorial sovereignty, territorial
integrity and non-intervention in 1960s and 1970s are the new international structure
within which the Arab states were embedded. The new international structure that
emerged in 1960s is very different from its predecessors that structured international
system from 1922 to late 1950s.
The post 1960s international norms are the new international structure within
which state-territorial sovereignty and its role of non-intervention became the hegemonic
rules of the game in the Arab state system. This is the new international structure within
which Egypt distanced itself from the roles and practices of national sovereignty; and this
is the new international structure within which Iraq and Syria distanced themselves from
the roles and practices of geographical sovereignty.
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It is not just mere coincidence that “by 1964 the rules of the game in Arab politics
begun to shift toward norms of Arabism that were consistent with sovereignty,” wrote
Michael Barnett, referring to state-territorial sovereignty (Barnett 1998: 122). It is not just
mere coincidence that all the alternative accounts choose 1960s and/or 1970s as a turning
point in the consolidation of territorial-state sovereignty and non-intervention in the
Middle East.
The consolidation of state-territorial sovereignty, territorial integrity and nonintervention in international system, I argue, contributed to the consolidation of these
very same norms in the Arab state system. For, the new international norms constituted a
new international structure, with distinctive constraints and opportunities. The new
international norms and practices of sovereignty impose new structural constraints and
opportunities that were absent in the past. The new international norms empowered some
states while constrained others in the Arab state system; the new international norms
legitimized some practices and delegitimized others; and the new international norms
constrain and enable the type of involvement of great powers in the Middle East. The
new international norms constituted what is thinkable and unthinkable, possible and
impossible in international and regional politics.98
To illustrate the importance of post 1960s international norms of sovereignty on
the regional Arab state system, I will compare them with historical norms of sovereignty.
98

The compatible/incompatible relation between regional and international norms is a significant
source of power. “Norms that fit logically with other powerful norms are more likely to become
persuasive and to shape behavior . . . Mutually reinforcing and logically consistent norms appear
to be harder to attack and to have advantage in the normative contestations that occur in social
life. In this sense, logic internal to norms themselves shapes their development and, consequently,
shapes social change” (Finnemore 2003: 71).
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This comparison will clearly shows that “changes in the content and understanding of
sovereignty can greatly affect the ways in which states are constrained or enabled to act
in their international relations” (Barkin and Cronin 1994:110).
State-Territorial Sovereignty vs. National Sovereignty
International systems that are based upon state-territorial sovereignty are very
different from international system of national sovereignty. Historically, there has been
tension between
state sovereignty, which stresses the link between sovereign authority and a
defined territory, and national sovereignty, which emphasizes a link between
sovereign authority and a defined population. The two types fundamentally differ
in the source of their legitimation as independent entities, thereby altering the
environment through which states relate to each other. During periods when
international norms legitimize state rather than national sovereignty, the
international community and its institutions will tend to defend the rights of
established states against nationalist claims of domestic ethnic groups. On the
other hand, when the norms of the international order favor national over state
sovereignty, the international community will be more sympathetic to pleas for
national self-determination, often at the expense of established states (Barkin
and Cronin 1994: 108).
The status of interstate borders is international system of state-territorial sovereignty is
also very different from the status of interstate borders in international system of national
sovereignty:
Should the state emphasis predominate in the understanding of sovereignty over
national emphasis, then international borders will be seen as territorially
determined, and the international community can be expected to defend the
interests of established states over nationalist aspirations. On the other hand,
should the nationals emphasis predominate, then states will be seen as tied to
specifically defined populations and territorially malleable to suit the evolution of
nations. The international community will then be more sympathetic to nationalist
claims, often at the expense of established states (Barkin and Cronin 1994: 113114).
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Following World War I, the international society adopted national sovereignty as
its ordering principle but after World War II, and particularly after 1960, international
society an adopted state-territorial sovereignty as its ordering principle. The change from
national sovereignty to state sovereignty as ordering principle of international system
reflected the new international understandings that nationalism was the primary cause of
World War II because nationalism provided justifications for German occupations of
Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, and nationalism was one of most objectionable
aspects of the fascist ideology (122).
Viewing nationalism as the cause of World War II, the international society
affirmed the self-determination of people but not of nations or states. From the
perspective of post-World War II international society, “self-determination does not
apply to independent countries, for whom territorial integrity overrides claims that
individual peoples might make” (Elden 2009: 146). The change from national to stateterritorial sovereignty is also embodied in practices. “It is clear in practice that territorial
integrity has regularly and usually successfully been asserted as dominant [over selfdetermination]…because sovereignty has been taken to apply to state rather than
peoples” (Elden 2009: 166).
The new international understanding of sovereignty as state-territorial sovereignty
rather than national sovereignty has significantly affected the practices of drawing interstate borders. “The intersubjective understanding of sovereignty that state borders had a
legitimacy apart from national groups had a marked effect on the patterns of borders in
Europe following the war.” The German nation, for example, was divided into two
states. Furthermore, “instead of expanding the borders of the German state to encompass
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ethnic Germans in Eastern Europe, millions of ethnic Germans were evicted en masse
from Poland and Czechoslovakia so that their borders with Germany would no longer be
threatened.” “Many borders in Eastern Europe, such as those between the Soviet Union
and Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania, were altered in ways that were politically
convenient but ethnically non-representative.” In the same vein, Korean and Vietnamese
nations were also divided into two states and decolonization in Africa also did not
proceed along nationalist lines (124). Thus it is obvious that the “division of the Arab
nation” into territorial states was not an exception to the practices of international society
that adopted state-territorial sovereignty as its ordering principles.
This is the international society within which state-territorial sovereignty become
the hegemonic rules of the game in the Arab state system. This is the international society
within which Egypt, Iraq, Syria and the Hashemite distanced themselves from national,
geographical and dynastic sovereignty respectively. It is obvious that the post 1960s
international society is much less tolerant of the practices of dynastic, national and
geographical sovereignty than previous international societies.
The international society, which adopted state-territorial sovereignty,
delegitimized Egypt’s practices of national sovereignty and its legitimizing principle of
national self-determination. Egypt’s practices of national sovereignty, legitimized by
nationalism, were perceived as a threat to international peace and stability. For, the
international society defined international peace and stability in terms of state-territorial
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sovereignty, which “clearly establishes the priority of the integrity of established state
borders over the integrity of national or nationalist groups” (Barkin and Cronin 123).99
The international society, whose ordering principle state-territorial sovereignty,
also rejected Egypt’s legitimizing principle of national self-determination because
according to the new norm of sovereignty, “self-determination does not apply to
independent countries, for whom territorial integrity overrides claims that individual
peoples might make” (Elden 2009: 146).
Similarly, the new norms of state-territorial sovereignty delegitimized Iraq
sovereign claims over Kuwait and Syria sovereign claims over Lebanon. For, Syria and
Iraq practices were a threat to territorial integrity norm. Territorial integrity norm is not a
natural feature of international system; it is a new norm that entered its acceptance stage
in early 1960s and reach its high level of institutionalization in mid 1970s (Zacher 2001).
International society favored territorial integrity over redrawing international borders.
For, “territorial integrity has long been asserted as a stabilizing factor… the status quo,
for all its flaws, is preferred over the disorderliness that would likely result from
wholesale redrawing of boundaries” (Elden 2009: 143).
Had the international society adopted national sovereignty instead of stateterritorial sovereignty as its ordering principle, Egypt would face more enabling and less
constraining international normative structure. Had international society adopted national
99

This is very different from post World War I international society that sought international
justice. For example, the Covenant of the League of Nations stipulates that “the members of the
League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the
maintenance of right and justice” (article 15, paragraph 7). This reference to right and justice as
legitimate basis for state actions is in marked contrast to the emphasis on international peace and
security in the Charter of the UN” (Barkin and Cronin 124).
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sovereignty, the interstate borders in the Arab state system would be very different. Had
international society not adopted state-territorial sovereignty, Iraq and Syria receive less
opposition from international society.
The international norms of state-territorial sovereignty protected the weak Arab
states from powerful neighbors. They protected Kuwait from Iraq; they also protected
Lebanon from Syria; they protected Syria and Saudi Arabia from the Hasehmite dynasty,
and they also protected the Arab monarchies from Nasser. The failed state of Lebanon
would not survive without the international norm of state-territorial sovereignty;100 the
small state of Kuwait would not survive without the protection provided by international
norm of state-territorial sovereignty. The international norms of state-territorial
sovereignty also provided authority, legitimacy and justification to the United Nations
and great powers to intervene in the Middle East to protect the weak Arab states from
their stronger neighbors as the British intervention in Kuwait in 1961.
In other words, the international norms of state-territorial sovereignty imposed
structural obstacles against the practices of national sovereignty, dynastic sovereignty and
geographical sovereignty in the Arab state system. The international norm of stateterritorial sovereignty not only delegitimized the mere acts of intervention but they also
made impossible the social purposes behind the acts of intervention. By making
impossible the social purposes associated with national, dynastic and geographical
sovereignty, the international norms also diminished the utility of the acts of intervention
that sought to achieve these social purposes. In other words, international society
100

Similarly, Jackson and Rosberg (1982) also explain the survival of weak African states by the
international norms of sovereignty.
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delegitimizes both the practices of intervention and the purposes of the acts of
intervention.
The above discussion aimed to denaturalize and historicize the international
norms of state-territorial sovereignty to show their distinctive effects on the consolidation
of state-territorial sovereignty and its associated roles of intervention and nonintervention in the Arab state system. This task cannot be done if we adopt the
mainstream IR account of sovereignty that impose a timeless, fixed meaning of
sovereignty instead of exploring the historical practices of sovereignty. The above
counter factual analysis makes explicit the impact of international norms on political
order in the regional Arab state system.101 Let’s turn to the third explanatory variable,
inter-state borders in the Arab state system.
Sovereignty’s Complementary Institution: Inter-State Border in the Arab
State System
During this period, we also notice more institutionalization of inter-state borders
in the Arab state system, comparing to the previous two periods discussed in Chapters
Five and Six.
The higher-level institutionalization of inter-state borders also contributed to the
decline in the practices of intervention. For, high level of institutionalization of inter-state
border reduces mutual vulnerability, insecurity, uncertainty, and fear between
neighboring states as well as intervention driven by fear and uncertainty. It also clarifies
the distinction between territorial jurisdictions of supreme authority between neighboring
101

Jackson and Rosberg (1982) also utilize counter-factual analysis to explain the impact of
international norms of sovereignty on the survival of weak African states.
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states. Equally important, inter-state borders helped the ruling Arab regimes to
consolidate territorial identity, on the expense of transnational and other non-territorial
identities, which also reduced the political and security interdependence between the
Arab states.
Prominent scholars have acknowledged the change in the level of
institutionalization of inter-state borders in the Arab state system. Fouad Ajami wrote in
1978 that
the boundaries of Arab states have been around now for nearly six decades. It is
not their existence which is novel, but their power and legitimacy—the power (as
much as that power exists in the modern state system) to keep pan-Arab claims at
bay and effectively to claim the loyalty of those within. They are no longer as
“illusory and permeable” as they used to be. (1978: 365)
Discussing the decades between 1977 and 1987, Ghassan Salame also observes the
higher level of institutionalization of inter-state borders. He notices what he calls the
“amazing and widespread stability” in the Arab states system (1987: 345). “The various
Arab regimes are first protected by the triumph of geography. No sweeping trends such
as the Nasserite one are emerging. Borders have become much less permeable to ideas
originating in other Arab countries” (1987: 345).
Even Saddam Hussein, President of Iraq and one of the most radical Arab leaders
acknowledges the new power of inter-state borders. In a revealing speech in 1982 he
claims:
Arab unity can only take place after a clear demarcation of borders between all
countries . . . Arab unity must not take place through the elimination of the local
and national characteristics of any Arab country . . . The question of linking unity
to the removal of boundaries is no longer acceptable to present Arab mentality. It
could have been acceptable 10 or 20 years ago. We have to take into
consideration the change which the Arab mind and psyche have undergone. We
must see the world as it is. Any Arab would have wished to see the Arab nation as
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one state . . . But these are sheer dreams. The Arab reality is that the Arabs are
now 22 states, and we have to behave accordingly. Therefore unity must not be
imposed, but must be achieved through common fraternal opinion. Unity must
give strength to its partners, not cancel their national identity. (quoted in Drysdale
and Blake 1985: 257)
Conclusion
The practices of intervention declined in the Arab state system because of
transformation in the norms of sovereignty in the Arab state system and international
system. The consolidation of state-territorial sovereignty and its associated role of nonintervention in both Arab state system and international system constituted the decline in
the practices of intervention in the Arab state system.
In addition, for the first time since its formation, the structure of the Arab state
system is composed of shared inter-subjective norms of sovereignty instead of conflicting
norms of sovereignty. This change in the normative structure reduced the level of fear
and uncertainty in the system, as well as interventions driven by fear and uncertainty.
Finally, the inter-state border became more institutionalized during this period, compared
to the previous ones, which also contributed to the decline in the practices of intervention.
Yet this is not the end of history. The revival of the acts of intervention in the
Arab state system since the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011 shows that the Arab
state system is entering a new era in which the principle of state-territorial sovereignty
and its associated role of non-intervention are seriously contested. This change in stateterritorial sovereignty and non-intervention in the Arab state system is constituted by
transformation in the norms of sovereignty in the international system as well as changes
in territoriality (inter-state borders).
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION: THE ARAB SPRING, SOVEREIGNTY AND
INTERVENTION
Sovereignty and Intervention in the Arab State System
Since the eruption of the popular uprisings in the Arab world in 2011, the Arab
state system has been experiencing a resurrection in the practices of external intervention.
We also notice change in the type of intervention. For the first time in their history,
individual Arab states and the Arab League conduct external interventions in domestic
affairs of Arab states justified by humanitarian causes.
In response to its mass atrocities against Libyan citizens, the Arab League
suspended Qaddafi’s Libya from the regional organization in February 22, 2011. A few
months later, in August 2011, the Arab League turned over the Libya’s seat to the
National Transitional Council (NTC), effectively recognizing the rebel body as the
legitimate authority in Libya.
In a special meeting in Cairo on March 12, 2011, the Arab League also called
upon the United Nation Security Council to impose a no fly zone over Libya. The Arab
League resolution proclaims that Gadhafi’s government had “lost its sovereignty” and
asked the “United Nations to shoulder its responsibility—to impose a no-fly zone over
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the movement of Libyan military planes and to create safe zones in the places vulnerable
to airstrikes”(Huffington Post website).102 All 22 Arab states supported the decision
except Syria and Algeria.
The Arab League also strongly supported the United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1973 on March 17, 2011 authorizing “all necessary measures” “to protect
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab
Jumahiriya.” The resolution also imposed a no-fly zone over Libya “to protect civilians”
(UN Website).103 Several Arab states including Jordan, UAE, and Qatar took part of
NATO military operations in Libya authorized by UNSC 1973 resolution. Even the Arab
public opinion welcomed the international intervention in Libya despite the memory of
the “coalition of the willing” invasion in Iraq in 2003, which was partly legitimated on
humanitarian grounds.
The Arab League has adopted similar policies towards Syria. Following Bashar
Assad regime’s massive human rights violations, the Arab League expelled Assad’s Syria
from the regional organization on November 12, 2011. In the same resolution, the Arab
League asked all its members to withdraw their ambassadors from Damascus. The Arab
League also imposed political and economic sanctions against the Syrian regime. Only
Yemen and Lebanon opposed the resolution while Iraq abstained.
The Arab League even asked the United Nations Security Council to send a
peacekeeping mission into Syria. In a resolution issued on February 12, 2012, the League
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"ask the UN Security Council to issue a decision on the formation of a joint UN-Arab
peacekeeping force to oversee the implementation of a ceasefire" (BBC).104 The
resolution also urged the League members to “halt all forms of diplomatic cooperation”
with the Syrian government. The resolution also states that the league supported “opening
channels of communication with the Syrian opposition and providing all forms of
political and financial support to it” (New York Times).105
In November 2012, both the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council
recognize the Syrian opposition as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people.
“The states of the council announce recognizing the National Coalition for the Forces of
the Syrian Revolution and Opposition... as the legitimate representative of the brotherly
Syrian people,” GCC chief Abdullatif al-Zayani said in a statement (Alarabiya).106 And
on March 2013, the Arab League granted the Arab League seat to the Syrian opposition
coalition.107 In addition, individual Arab states, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Jordan,
have provided military support to the Syrian opposition.
The above practices of intervention, legitimated on humanitarian grounds, are
unprecedented in the Arab state system. For the first time, the Arab League intervenes in
internal affairs of member state in response to massive human rights violations against its
citizens. For the first time, the Arab League suspends member states for domestic human
104
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rights violations. For the first time, the Arab League recognizes opposition groups as
legitimate sovereign instead of the ruling regimes. For the first time, the Arab League
called for international intervention in internal affairs of an Arab state.
In the past, the Arab state system never experience intervention justified by
humanitarian causes. In 1982 the Assad regime conducted a massacre in the city of
Hama, killing dozens of thousands of people, but the reaction of the Arab states was
nothing comparing to the current response. The regime of Saddam Hussein also
conducted massive atrocities against Kurds and Shia in Iraq but the Arab reaction was
also passive. In reaction to Black September in 1970s, when the Jordanian regime killed
thousands of Palestinians, the Arab states reaction was actually based on respect to stateterritorial sovereignty.
The current revival in the practices of intervention and their justification by
humanitarian causes embody significant change in the inter-subjective understandings of
sovereignty in the Arab state system. Accordingly, state-territorial sovereignty is still the
dominant institution of sovereignty in the Arab state system. But absolute nonintervention is no longer the hegemonic rule of the game in the Arab state system.
According to the new understanding of sovereignty, the state loses it right of nonintervention if it conducts massive human rights violations against its citizens.
Contingent sovereignty, rather than absolute sovereignty, is the new emerging
norm of sovereignty in the Arab state system. The state loses its right of absolute nonintervention only if it conducts massive human rights violations. The conditions of
external intervention are restricted only to extreme cases of massive human rights
violations as the cases of Syria and Libya illustrated.
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This change in sovereignty partly explains the differences in the Arab League
strong reactions to Libya and Syria on the one hand and its relatively mild reaction to
Egypt, Bahrain and Tunisia on the other. This difference in intervention is partly
explained by the severity of human rights violations. According to the new understanding
of sovereignty, the Arab League intervenes only in cases with severe human rights
violations as in the cases of Libya and Syria. But Egypt, Tunisia and Bahrain experienced
much less human rights violations than Syria and Libya.
While there have been changes in the practices of intervention, the principle of
territorial integrity is still strong in the Arab state system. There is a strong consensus
between Arab states on the legitimacy of territorial integrity. Despite the rise of
sectarianism in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria and calls for redrawing the borders of the region
based on sectarian lines, the Arab League still strongly support the territorial integrity
norm. Since the eruption of the Arab Spring, the Arab League and the Arab states have
repeatedly emphasized their strong respect to territorial integrity of all Arab states. All
the Arab League initiatives to solve the civil wars in Iraq, Syria and Libya were based in
the principle of territorial integrity.
It is important to emphasize that above regional changes in sovereignty are still in
their emerging stage and has yet to reach high level of institutionalization. Regional and
international forces are competing, through practices, on redefining the norms of
sovereignty in the Arab state system. It is ongoing process and still too early to impose a
definite conclusion on the new norms of sovereignty in the Arab state system. But it is
safe to assert the end of absolute non-intervention in the Arab state system.
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Sovereignty and Intervention in International System
The revival of the practices of intervention in the Arab state system takes place
within a new international normative structure. The regional changes in sovereignty and
intervention are not independent from but rather constituted by the international changes
in sovereignty and intervention.
The international norms of sovereignty have been redefined since the end of the
Cold War. Former U.N. secretary general Kofi Annan asserts in 1999, “State sovereignty,
in its most basic sense, is being redefined—not least by the forces of globalization and
international co-operation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the
service of their people, and not vice versa” (Economist). In the same year the secretary
general spoke of “the overriding right of people in distress to receive help… we will not,
and we cannot, accept a situation where people are brutalized behind national
boundaries” (Dobus 2012: 22).
According to the new international understanding, sovereignty is no longer
absolute. “Sovereignty no longer exclusively protects States from foreign interference; it
is a charge of responsibility where States are accountable for the welfare of their
people”(UN Website).108 Instead of absolute sovereignty, the United Nations endorsed
the principle of “sovereignty as responsibility” (Deng 1993, 1995; Deng et al 1996) and
“Responsibility to Protect.” The change in the norms of sovereignty is also embodied in
the practices of humanitarian intervention (Wheeler 2003).
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The United Nations endorsed the Responsibility to Protect in 2005 UN World
Summit109 (paragraphs 138-140 of the Outcome Document).110 The three pillars of R2P
are the following:
1) The State carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their
incitement;
2) The international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist
States in fulfilling this responsibility;
3) The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate
diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect populations from these
crimes. If a State is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the
international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect
populations, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” (UN
Website).
The international intervention in Libya was in fact an implementation of the
principle of “Responsibility to Protect” as clearly mentioned in UNSC resolution 1973.
While international military intervention, justified by R2P, did not take place in Syria, the
new norms of sovereignty constituted significant international political and economic
interventions against Assad regime for its failure to protect the Syrian citizens from mass
atrocities (Dunne 2013).
The Arab Spring clearly shows that international norms of sovereignty affect not
only inter-state relations but also state-society relations. The international norms of
sovereignty did not justify any act of external support to help popular uprisings for
human rights and democracy between 1950s and 1980s. Conversely, the current norms of
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sovereignty provide significant support to domestic campaigns for democracy and human
rights (Barnett 2010; Clark 2009; Mayall 2000).
In 19th century, European Concert of Great powers justified military interventions
into domestic affairs of European states to repress liberalism and restore monarchy. The
acts of military intervention to repress liberalism and protect monarchies, which were
common in the first half of 19th century, are unthinkable today (Finnemore 2003: 108124).
It is not merely a coincidence that the popular uprisings for democracy in the
Arab countries took place within a particular international system that place an important
value on “popular sovereignty” and “sovereignty as responsibility” rather than absolute
sovereignty. It is not merely a coincidence that the Arab popular uprisings did not take
place in international system dominated by absolute sovereignty such as the international
system in 1950s and 1960s. The ongoing reactions of international community to the
mass atrocities in Syria is not ideal but it is much more aggressive comparing to the
international passive response to the mass atrocities that were conducted by the same AlAssad regime in the city of Hama in 1982.
The importance of international norms to domestic struggles against supreme
authority is also evidenced in great power responses. The United States and England
intervened militarily in Lebanon, Kuwait and Jordan to support the ruling elites and
monarchies there in 1950s and 1960s. But the U.S. and England could not do the same to
protect their current ruling allies such as Mubarak in Egypt or Ben Ali in Tunisia. The
difference in international reactions now and then to internal resistance to supreme
authority is largely explained here by changes in the dominant norms of sovereignty in
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international system rather than changes in polarity and distribution of power in
international system.111 International norms of sovereignty constrain not only small states
but also great powers and superpowers.
Sovereignty’s Complementary Institution: Inter-State Borders in the Arab State
System
The inter-state borders in the Arab state system are no longer as effective in
controlling diffusion of ideas across borders as in the past. “Gone are the days when
Arab regimes monopolized access to information and determined what their public saw in
television and read in the print” (Brynen, Moore, Salloukh and Zahar 2012: 233).
Globalization (new communication technologies) lowered the effectiveness of inter-state
borders. As a result it increased the interdependence among Arab states. This strategic
interdependence and vulnerability, caused by communication technologies, constituted at
least some of the causes of the current acts of intervention in the Arab state system.
Conclusion
This research argues that changes in the regional and international norms of
sovereignty as well as changes in level of institutionalization of borders constituted the
significant variation in the practices of intervention in the Arab state system from the fall
of the Ottoman Empire to the present.
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In the same vein, the type of sovereignty in the international system also influences the
international reactions to military coups. International society’s norms of sovereignty did not
perceive military coups as illegitimate political act in 1950s and 1960s. There were no
international political or economic sanctions against states that experience military coups in
1950s and 1960s. Conversely, the current international norms of sovereignty perceive military
coups as illegitimate and ought to be punished by economic and political sanctions. The current
illegitimacy of military coups is sanctioned in regional and international organizations including
United Nations (UN), Organization of African Union (OAU) and Organization of American
States (OAS).
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Sovereign-territorial states are often assumed and taken for granted in the
International Relations and Middle East area studies. Instead, this dissertation
problematizes both the sovereignty and territoriality of the Arab state. Both comparative
politics and international relations accounts of the Middle East would benefit
significantly if they allow sovereignty and territoriality to be variable instead of fixed and
static concepts. Studying the relations between sovereignty, territoriality and intervention
are important not only for understanding the Arab Spring but also for better
understanding of the impact of globalization on the state in the international system.
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